By Jawad Adra

The Full Presentation

 

The Lebanese community cannot be understood through sectarian identity alone. Collective exhaustion, war, fear, and a deep loss of confidence in the future are reshaping political attitudes, even when those attitudes appear contradictory on the surface.

 

Lebanese people are exhausted. They have lost their savings, while nearly half the population lives without health coverage amid the collapse of basic services such as electricity, water, and public transportation. Public education has deteriorated, unemployment has risen, and emigration continues unabated. Then came the latest war, adding a new layer of fear to an already exhausted society. It is therefore hardly surprising that so many Lebanese now say: “We are tired” and “We cannot take this anymore.”

 

What is striking, however, is that the community that suffered the most was also the one most opposed to direct talks or normalization with Israel. According to the poll, 92.9% of Shiites opposed direct negotiations, rising to 94.3% when the issue became normalization, and to 96% when the idea of opening an Israeli embassy in Beirut was raised.

 

By contrast, the Druze community appeared to be the most supportive of direct negotiations, normalization, and the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut. Christian communities, particularly Maronites and Orthodox Christians, also showed relatively high levels of support for direct negotiations, while nearly half of Sunni respondents supported this option as well, even though many still opposed any direct contact between the Lebanese prime minister and Benjamin Netanyahu.

 

Yet the significance of this poll lies not only in measuring opinions, but in revealing the deep contradictions within Lebanese society itself. Many Lebanese who doubt the possibility of a “just peace,” or who believe Israel would have launched war regardless of the pretext, or expect that Israel will fully withdraw from all territories it has occupied in Lebanon, simultaneously support direct negotiations or even a formal peace agreement. It is as though part of Lebanese society is no longer searching for conviction as much as it is searching for an escape from permanent exhaustion.

 

Even more revealing is how sharply today’s results differ from those of the August 2025 poll. In less than a year, support for a peace agreement with Israel rose from 25% to nearly 49%, while support for normalization increased from 13.2% to more than 30%. Such rapid shifts raise a fundamental question: do political convictions truly change so quickly, or do exhausted societies become more willing to embrace options they once rejected?

 

At this point, sectarian identity alone becomes an insufficient explanation. Certainly, sectarian belonging still plays a major role in shaping political attitudes, but the results also point to more complex political, psychological, and social dynamics. Within every sect there were groups whose positions contradicted the dominant mood of their own community, suggesting that Lebanon cannot be understood solely through its traditional sectarian divisions.

It is also useful to read these results through the lens of generations rather than sects alone. Younger age groups showed stronger opposition to negotiations, normalization, and the opening of an Israeli embassy, while support gradually increased with age, reaching its highest levels among those over seventy.

 

This raises another important question: does the memory of war push older generations toward pragmatism and compromise, while younger generations gravitate toward more rigid or principled positions? Or are younger Lebanese, precisely because they already feel deprived of a future, less willing to make what they see as moral or sovereign concessions?

 

In any case, it is clear that Lebanese society is divided, but these divisions are neither simple nor one-dimensional. They are shaped by a mixture of sectarian identity, politics, fear, historical experience, collective exhaustion, and a deep loss of trust in the state, in the world, and even in the possibility of justice itself.

 

For that reason, the value of this poll does not lie in using it to condemn people or morally discipline them, but rather in trying to understand them. Exhausted societies do not think the same way stable societies do, and people living with fear, anxiety, and collapse may simultaneously hold positions that appear contradictory, yet remain entirely consistent with their profound sense of exhaustion.

 

Perhaps the deeper importance of these findings is that they open the door to larger questions about the future of Lebanon’s political and party system, and whether the country’s divisions will remain trapped within sectarian structures or gradually re-emerge through new political alignments that transcend the traditional framework Lebanon has known for decades. For polls do not merely measure opinions; sometimes, they measure the level of exhaustion that precedes major transformations.

Methodology and Sample Distribution

 

• Data for this study were collected through a quantitative survey administered to a representative sample of 2,000 Lebanese citizens aged 21 years and above across Lebanon’s nine governorates.

 

• The sample was proportionally allocated according to the population size of each governorate—North, Akkar, South, Nabatieh, Mount Lebanon, Keserwan–Jbeil, Beirut, Beqaa, and Baalbeck-Hermel—and further distributed across Lebanon’s 26 districts (cazas). Each governorate was subdivided into its respective districts, within which district capitals and selected villages were included to ensure adequate geographic and confessional representation.

 

• The sample was equally distributed by gender, comprising 1,000 male and 1,000 female respondents.

 

• Respondents were distributed by confession as follows: 21.3% Maronite, 7.2% Greek Orthodox, 4.7% Greek Catholic, 3.4% Armenian Orthodox/Catholic, 27.9% Sunni, 27.9% Shiite, 5.7% Druze, 0.9% Alawite, and 1% Christian minorities.

 

• Data collection was conducted through face-to-face interviews using tablet-assisted questionnaires. In the South and Nabatieh governorates, interviews were carried out in person across towns and villages in several districts, including Sidon, Tyre, Jezzine, and Hasbaya. Due to displacement resulting from the security situation, part of the Shiite sample—particularly respondents originally residing in Bint Jbeil, Nabatieh, and Marjeyoun—was interviewed in their temporary locations in Chouf, Aley, and Beirut.

 

• At the household level, interviewers first identified all household members aged 21 years and above. Respondents were then selected using the “most recent birthday” method. If the selected individual was unavailable, the eligible adult with the next closest upcoming birthday was invited to participate.

 

• Prior to each interview, respondents were informed of the study’s objectives and assured that participation was voluntary and that all responses would remain anonymous and confidential.

 

• Fieldwork was conducted between April 28 and May 5, 2026.

 

• The survey carries a margin of error of ±3.2 percentage points at the national level, while the overall refusal rate reached 26%.

In light of regional shifts, security and political tensions, and the war Israel is waging against Lebanon, this survey aims to monitor Lebanese public opinion trends regarding issues of war and peace, the relationship with Israel, the role of Hezbollah, the future of its weapons, as well as the options available to the Lebanese state in the upcoming phase.

 

The results reveal clear and deep divergences among the various components of Lebanese society, not only on a sectarian level, but also across different generations, with younger age groups displaying approaches that are sometimes radically different from older age groups. The results also reflect the traditional Lebanese divide between those who link Lebanon’s security to resistance and conflict with Israel, and those who believe that Lebanon’s interest lies in neutrality, political settlements, or redefining the relationship with Israel within a broader regional and international framework.

 

The significance of these findings is not limited to measuring current popular sentiment, but also contributes to understanding the gradual shifts taking place in Lebanese public opinion regarding issues that were previously considered almost settled or highly sensitive in public discourse. As such, this survey serves as an important indicator of the nature of existing divisions, and of potential changes in the political and security priorities of the Lebanese people in the coming phase.

 

1. How would you evaluate the President’s management of the crisis during the recent war period?

 

47.9% of respondents rated the President’s management of the crisis during the recent war as excellent (21.3%) or good (26.6%), compared to 32.1% who described it as poor and 19.7% who considered it average.

 

The distribution of results by sect shows that Druze respondents recorded the highest positive evaluation (“excellent/good”) at 82.4%. Meanwhile, Maronite, Orthodox, and Catholic respondents distributed their evaluations between “excellent” and “good” at relatively similar rates ranging between 70% and 80%, dropping to 54.4% among Sunni respondents. In contrast, negative evaluations of the President’s performance were highest among Shiite respondents, reaching 79.2%.

 

By age, the highest rate of negative evaluations of the President’s management of the crisis during the recent war was recorded among young respondents aged 21–29 (41%). This percentage gradually declined with age, reaching only 15.8% among respondents aged 70 and above. Conversely, the oldest age group recorded the highest rate of “excellent” evaluations of the President’s performance at 57.9%, surpassing all other age groups, where the rate of excellent evaluations did not exceed 31.3%.

 

2. How would you evaluate the Prime Minister’s management of the crisis during the recent war period?

 

46.6% of respondents rated the Prime Minister’s management of the crisis during the recent war as excellent (20.1%) or good (26.5%), compared to 34.3% who described it as poor and 18.6% who considered it average.

 

According to sect, Druze and Sunni respondents gave high rates of “excellent” evaluations to the Prime Minister’s performance during the crisis (54.4% and 32.6% respectively), while Shiite respondents recorded a very high rate of negative evaluations reaching 82.8%. As for respondents from Christian sects (such as Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Catholics), their opinions were distributed relatively evenly between “excellent” and “good,” ranging between 65% and 70%.

 

By age group, the youngest respondents (21–29 years old) recorded the highest rate of negative evaluations of the Prime Minister’s performance (42%). This percentage gradually declined with age, reaching 15.8% among the oldest age group (70 years and above). In contrast, the oldest age group recorded the highest rate of “good” evaluations of the Prime Minister’s management of the crisis at 57.9%, while the lowest rate of “excellent” evaluations was recorded among respondents aged 30–39, at 12.6%.

 

 

3. In your opinion, who bears the greatest responsibility for the current escalation in Lebanon?

 

Israel and Hezbollah topped the list of parties held responsible by respondents for the current escalation in Lebanon, with nearly identical percentages of 32.9% and 32.8% respectively. The percentages attributed to other options were significantly lower, including “everyone shares responsibility” (12.1%), Iran (8.8%), and the United States (8.1%).

According to sect, Christian and Druze respondents primarily blamed Hezbollah, with percentages ranging between 50% and 61%. Shiite respondents, on the other hand, blamed Israel at a rate of 57.7%, while none of them held Hezbollah responsible (0%). Sunni respondents were divided between blaming Hezbollah (39.1%) and Israel (33%). Notably, the highest percentage blaming Iran was recorded among Maronites (20.7%), while 16.5% of Shiite respondents considered the United States responsible for the escalation.

 

By age group, 78.9% of respondents aged 70 and above held Hezbollah primarily responsible for the current escalation in Lebanon, compared to only 28.5% among the youngest age group (21–29 years old). In contrast, 36% of respondents aged 21–29 blamed Israel for the escalation, compared to only 10.5% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

According to governorate of residence, respondents in Baalbek-Hermel Governorate recorded the highest percentage of those who considered Israel responsible for the escalation, at 80.5%, while this percentage dropped to only 17.1% in Mount Lebanon Governorate. In contrast, Akkar Governorate recorded the highest percentage of respondents who blamed Hezbollah for the escalation (58.7%), followed by North Governorate at 43.8%. In South Governorate, 40.5% of respondents considered all parties responsible, while 37.9% believed Israel was primarily responsible. In Nabatieh Governorate, opinions were divided: 32.1% blamed Israel, 25.6% blamed the United States, and another 25.6% believed responsibility was shared among all parties.

 

4. To what extent do you believe the Lebanese government fulfilled its expected role during the recent war?

 

The percentage of respondents who believed that the Lebanese government had fulfilled its expected role “to some extent” during the recent war (32.5%) was nearly equal to the percentage of those who believed it had “not met expectations at all” (31.5%). In contrast, 20.8% of participants believed that the government had not sufficiently met expectations, while only 12.6% considered that it had fulfilled its expected role “to a great extent.”

 

According to sect, Catholic and Sunni respondents expressed the highest levels of confidence in the government’s role “to a great extent” (25.5% and 21% respectively). In contrast, the highest percentage of Shiite respondents (72.8%) believed that the government “did not meet expectations at all,” while the highest proportion of Druze respondents stated that the government had played its expected role during the war “to some extent” (66.7%).

 

By age group, 38.5% of respondents aged 21–29 believed that the government had met expectations, including 11.5% who believed it had done so “to a great extent” and 27% “to some extent.” This percentage gradually increased with age, reaching 68.4% among respondents aged 70 and above, including 21.1% who believed the government had met expectations “to a great extent” and 47.4% “to some extent.”

 

5. How do you evaluate the role of official institutions in relief and displacement matters, particularly the role of the Ministry of Social Affairs, during this war?

 

More than one-third of survey participants (36.4%) stated that the performance of official institutions in handling relief and displacement issues, particularly the Ministry of Social Affairs, did not meet expectations during the war. In contrast, the percentages of those who believed that these institutions “did not meet expectations at all” (24.2%) and those who believed they met expectations “to some extent” (24.9%) were relatively close. Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents who said these institutions met expectations “to a great extent” did not exceed 10.8%.

According to sect, 41.2% of Shiite respondents believed that these institutions did not sufficiently meet expectations, while 35.8% believed they did not meet them at all. In contrast, 12.2% of both Sunni and Maronite respondents believed that these institutions met expectations to a great extent, while the highest proportion of Druze respondents believed that these institutions met expectations “to some extent” (42.1%).

 

6. How would you describe the ongoing ceasefire so far?

 

19.4% of respondents considered the ongoing ceasefire to be a defeat for everyone, while 15.9% believed that there is, in fact, no ceasefire. The remaining views were distributed fairly evenly: 15.4% considered it a victory for Israel, another 15.4% viewed it as a victory for the Lebanese state, 14.6% described it as a victory for Hezbollah, 9.4% as a victory for all of Lebanon, while 7.2% considered it a victory for the United States.

 

Maronite, Orthodox, and Druze respondents clearly viewed the current ceasefire as a defeat for everyone, with percentages reaching 30.5%, 34.7%, and 47.4% respectively. In contrast, Shiite respondents considered it a victory for Hezbollah (33.3%). Catholic and Armenian respondents viewed it as a victory for the Lebanese state (36.2% and 47.1% respectively). Sunni respondents, meanwhile, were divided between those who considered it a victory for Israel (22.9%) and those who viewed it as a victory for the Lebanese state (23.3%).

 

The oldest age group (70 years and above) was the most likely to describe the ceasefire as “a defeat for everyone,” at 31.6%. This percentage gradually declined among younger age groups, reaching its lowest level (12.5%) among respondents aged 21–29. Conversely, 31.6% of respondents aged over 70 considered the ceasefire a victory for the Lebanese state, while this percentage declined across other age groups, reaching its lowest point (12.6%) among respondents aged 40–49.

 

61.5% of respondents in Nabatieh Governorate stated that there is essentially no ceasefire, followed by residents of Keserwan-Jbeil Governorate at 55.2%. In contrast, 56.5% of respondents in Beqaa Governorate described the ceasefire as a victory for the Lebanese state, along with 29.3% of respondents in Akkar Governorate who shared the same view. In Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, 45.5% considered the ceasefire a victory for Hezbollah. On the other hand, Mount Lebanon Governorate and South Governorate recorded the highest percentages of respondents who believed the ceasefire represented a defeat for all parties, at 39.7% and 29.3% respectively. Additionally, 33% of respondents in Beirut and 29.5% of residents in North Governorate considered the ceasefire a victory for Israel.

 

7. What is your position on the direct peace negotiations between Lebanon and Israel?

 

Public opinion shows a clear divide regarding the issue of direct negotiations with Israel. While 21.9% of respondents expressed strong support for this option, 27.1% expressed partial support, meaning that nearly 49% tend to support it to varying degrees. In contrast, 33.2% expressed strong opposition, while 11.3% opposed it to some extent, bringing the total percentage of opponents to approximately 44.5%.

 

According to sect, Maronite and Orthodox respondents recorded high levels of support for direct negotiations. Among Maronites, 78% supported the idea (36.2% strongly and 41.8% to some extent), while 73.6% of Orthodox respondents supported it (37.5% strongly and 36.1% to some extent). Druze respondents also supported direct negotiations at a rate of 72% (50.9% strongly and 21.1% to some extent). In contrast, 92.9% of Shiite respondents opposed negotiations (78.9% strongly and 14% to some extent). None of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, while only 4.3% expressed support to some extent. Sunni respondents, meanwhile, were divided, with 54.4% expressing support (31.5% to some extent and 22.9% strongly) compared to 38% who opposed the idea.

 

By age group, 35% of respondents aged 21–29 supported direct negotiations, while support increased gradually with age, reaching its highest level among respondents aged 70 and above, at 79%.

 

Akkar Governorate recorded the highest level of support for direct negotiations with Israel at 74.7% (20% strongly supported and 54.7% supported “to some extent”). Mount Lebanon Governorate ranked second with 63.4% support, followed by North Governorate at 60.9%, then Keserwan-Jbeil Governorate at 58.6%, and Beqaa Governorate at 52.1%. In contrast, Nabatieh Governorate recorded the highest level of opposition to direct negotiations at 83.4%, followed by South Governorate at 76.8%, and Baalbek-Hermel Governorate at 72.7%. In Beirut, opinions appeared more divided, with 50% opposing the idea (6.4% to some extent and 43.6% strongly), compared to 45.7% who supported it.

 

8. How would you react if the President of the Republic and the government signed a peace agreement with Israel?

 

Nearly half of respondents (48.9%) tend to accept the idea of the President of the Republic and the government signing a peace agreement with Israel to varying degrees. While 23% expressed strong support for this option, 25.9% expressed partial support. In contrast, 46% opposed the idea, including 34.4% who opposed it strongly and 11.6% who opposed it to some extent. Meanwhile, 4.5% remained neutral, while only 0.6% declined to answer.

 

According to sect, Druze respondents showed the highest level of support for signing a peace agreement with Israel, reaching 84.2%, including 59.6% who strongly supported the agreement and 24.6% who supported it to some extent. Maronite and Orthodox respondents also recorded high levels of support: 76.5% of Maronites supported the agreement (33.8% strongly and 42.7% to some extent), while 72.2% of Orthodox respondents supported it (38.9% strongly and 33.3% to some extent). In contrast, 92.1% of Shiite respondents opposed the agreement (76.3% strongly and 15.8% to some extent). None of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, while support “to some extent” was limited to 5%. Sunni respondents, meanwhile, recorded a support rate of 51.6% (27.6% to some extent and 24% strongly), compared to 44.1% who opposed the idea. Compared with a poll conducted by Information International in August 2025, support for a peace agreement with Israel increased from 25% to nearly 49% in the current survey.

 

Support for signing a peace agreement with Israel also increases with age, rising from 37.5% among respondents aged 21–29 to 68.5% among respondents aged 70 and above, including both strong and partial supporters.

 

9. To what extent do you support President Joseph Aoun traveling to the United States to meet Netanyahu?

 

Nearly half of respondents (50.1%) opposed the idea of President Joseph Aoun visiting the United States to meet Benjamin Netanyahu. Among them, 36.6% opposed the idea strongly, while 13.5% opposed it to some extent. In contrast, 43% supported such a visit, including 16.9% who expressed strong support and 26.1% who supported it to some extent. Meanwhile, 6.5% remained neutral, while 0.4% declined to answer.

 

Druze respondents recorded the highest levels of support for President Aoun visiting the United States to meet Netanyahu, with 82.5% supporting the idea, including 50.9% strongly and 31.6% to some extent. Support was also significant among Maronite respondents (71.8%, including 27.2% strongly and 44.6% to some extent) and Orthodox respondents (66.7%, including 30.6% strongly and 36.1% to some extent). In contrast, 93.2% of Shiite respondents opposed the move (79.9% strongly and 13.3% to some extent). None of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, while support “to some extent” was limited to 3.2%. Sunni respondents, meanwhile, showed higher levels of opposition, with 52.7% opposing the visit (34.8% strongly and 17.9% to some extent), compared to 39.4% who supported it (25.1% to some extent and 14.3% strongly).

 

More than two-thirds of respondents aged 70 and above (68.4%) supported President Joseph Aoun visiting the United States to meet Netanyahu. This percentage gradually declined among younger age groups, reaching its lowest level at 29% among respondents aged 21–29.

 

10. What is your view if there were contact between the Lebanese Prime Minister and Netanyahu?

 

Nearly half of respondents (49.9%) oppose communication between the Lebanese Prime Minister and Netanyahu, with 36.6% strongly opposing the idea and 13.3% opposing it “to some extent.” In contrast, 43% support such communication, including 16.3% who strongly support it and 26.7% who support it “to some extent.” Meanwhile, 6.6% adopted a neutral position, while 0.5% declined to answer.

 

Druze respondents recorded the highest levels of support for communication between the Prime Minister and Netanyahu (80.7%), including 50.9% who strongly supported it and 29.8% who supported it to some extent. Support was also notably high among Maronites (72.3%), including 26.3% who strongly supported the idea and 46% who supported it to some extent, as well as among Orthodox respondents (69.5%), including 26.4% strong support and 43.1% partial support. In contrast, 92.5% of Shiite respondents opposed such communication (78.9% strongly opposed and 13.6% opposed to some extent), while none of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, and only 3.6% supported it to some extent. As for Sunni respondents, 54.4% opposed such communication (35.8% strongly and 18.6% to some extent), compared to 39.1% who supported it (25.1% to some extent and 14% strongly).

 

The findings also show that support for communication between the Lebanese Prime Minister and Netanyahu increases with age. Only 29% of respondents aged 21–29 supported such communication, while support rises gradually with age, reaching 68.4% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

 

11. What is your stance on opening an Israeli embassy in Beirut?

 

More than two-thirds of respondents (66.6%) oppose the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut, with 54.1% strongly opposing the idea and 12.5% opposing it “to some extent.” In contrast, only 20.9% supported this step, including 7.7% who strongly supported it and 13.2% who supported it to some extent. Meanwhile, 11.1% adopted a neutral position, while only 1.4% declined to answer.

 

When distributed by sect, Maronite respondents supported the move by 42.3% (16% strongly and 26.3% to some extent), compared to 31.9% who opposed it. Orthodox respondents supported the idea by 31.9% (12.5% strongly and 19.4% to some extent), while 48.7% opposed it. Druze respondents recorded the highest level of support at 70.1% (33.3% strongly and 36.8% to some extent), compared to 28% who opposed it. In contrast, 96% of Shiite respondents opposed the move (84.9% strongly and 11.1% to some extent), while none of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, and only 1.1% supported it to some extent. As for Sunni respondents, 86.4% opposed the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut (71.7% strongly and 14.7% to some extent), compared to only 9.3% who supported it (6.8% to some extent and 2.5% strongly).

By age, 81.5% of respondents in the younger age group (21–29 years) opposed the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut, including 68.5% who strongly opposed it and 13% who opposed it to some extent. This percentage declines gradually with age, reaching 42.1% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

By governorate, 91.3% of respondents in Akkar and 90.9% in Baalbek-Hermel opposed the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut (81.8% strongly and 9.1% to some extent), followed by respondents in South Governorate at 85.4%, and Beirut at 77.6%. In contrast, Mount Lebanon Governorate recorded the highest levels of support for opening an Israeli embassy in Beirut (44.3%), with 25.8% supporting the move “to some extent” and 18.5% expressing strong support.

 

12. What is your position on normalization in Lebanon with Israel, i.e., establishing economic, commercial, and cultural relations with Israel?

 

The survey results show that 59.3% of respondents oppose normalization with Israel, meaning the establishment of any economic, commercial, or cultural relations. Of these, 48.4% strongly oppose normalization, while 10.9% oppose it to some extent. In contrast, 30.4% support normalization, including 11.5% who strongly support it and 18.9% who support it to some extent. Meanwhile, 8.6% preferred to remain neutral, while 1.7% declined to answer or did not specify their position.

 

By sect, Maronite respondents recorded a support rate of 57.8% (21.6% strongly and 36.2% to some extent), compared to 26.8% who opposed normalization. Orthodox respondents also supported normalization at a rate of 48.6% (15.3% strongly and 33.3% to some extent), while 37.5% opposed it. In contrast, 94.3% of Shiite respondents opposed normalization (82.8% strongly and 11.5% to some extent), while none of them (0.0%) expressed strong support, and only 2.2% supported it to some extent. Sunni respondents also tended toward opposing normalization, with 73.8% expressing opposition (57% strongly and 16.8% to some extent), compared to only 19% who supported it (16.1% to some extent and 2.9% strongly). Meanwhile, Druze respondents recorded the highest level of support for normalization at 79% (54.4% strongly and 24.6% to some extent), compared to 17.6% who opposed it. Compared with a poll conducted by Information International in August 2025, support for normalization has risen from 13.2% to more than 30% in the current survey.

 

The highest level of opposition to normalization with Israel was recorded among younger respondents aged 21–29, at 73%. This percentage declines gradually with age, reaching 42.1% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

By governorate, respondents in South Governorate recorded the highest level of opposition to normalization at 81.9% (68.1% strongly and 13.8% to some extent), followed by Baalbek-Hermel at 80.5%, where 71.4% strongly opposed normalization and 9.1% opposed it to some extent, then Nabatieh Governorate with an opposition rate of 79.4%. In contrast, respondents in Mount Lebanon Governorate showed a greater tendency toward supporting normalization compared to other governorates (56.4%), with 29.6% supporting it to some extent and 26.8% expressing strong support.

 

13. Do you think Israel continues the war on Lebanon due to its interest in the country’s resources, such as oil and water?

 

64.5% of Lebanese respondents believe that Israel’s continued war on Lebanon is driven by ambitions over its natural resources such as oil and water, with 41.1% strongly agreeing and 23.4% somewhat agreeing. In contrast, 22.8% disagreed, including 14.1% who somewhat disagreed and 8.7% who strongly disagreed. Meanwhile, 8.1% took a neutral position, while 4.6% declined to answer or did not specify their position.

 

By sect, Maronite respondents showed 43.2% agreement (27.7% strongly and 15.5% to some extent), compared to 32.4% who disagreed. Orthodox respondents agreed at a rate of 48.6% (29.2% strongly and 19.4% to some extent), while 26.4% disagreed. Similarly, 34% of Catholic respondents agreed (10.6% strongly and 23.4% to some extent), while 29.8% disagreed. In contrast, agreement was significantly higher among Shiite respondents (85.3%) (58.1% strongly and 27.2% to some extent) and Sunni respondents (81.7%) (50.2% strongly and 31.5% to some extent), while 3.6% of Sunnis strongly disagreed and 11.1% somewhat disagreed. Druze respondents recorded the highest level of disagreement with this belief at 59.6%, compared to 28.1% who agreed (15.8% strongly and 12.3% to some extent).

 

Agreement with the belief that Israel has ambitions over Lebanon was highest among younger respondents aged 21–29 (74%). This percentage declines gradually with age, reaching 36.8% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

14. What is your position on the issue of disarming Hezbollah?

 

The survey shows a clear division in Lebanese opinions regarding the issue of disarming Hezbollah. A total of 58.2% of respondents supported this step, including 44.7% who strongly supported it and 13.5% who supported it to some extent. In contrast, 34.2% opposed it, including 26.1% who strongly opposed it and 8.1% who opposed it to some extent. Meanwhile, 7.3% adopted a neutral position, while only 0.3% declined to answer.

 

Orthodox respondents recorded the highest levels of support for disarming Hezbollah at 88.9% (66.7% strongly and 22.2% to some extent), followed by Maronites at 87.3% (67.6% strongly and 19.7% to some extent), and Druze at 77.2% (71.9% strongly and 5.3% to some extent). In contrast, 87.5% of Shiite respondents opposed this measure (71.7% strongly and 15.8% to some extent), compared to only 7.9% who supported it (3.2% strongly and 4.7% to some extent). Sunni respondents showed 70.2% support for disarming Hezbollah (55.9% strongly and 14.3% to some extent), compared to 19.3% who opposed it (11.8% strongly and 7.5% to some extent).

 

43% of respondents aged 21–29 opposed the disarmament of Hezbollah. This opposition gradually decreases with age, reaching 21.7% among respondents aged 60–69 and 21.1% among those aged 70 and above.

 

 

 

Respondents in Baalbek-Hermel recorded the highest levels of opposition, with 77.9% opposing disarmament (71.4% strongly and 6.5% to some extent). Opposition also reached 67.9% in Nabatieh Governorate and 59.5% in South Governorate. In contrast, several governorates showed higher levels of support for disarmament. Akkar recorded the highest support at 82.6%, followed by North Governorate at 78.8%, then Keserwan-Jbeil and Mount Lebanon Governorate at 74.1% and 69.7% respectively. The Bekaa recorded 72.4% support for disarmament, while Beirut showed a lower support rate of 52.2%.

 

15. What is your stance on integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese Army?

 

Regarding the integration of Hezbollah into the Lebanese Army, 47.5% of respondents opposed this idea, including 29.1% who strongly opposed it and 18.4% who opposed it to some extent, compared to 40.1% who supported it (19.6% strongly supported and 20.5% supported to some extent). The neutral category accounted for 11.1%, while 1.3% refused to answer.

 

According to sect, Orthodox respondents (63.9%), Druze respondents (61.4%), and Maronite respondents (55.9%) emerged as the most opposed to the idea of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese Army. Meanwhile, 52.6% of Sunni respondents expressed support for the idea. Shiite respondents were divided, with 48% opposing the integration of Hezbollah into the army compared to 36.9% who supported it.

 

16. Do you expect Israel to fully withdraw from all territories it has occupied in Lebanon?

 

Regarding expectations of Israel’s withdrawal from all areas it occupies in Lebanon, the results show a near-even split among respondents. A total of 44.2% expressed confidence that such a withdrawal could happen (13.6% to a large extent and 30.6% to some extent), compared to 42.5% who expressed skepticism (20.9% to some extent and 21.6% not at all). In addition, 9.2% adopted a neutral position, while 4.1% preferred not to answer.

 

By sect, optimism regarding the possibility of withdrawal is most pronounced among Druze respondents (47.4%), Shiites (46.6%), and Maronites (46.1%), although in all cases the dominant share of optimism is “to some extent.” In contrast, a higher level of skepticism is observed among Sunni respondents, with 52.3% expressing doubt that Israel will withdraw from all the areas it occupies in Lebanon.

 

17. Do you believe Hezbollah is entitled to seek political concessions in exchange for surrendering its weapons?

 

Support for Hezbollah’s right to request a political price in exchange for handing over its weapons stood at 43.5%, compared to 46.9% who opposed it. A total of 25.3% expressed strong support for this right, while 18.2% supported it to some extent. On the other hand, 32.8% rejected the idea outright, and 14.1% expressed partial opposition. The neutral group accounted for 7.6%, while 2% declined to answer.

 

By sect, Maronite respondents recorded the highest levels of opposition to Hezbollah’s right to demand a political price in exchange for disarmament, at 75.1% (52.6% strongly opposed and 22.5% somewhat opposed), followed by Druze respondents at 73.7% (66.7% strongly opposed and 7% somewhat opposed), Orthodox respondents at 62.5% (50% strongly opposed and 12.5% somewhat opposed), and Catholics at 48.9% (38.3% strongly opposed and 10.6% somewhat opposed). In contrast, 84.9% of Shiite respondents supported this right (62% strongly and 22.9% to some extent), with virtually no strong opposition and only 10.8% expressing partial opposition. Sunni respondents were more divided: 41.6% supported this right (14% strongly and 27.6% to some extent), while 48.8% opposed it (33% strongly and 15.8% to some extent).

 

54.5% of respondents aged 21–29 supported Hezbollah’s right to request a political price in exchange for disarmament. This support declines progressively with age, reaching 31.4% among those aged 60–69 and 10.6% among those aged 70 and above.

 

18. Do you think the slogan “Beirut is a demilitarized zone” is feasible?

 

Regarding the slogan “Beirut free of weapons,” 15.8% supported the idea to a large extent, while 34.1% supported it to some extent. In contrast, 23.3% rejected the idea outright, and 17% expressed partial opposition. The neutral group accounted for 6.5%, while 3.3% refused to answer.

 

By sect, Druze respondents recorded the highest overall level of support for this slogan (80.7%), followed by Maronites (66.2%), Orthodox (65.3%), and Sunnis (59.2%), with “to some extent” support predominating among most of these groups. The exception was Druze respondents, who showed higher levels of strong support compared to others. In contrast, 74.6% of Shiite respondents opposed the idea, including 47% who rejected it outright and 27.6% who opposed it to some extent.

By age, support for the slogan among the youngest age group (21–29) stood at 40% (13% strongly support and 27% somewhat support), increasing progressively to 73.7% among those aged 70 and above. Conversely, opposition decreases from 48% among younger respondents to 26.3% among the oldest age group.

 

19. Do you think Israel would have attacked Lebanon even if Hezbollah had not fired the six rockets at Israel on March 2?

 

A total of 54.7% of respondents supported this view (40.1% “to a large extent” and 14.6% “to some extent”), compared to 39.1% who expressed opposition (17.6% strongly opposed and 21.5% “not really”). The neutral category stood at 2.9%, while 3.3% refused to answer.

 

By sect, Maronite respondents recorded an opposition rate of 60.1% (22.5% strongly opposed and 37.6% somewhat opposed), compared to 32.9% who supported the view. Orthodox respondents also showed opposition at 56.9% (25% strongly and 31.9% somewhat), and Catholics at 59.6% (31.9% strongly and 27.7% somewhat). In contrast, support for this belief was significantly higher among Shiite respondents, reaching 91.4% (77.4% strongly and 14% somewhat), and among Sunnis at 56.3% (36.2% strongly and 20.1% somewhat). Druze respondents recorded the highest level of opposition at 78.9% (61.4% strongly and 17.5% somewhat), compared to 21.1% who supported it (12.3% strongly and 8.8% somewhat).

 

By age, younger respondents (21–29) are more likely to believe that the war would have been likely regardless of Hezbollah’s firing of rockets on March 2 (61.5% — 49% strongly and 12.5% somewhat), while 68.4% of older respondents (70 and above) believe that the rocket launch was decisive in triggering the war (57.9% strongly and 10.5% somewhat).

 

20. Do you think it is in Lebanon’s interest to separate the war track with Israel from the Islamabad negotiations?

 

A total of 54% of respondents supported separating the war track with Israel from the Islamabad negotiations (30.2% “to a large extent” and 23.8% “to some extent”), compared to 34% who expressed opposition (24.7% strongly opposed and 9.3% “no, to some extent”). In addition, 6.7% remained neutral, while 5.3% refused to answer.

 

By sect, Druze respondents recorded the highest level of support for separating the war track with Israel from the Islamabad negotiations (89.5%), followed by Maronites (80.7%), then Orthodox respondents (76.4%). Sunnis also showed support at 62%. In contrast, Shiite respondents showed strong opposition at 86.1%, including 70.3% who strongly opposed and 15.8% who opposed to some extent, with an almost complete absence of meaningful support (6.8%).

 

21. Do you think Lebanon should adhere to the Arab Peace Initiative or pursue a separate peace with Israel without the Arab states?

 

A total of 37.4% of respondents supported adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative, while 24.8% preferred the option of pursuing a separate peace with Israel outside the Arab framework. Meanwhile, 32.8% rejected any peace initiative with Israel, and 5% refused to state their position on the issue.

 

By sect, the results show clear variation in attitudes toward Lebanon’s choice between adhering to the Arab Peace Initiative or pursuing a unilateral peace with Israel. A majority of Sunnis (59.5%) and 41.8% of Maronites preferred adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative. Druze respondents recorded the highest support for a separate peace with Israel (66.7%), followed by 48.6% of Orthodox, 43.7% of Maronites, and 40.4% of Catholics. In contrast, Shiite respondents stood out as the most opposed group, with 77.1% rejecting any peace initiative with Israel.

 

The results also show that the 21–29 age group was the most likely to reject any peace initiative with Israel (44.5%), followed by support for the Arab Peace Initiative (36%). The option of a separate peace with Israel was most prominent among those aged 70 and above (42.1%).

 

By place of residence, 69.6% of respondents in the Bekaa governorate supported adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative, followed by Akkar (65.3%), North Lebanon (59.6%), and Keserwan–Jbeil (53.4%). In contrast, 53.7% of residents of Mount Lebanon favored a separate peace with Israel outside the Arab framework. Meanwhile, the South, Baalbek–Hermel, and Nabatieh recorded the highest rejection rates of any peace initiative with Israel (68.1%, 61%, and 57.7% respectively). In Beirut, opinions were divided: 36.2% supported the Arab Peace Initiative, 39.4% rejected any peace initiative with Israel, while 20% supported a separate peace with Israel.

 

22. How would you assess the performance of the Lebanese Army and its commander during the recent war and the ongoing ceasefire?

 

A total of 73.7% of respondents rated the performance of the Lebanese Army and its Commander during the recent war and the current ceasefire as positive (33.2% “very positive” and 40.5% “somewhat positive”). In contrast, 12.4% gave a negative assessment (8.5% “somewhat negative” and 3.9% “very negative”), while 13.7% were neutral and only 0.2% refused to answer.

 

By sect, Druze respondents recorded the highest level of support for the performance of the Lebanese Army and its Commander during the recent war and the current ceasefire (93%), with 71.9% rating the performance as very positive and 21.1% as somewhat positive, with almost no opposition. They are followed by Sunnis at 75.3%, and then Maronites at 67.1%. As for Shiite respondents, 26.9% rated the performance as very positive and 41.9% as somewhat positive, alongside a notable neutral share of 18.6%.

 

23. How do you assess the impact of Iran’s role on the situation in Lebanon?

 

A total of 63% of respondents rated Iran’s role in Lebanon as negative (48.5% “very negative” and 14.5% “somewhat negative”), compared to 30.7% who viewed it as having a positive impact (20% “very positive” and 10.7% “somewhat positive”). Meanwhile, 5.1% remained neutral, and 1.2% refused to answer.

 

By sect, Druze respondents recorded the highest level of negative assessment of Iran’s role (93%), with 82.5% describing it as very negative and 10.5% as somewhat negative, followed by Maronites (91%), including 71.8% who viewed the role as very negative and 19.2% as somewhat negative. Sunnis also expressed a largely negative stance (79.6%), with 61.3% considering the role very negative and 18.3% somewhat negative. In contrast, 86% of Shiite respondents viewed Iran’s role in Lebanon as positive, including 61.3% who rated it as very positive and 24.7% as somewhat positive, with virtually no negative evaluations.

 

By age, 38.5% of respondents aged 21–29 viewed Iran’s role positively, with this share gradually declining with age to reach only 10.6% among those aged 70 and above. In contrast, negative assessments rise from 55% among younger respondents to 89.5% among older age groups, including 63.2% who rated the role as very negative and 26.3% as somewhat negative.

 

24. How do you assess the impact of Saudi Arabia’s role on the situation in Lebanon?

 

A total of 51.1% of respondents viewed Saudi Arabia’s role in Lebanon as positive (19.3% “very positive” and 31.8% “somewhat positive”), compared to 32% who rated it negatively (16.3% “very negative” and 15.7% “somewhat negative”). In addition, 14.6% were neutral, while 2.3% refused to answer.

 

The breakdown of results by sect shows that Druze respondents recorded the highest level of positive evaluation of Saudi Arabia’s role (80.7%), including 54.4% who considered it very positive and 26.3% somewhat positive. Support also reached 66.7% among Maronites and 62.7% among Sunnis. In contrast, Shiite respondents expressed the highest level of negative assessment of Saudi Arabia’s role in Lebanon (64.9%), with 38% rating it as very negative and 26.9% as somewhat negative, and a near absence of strong positive evaluations (1.1%).

 

By age, the share of respondents who view Saudi Arabia’s role positively rises from 42.5% among the youngest age group (21–29) to 64.9% among those aged 60–69, distributed between 33.6% who rate the role as very positive and 31.3% somewhat positive.

 

25. How do you assess the impact of USA’s role on the situation in Lebanon?

 

59.5% of respondents rated the role of the United States in Lebanon negatively, with 46.8% describing it as “very negative” and 12.7% as “somewhat negative.” In contrast, 32% assessed this role positively (11.5% “very positive” and 20.5% “somewhat positive”). Meanwhile, 7.4% chose a neutral position, and 1.1% refused to answer.

 

According to sect, 77.2% of Druze respondents evaluated the role of the United States in Lebanon positively (49.1% very positive and 28.1% somewhat positive), in addition to 64.8% of Maronites (22.5% very positive and 42.3% somewhat positive). In contrast, 73.8% of Sunnis considered the US role to be negative, compared to only 16.5% who viewed it positively. Shiites were the most critical group, with 96.4% stating that the US role in Lebanon is negative, including 83.5% who rated it as very negative and 12.9% as somewhat negative, with an almost complete absence of positive assessments (0.4%).

According to age, the 21–29 age group recorded the highest level of negative assessment of the US role in Lebanon at 73%, distributed between 56.5% “very negative” and 16.5% “somewhat negative.” This percentage gradually declines with age, reaching 36.8% among respondents aged 70 and above.

 

26. In your opinion, what is the best option to ensure stability in Lebanon?

 

The option of a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and an end to violations by land, sea, and air ranked first among the proposed solutions to ensure Lebanon’s stability, with 45.4%. In contrast, 21.5% of respondents believed that the optimal solution lies in strengthening the Lebanese Army, followed by the option of concluding a peace treaty with Israel at 16.7%, while 15.3% supported the dissolution of Hezbollah as a pathway to stability.

 

Shiite respondents showed overwhelming support for the option of full Israeli withdrawal, at 89.2%. In contrast, Sunnis were divided between supporting Israeli withdrawal (40.5%) and strengthening the Lebanese Army (40.9%). Maronites leaned toward a peace treaty with Israel (31.9%), while 29.1% supported the dissolution of Hezbollah, and only 18.3% supported Israeli withdrawal. Druze respondents recorded the highest support for a peace treaty with Israel at 64.9%, the highest among all surveyed groups.

According to age, the 21–29 age group showed the highest support for full Israeli withdrawal at 55%, followed by the 30–39 age group at 51.8%. Support for a peace treaty with Israel peaked among those aged 70 and above at 42.1%.

 

According to governorate of residence, the highest shares of respondents in Baalbek–Hermel (81.8%) and the South (80.2%) considered full Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory and an end to violations by land, sea, and air as the best option. Nabatieh ranked third at 65.4%, followed by Keserwan–Jbeil at 48.3%, and Beirut at 45.7%. In contrast, 36.9% of residents of Mount Lebanon considered a peace treaty with Israel the most appropriate option, while 35.6% of respondents in the North believed that strengthening the Lebanese Army alone is the best solution. Additionally, 33.3% in the Bekaa, 27.6% in Keserwan–Jbeil, and 24.7% in the North supported the dissolution of Hezbollah as a pathway to stability. In Akkar, results showed a balanced division of opinions, with 45.3% believing that full Israeli withdrawal is the best solution, while an equal 45.3% considered strengthening the Lebanese Army the most appropriate option.

 

27. If Hezbollah hands over its weapons to the state, what would you prefer?

 

In the event that Hezbollah hands over its weapons to the state, the largest share of respondents (72.5%) preferred that the weapons be kept and the Lebanese Army be trained on them. This was compared to 13.2% who supported handing the weapons over to Iran, while 8% believed they should be completely destroyed. In addition, 4% considered that Hezbollah should retain its weapons, while 2.3% said they should be handed over to another external party.

 

The distribution of results by sect shows broad support among Maronite and Sunni respondents for integrating Hezbollah’s weapons into state institutions, at 87.3% and 83.2% respectively. In contrast, 50.2% of Shiite respondents supported keeping the weapons under the Lebanese Army’s control, while 36.6% preferred handing them over to Iran, and 11.8% believed they should remain with Hezbollah. Druze respondents showed a notable split, with 57.9% supporting keeping the weapons under the Army, compared to 35.1% who preferred their destruction.

 

28. In your opinion, who is primarily responsible for hindering the effective arming of the Lebanese Army?

 

45.6% of respondents considered the United States to be the main obstacle to the effective armament of the Lebanese Army, followed by 35.1% who held Hezbollah responsible. In contrast, much lower percentages attributed responsibility to Iran (3.4%), Israel (2.7%), Europe (1.9%), while 1% blamed Saudi Arabia, and 8.2% refused to answer.

 

According to sect, 75.4% of Druze respondents considered Hezbollah to be the main obstacle to arming the army, compared to only 17.5% who pointed to the United States. Maronite respondents mainly blamed Hezbollah (48.8%), compared to 25.4% who considered the United States the main obstacle. Sunnis showed clear division, with 40.9% blaming the United States and 43.7% holding Hezbollah responsible. Shiites formed the most clear-cut group in blaming the United States, at 87.1%.

 

According to age, the United States emerged as the most frequently perceived main obstacle among the youth (21–29 years), at 55%. This share gradually declines with age, reaching 31.6% among those aged 70 and above. In contrast, the attribution of responsibility to Hezbollah increases from 30% among younger respondents to 47.4% among older age groups.

 

By place of residence, the majority of respondents in the South (85.3%), Nabatieh (76.9%), and Baalbek–Hermel (76.6%) considered the United States the main actor hindering the effective arming of the Lebanese Army, followed by Beirut (61.7%), the Bekaa (49.3%), and Keserwan–Jbeil (46.6%). In contrast, respondents in several other governorates considered Hezbollah to be the actor obstructing the arming of the army, at 70.7% in Akkar, 52.7% in the North, 45.6% in Mount Lebanon, and 40.6% in the Bekaa.

 

29. In your opinion, is it possible to achieve a just peace between Lebanon and Israel?

 

43.3% of respondents believed that a just peace between Lebanon and Israel is not possible, while 32.7% considered it achievable. Meanwhile, 24% expressed uncertainty or had no clear position regarding this possibility.

 

According to sect, 80.7% of Druze respondents supported the possibility of achieving peace, compared to 14% who rejected it. The level of support decreased among Maronites, with 51.6% believing that peace could be achieved, 19.2% rejecting it, and 29.1% remaining uncertain. Among Sunnis, 30.8% supported the possibility of peace, 43% rejected it, and 26.2% were undecided, while 83.5% of Shiites believed that peace is not possible.

 

According to age, 56.5% of the 21–29 age group oppose the idea of achieving a just peace between Lebanon and Israel, with this share gradually declining with age to around 31% among older age groups.

 

By place of residence, the highest proportions of respondents in Baalbek–Hermel, Nabatieh, and the South believe that a just peace between Lebanon and Israel is not possible (71.4%, 69.2%, and 62.1% respectively). These figures decrease in other governorates, reaching 51.1% in Beirut, 47.3% in the North, and 43.1% in Keserwan–Jbeil. In contrast, 55.1% of respondents in the Bekaa, 46.7% in Akkar, and 46% in Mount Lebanon believe that peace with Israel is possible.

 

30. Who is your preferred party among the following?

 

Regarding the most preferred actor among Lebanese respondents, “the resistance” ranked first with 29.3%, followed by the option “none” at 19.7%. Saudi Arabia came in third with 19.3%, followed by the United States at 18%. The option “Lebanon” received only 6.8%, while Syria and China received 1.9% and 1.8% respectively. Iran recorded 0.9%, while Israel ranked last with 0.2%. Refusals accounted for 1.3%, while 0.8% selected other actors.

 

Maronite respondents preferred the United States at 35.2%, followed by Saudi Arabia (19.7%), while support for “the resistance” did not exceed 5.2%. Sunni respondents showed a clear preference for Saudi Arabia at 44.1%, compared to 14% for “the resistance” and only 2.2% for the United States. Shiite respondents formed the strongest support base for “the resistance” at 78.9%, with an almost complete absence of support for Saudi Arabia or the United States. Druze respondents showed a stronger preference for the United States at 52.6%, while support for “the resistance” did not exceed 10.5%.

 

31. What is your opinion on the following statement: The Lebanese government made a mistake by agreeing to enter into direct negotiations with Israel before a ceasefire was established?

 

47.9% of respondents agreed that the government was wrong to engage in direct negotiations with Israel before a ceasefire decision (36.2% strongly agree and 11.7% somewhat agree). In contrast, 47.6% disagreed that the government made a mistake in this regard (26.8% somewhat disagree and 20.8% strongly disagree). Meanwhile, 3.9% took a neutral position, and only 0.6% refused to answer.

 

According to sect, Shiite respondents formed the largest group considering the government’s decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel before a ceasefire as a mistake (94.2%), with 81.7% strongly agreeing and 12.5% somewhat agreeing, and an almost complete absence of disagreement (4.3%). In contrast, Druze (80.7%) and Maronites (78.4%) were the most opposed to the view that the government made a mistake in this context. Sunni respondents were divided, with 50.2% disagreeing that the government made a mistake, compared to 44.1% who agreed.

 

32. What is your opinion on the following statement: The Lebanese government made a mistake in designating Hezbollah’s military wing as illegal?

 

51.8% of respondents disagreed that the government made a mistake in classifying Hezbollah’s military wing as illegal (34.1% strongly disagree and 17.1% somewhat disagree). In contrast, 41.1% believed that the government did make a mistake in taking this decision (33.5% strongly agree and 7.6% somewhat agree).

 

According to sect, the largest share of Shiite respondents (93.2%) agreed that the government made a mistake in this decision, with 81.7% strongly agreeing and 11.5% somewhat agreeing, and an almost complete absence of disagreement (3.2%). In contrast, Maronite and Druze respondents largely rejected the idea that the government made a mistake in this context (82.2% and 80.7% respectively). Among Sunnis, 59.1% disagreed that the government made a mistake, compared to 29% who agreed.

 

33. What is your opinion on the following statement: The Lebanese government was wrong in asserting that diplomacy alone can protect Lebanon?

 

51.7% of respondents believed that the government did not make a mistake when stating that “diplomacy protects Lebanon” (29.1% strongly disagree and 22.6% somewhat disagree). In contrast, 41.4% felt that the government was wrong in adopting this position (29.9% strongly agree and 11.5% somewhat agree). Meanwhile, 5.7% took a neutral stance, and only 1.2% refused to answer.

 

Shiite respondents formed the largest group agreeing that the government was wrong in this statement (83.5%), with 69.5% strongly agreeing and 14% somewhat agreeing, alongside an almost complete absence of disagreement (9.7%). In contrast, Maronite and Druze respondents were the most likely to reject the claim that the government made a mistake, at 84.2% and 73.2% respectively. Sunni respondents were divided, with 61.3% disagreeing that the government made a mistake in this context, compared to 31.9% who agreed.

 

34. What is your opinion on the following statement: People in the South have the right to resist Israel regardless of who supports them?

 

63.6% of respondents support the principle of “the right of the people of South Lebanon to resist Israel regardless of the supporting party” (49.7% strongly support and 13.9% somewhat support), compared to 29.3% who oppose it (17.1% somewhat oppose and 12.2% strongly oppose). Meanwhile, 6.4% took a neutral position, and 0.7% refused to answer.

 

According to sect, Shiite respondents recorded the highest levels of support for the statement “the people of the South have the right to resist Israel regardless of the supporting party,” at 95%, distributed between 84.6% strongly supportive and 10.4% somewhat supportive, with an almost complete absence of opposition (3.6%). In contrast, 46.1% of Maronites supported this view (36.2% strongly and 9.9% somewhat), compared to 45% who opposed it (28.6% somewhat and 16.4% strongly). Druze respondents showed majority opposition at 59.7% (35.1% somewhat and 24.6% strongly), compared to only 22.8% in support. Meanwhile, 70.6% of Sunnis supported the statement (44.4% strongly and 26.2% somewhat), compared to 23.3% who opposed it at varying levels.

 

Support for the right of the people of South Lebanon to resist Israel, regardless of the supporting party, is higher among the youngest age group (21–29 years), reaching 74%, and gradually declines with age, falling to 42.1% among respondents aged 70 and above.

For more details, please refer to the full presentation here: The Full Presentation