When Exhaustion Becomes a Political Position:

Lebanese Between Rejecting Israel and Accepting Negotiations

 

By Jawad Adra

The Lebanese community cannot be understood through sectarian identity alone. Collective exhaustion, war, fear, and a deep loss of confidence in the future are reshaping political attitudes, even when those attitudes appear contradictory on the surface.

Lebanese people are exhausted. They have lost their savings, while nearly half the population lives without health coverage amid the collapse of basic services such as electricity, water, and public transportation. Public education has deteriorated, unemployment has risen, and emigration continues unabated. Then came the latest war, adding a new layer of fear to an already exhausted society. It is therefore hardly surprising that so many Lebanese now say: “We are tired” and “We cannot take this anymore.”

What is striking, however, is that the community that suffered the most was also the one most opposed to direct talks or normalization with Israel. According to the poll, 92.9% of Shiites opposed direct negotiations, rising to 94.3% when the issue became normalization, and to 96% when the idea of opening an Israeli embassy in Beirut was raised.

By contrast, the Druze community appeared to be the most supportive of direct negotiations, normalization, and the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut. Christian communities, particularly Maronites and Orthodox Christians, also showed relatively high levels of support for direct negotiations, while nearly half of Sunni respondents supported this option as well, even though many still opposed any direct contact between the Lebanese prime minister and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Yet the significance of this poll lies not only in measuring opinions, but in revealing the deep contradictions within Lebanese society itself. Many Lebanese who doubt the possibility of a “just peace,” or who believe Israel would have launched war regardless of the pretext, or expect that Israel will fully withdraw from all territories it has occupied in Lebanon, simultaneously support direct negotiations or even a formal peace agreement. It is as though part of Lebanese society is no longer searching for conviction as much as it is searching for an escape from permanent exhaustion.

Even more revealing is how sharply today’s results differ from those of the August 2025 poll. In less than a year, support for a peace agreement with Israel rose from 25% to nearly 49%, while support for normalization increased from 13.2% to more than 30%. Such rapid shifts raise a fundamental question: do political convictions truly change so quickly, or do exhausted societies become more willing to embrace options they once rejected?

At this point, sectarian identity alone becomes an insufficient explanation. Certainly, sectarian belonging still plays a major role in shaping political attitudes, but the results also point to more complex political, psychological, and social dynamics. Within every sect there were groups whose positions contradicted the dominant mood of their own community, suggesting that Lebanon cannot be understood solely through its traditional sectarian divisions.

It is also useful to read these results through the lens of generations rather than sects alone. Younger age groups showed stronger opposition to negotiations, normalization, and the opening of an Israeli embassy, while support gradually increased with age, reaching its highest levels among those over seventy.

This raises another important question: does the memory of war push older generations toward pragmatism and compromise, while younger generations gravitate toward more rigid or principled positions? Or are younger Lebanese, precisely because they already feel deprived of a future, less willing to make what they see as moral or sovereign concessions?

In any case, it is clear that Lebanese society is divided, but these divisions are neither simple nor one-dimensional. They are shaped by a mixture of sectarian identity, politics, fear, historical experience, collective exhaustion, and a deep loss of trust in the state, in the world, and even in the possibility of justice itself.

For that reason, the value of this poll does not lie in using it to condemn people or morally discipline them, but rather in trying to understand them. Exhausted societies do not think the same way stable societies do, and people living with fear, anxiety, and collapse may simultaneously hold positions that appear contradictory, yet remain entirely consistent with their profound sense of exhaustion.

Perhaps the deeper importance of these findings is that they open the door to larger questions about the future of Lebanon’s political and party system, and whether the country’s divisions will remain trapped within sectarian structures or gradually re-emerge through new political alignments that transcend the traditional framework Lebanon has known for decades. For polls do not merely measure opinions; sometimes, they measure the level of exhaustion that precedes major transformations.

 

The survey was conducted face-to-face from April 28 to May 5, 2026, and included 2,000 respondents proportionally distributed across various regions and sects.

The margin of error was ±3.2, and the refusal rate reached 26%.

The sample was evenly distributed between males and females (1,000 surveys for each gender).

The respondents were distributed by confession as follows: 21.3% Maronites, 7.2% Orthodox, 4.7% Catholics, 3.4% Armenian Orthodox/Catholic, 27.9% Sunnis, 27.9% Shiites, 5.7% Druze, 0.9% Alawites, and 1% Christian minorities.

In light of regional shifts, security and political tensions, and the war Israel is waging against Lebanon, this survey aims to monitor Lebanese public opinion trends regarding issues of war and peace, the relationship with Israel, the role of Hezbollah, the future of its weapons, as well as the options available to the Lebanese state in the upcoming phase.

The results reveal clear and deep divergences among the various components of Lebanese society, not only on a sectarian level, but also across different generations, with younger age groups displaying approaches that are sometimes radically different from older age groups. The results also reflect the traditional Lebanese divide between those who link Lebanon’s security to resistance and conflict with Israel, and those who believe that Lebanon’s interest lies in neutrality, political settlements, or redefining the relationship with Israel within a broader regional and international framework.

The significance of these findings is not limited to measuring current popular sentiment, but also contributes to understanding the gradual shifts taking place in Lebanese public opinion regarding issues that were previously considered almost settled or highly sensitive in public discourse. As such, this survey serves as an important indicator of the nature of existing divisions, and of potential changes in the political and security priorities of the Lebanese people in the coming phase.