The book delves into five main eras that marked the early formation of the General Security.

First/ Nuclear Era: Edward Abou Jaoudeh (1945-1948)

This stage was known for its tight supervision of political parties, mainly those that were banned such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. Motivated by the extensive expertise he had gained from the Police Directorate, Commissioner Bechara Qahwaji suggested that the General Security ought to steer attention towards this type of data collection. Political parties had risen significantly since the mid 1940s following the different roles they had assumed during the battle of independence in shaping the national political and options as well as Lebanon’s relationships with Syria, the Arabs and the West. Holding dissenting ideologies and beliefs, these parties entered in local conflicts in the Lebanese towns and villages and raced against each other to promote their visions and attract supporters from among the young in the schools and neighborhoods.

Upon the instructions of Bechara Qahwaji, the General Security Chief issued on March 18, 1946 a memorandum number 16, which authorized the General Security personnel to monitor the activities of political parties and associations. This mission was motivated by a number of reasons drafted by Bechara Qahwaji: “Public and secret meetings have serious implications on social movements and must be addressed closely by the General Security. They constitute an effective method in influencing the masses and stirring public opinion, particularly those that are held behind closed doors because they are usually aimed against the policies and safety of the state. It is necessary to keep track of the activities of individuals, parties and organizations in order to know the time and whereabouts of their meetings and keep an eye on them when in session, either by attending in person when the meetings are held openly or by designating a member trusted to gather the adequate information or by secretly investigating the news through the attendees themselves or through loyal informed sources.”

According to Nassif, Abou Jaoudeh left no lasting influence on the General Security. His tenure was a short transitional period that lacked experience and organization and was marked by occasional chaos. He assumed his role inspired by President Bechara Khoury and left his post mysteriously, moving to the General Directorate of the Ministry of Education. Later under the presidential term of Camille Chamoun, he was dismissed from service and moved into the banking industry. In 1960, he ran for Parliament but did not succeed.

Second/ Singularity Era: Farid Chehab (1948- 1958)

Farid Chehab was the longest serving chief of the General Security. The 10 years he spent in office were marked by several crises mainly those in 1952 when President Bechara Khoury was forced to resign and in 1958 at the end of Camille Chamoun’s presidential term.

The Secret Archives Department was activated and gained a high standing by Chehab, between 1957 and 1958. During this time, he issued circulars to all ministries, public administrations and municipalities as well as the Gendarmerie Command and the Police Directorate urging them not to appoint or recruit any employee except upon the approval of the Political Department at the General Security tasked with examining his conduct, partisan affiliation and criminal background to verify that he had not been convicted or part of any banned party. The findings of the investigations that the successive Chiefs of the Investigation Department, Hussein Nasrallah and Bechara Qahwaji, used to conduct prior to referring the arrested people to the judiciary were added to the Department records. Upon arrest of a suspect, Nasrallah and Qahwaji would inquire from the Secret Archives Department about his file and gather all information related to him to form links based on potential previous offences.

Former Shura Council Head, Judge Youssef Saadallah Khoury (1983-1990) recounts that in the wake of his success in the Judicial Assistant Contest in 1955, he was summoned by the General Security Political Department and informed that his affiliation with the banned Syrian Social Nationalist Party had thwarted his appointment to the post. Khoury’s descent from the nationalist town of Ain Akrin reinforced the allegations brought against him.

“There is a black spot in your history that hinders your appointment”, Bechara Qahwaji told him. Judge Khoury denied any connection to the SSNP, asserting that he and his family supported the Phalanges Party, but he Head of the Political Department was not persuaded and needed someone to vouch for the accuracy of the defense. Seeking help, Judge Khoury dropped by the pharmacy of the Head of the Phalanges Party, Pierre Gemayel, in the Martyrs’ Square requesting his interference. The next day, Gemayel headed to the Political Department accompanied by the Personal Status General Director Farid Habib. The two stressed to Qahwaji that, unlike Ain Akrin’s Khoury fellows who are known to be SSNP loyalists, Youssef Saadallah Khoury and his family were Phalangist.

“Your visit is much appreciated. But nevertheless I wish to investigate,” Qahwaji replied politely.

Qahwaji was used to conveying the image of a knowing man in front of everyone. He put embassies under surveillance and tapped phone conversations using the large headsets and the “eavesdropping table” initiated by the French mandate in 1939 in order to monitor all the telegrams, messages and phone calls that could help in tracking the suspects posing threats to France in Lebanon. Eavesdropping was at the heart of the measures taken by the French authorities to secure the safety of its troops and monitor the movements and resistance schemes of their Lebanese rivals. As soon as the Lebanese were handed down the Telephone Authority after the withdrawal of the French troops, the “eavesdropping table” became part of the responsibilities given to the General Security under the control of Edward Abou Jaoudeh in 1948.

Information gathered from the wiretaps was not all recorded in official reports. The General Security Chief would decide what was fit to be transmitted to higher authorities and would cut out some of the content including slander and defamation. The President of the Republic received many such reports- in Arabic, French or both- some of which were written by hand and others on a typewriter. Farid Chehab jotted down wiretapping notes containing insults made by a number of politicians against him personally during internal or external phone calls with Damascus. He never hesitated in writing down the accusations thrown at him.

Wiretapping became a regular source for secrets and information throughout Chehab’s term and he was the first to assign this mission to the General Security before it was snatched by the Second Division in the 1960s. Farid Chehab collected all handwritten and typed wiretapping reports, thereby making a huge archive for himself, even after leaving the directorate, because of the precision of the data it provided, mainly relating to the turbulent 1950s.

Third/ Construction Era: Toufic Jalbout (1958-1964)

Captain Toufic Jalbout was an army officer who was appointed to chair the General Security at the beginning of Fouad Chehab’s presidential term. He initiated a number of administrative reforms highlighted below:

• Practicing more sternness in implementing the legal procedures necessary to grant foreigners annual cards of residency, especially after detecting fake Lebanese IDs in circulation and discovering that a number of Mukhtars and policemen were involved in the forgery.
• Reducing the time frame allotted for the completion of certain transactions and specifying the maximum processing time for the issuance of a passport to 3 days. Jalbout also introduced the red-inked application for expedited passport processing without charging extra fees. Thus, the General Security was capable in just 3 months of issuing 400 passports per day.
• Allowing wives to obtain passports without the approval of their husbands. At the time, the regulations in force necessitated the prior approval.
• Forcing Syrian nationals to use the white-colored card for entry into Lebanon and the red-colored card for exit and archiving these cards for future use should a security need arise. Before 1960, an ID or a passport was the only requirement for crossing the border.
• Organizing and updating the files of the foreigners residing in Lebanon.

The kidnapping of Jalbout was one of the significant incidents in his life. On Saturday, 30th of December 1961, the General Security Chief was taken captive during the coup d’etat attempted by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party against the Chehabi rule. Shortly after midnight, nationalist militants broke into Jalbout’s house in Hamra Street and forcibly dragged him out. Unlike the Chief of Staff, Youssef Chmait and the Commander of the Military District, Colonel Abdul Qader Chehab who were hauled out in their pajamas, Toufic Jalbout was allowed to put his clothes on before his detention. Jalbout hadn’t hired any guards to watch over his house as his relationship with the SSNP was never plagued by any apparent rows or misunderstandings, despite the news circulating about the activism of the latter and the confirmation of Inspector Joseph Abou Samra thereof.

Although informed a few days prior to the attempted coup that the SSNP was poised for an insurgency plot that would assume the form of a coup d’etat, Jalbout was taken aback that the party followed through with its escapade.

Fourth/ Atrophy Era: Joseph Salameh (1965-1971)

Nassif branded the chairmanship of Joseph Salameh over the General Security under the presidential term of Charles Helou as being a phase of atrophy marked by the diminishing role of the General Security and its transformation into a mere civil institution.

Fifth/ Significance Era: Antoine Dahdah (1971-1977)

Colonel Antoine Dahdah moved to head the General Security from the Lebanese Navy. His brother, Rodrigue, was married to Lamia, the daughter of the then President of the Republic Suleiman Frangieh. Nassif recounts that Colonel Dahdah held the President in high regard and considered him to be his first and foremost political authority. Therefore, the direct responsibility that he and his security apparatus were assigned was to protect the order and maintain the continuity of the presidential rule by ensuring stability and tight supervisory measures. Given his close ties with the President, Dahdah had a political role that stretched beyond the prerogatives stipulated by the law. Dahdah would often find excuses to overplay his role and expand his functions. Yet, he resigned to abide by the command of his direct superior, the Minister of Interior.

Discontented with his position, Dahdah assumed the capacity of the political and security advisor of the President who was known for his temper and for hardly involving any advisors, ministers or close connections in his decision-making.

The political and security turmoil that afflicted the Dahdah term culminated in the eruption of the Civil War in 1975. On April 10, 1973, an Israeli commando landed in Beirut and killed three Palestinian leaders in their houses in Verdun, thus stirring a row between President Suleiman Frangieh and PM Saeb Salam that escalated into an irreconcilable rift. Knowing that it would be difficult to carry out the confrontation without a potent Sunni premier, Dahdah advised the President to resign from his post.

* A 496-page book written by Nicolas Nassif and published by the General Directorate of General Security.