Historical background

On July 4, 1949, the SSNF revolted against President Bechara Khoury, which forced the army to intervene and restore order. The party’s leader, Antoine Saadeh, fled the country to neighboring Syria, after the Syrian military dictator Hosny Al-Zaim offered him support. However, Al-Zaim, had also struck a bargain with the Lebanese President, and apprehended Saadeh upon his arrival to Syria. He was handed over to the Lebanese authorities that tried and executed him within 24 hours. The execution of Saadeh lead the SSNP members to assassinate former PM Riad As-Solh in Amman on July 16, 1951, as they held him accountable for the death of their leader. During the 1958 revolution, the SSNP sided with the then President Camille Chamoun and the Phalanges Party in confronting the popular resistance backed by the Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. This set the stage for a rift between the party and the then Army Commander Fouad Chehab, who later established friendly relations with the Phalanges, thus aggravating the fissure with the SSNP. The party accused the pro-Chehab Army Intelligence of inducing the fall of SSNP candidate Enaam Raad in the 1959 by-elections in Baakleen and Joun and that of the SSNP president Abdallah Saadeh in the Koura 1960 elections along with Asaad Ashkar in Matn and Enaam Raad in Chouf. Time reinforced the hostilities between the two parties, and the SSNP found itself on the margin of the political life and the Lebanese administration, while the Phalanges expanded and promoted their position, taking advantage of their amiable ties with Fouad Chehab. The doctrine adopted by the SSNP added insult to the injury as it did not recognize Lebanon as an independent entity, but as part of Greater Syria, which consists of Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Jordan. Some pinpoint other reasons associated with foreign ties and regional interventions that fueled the hostility between the SSNP and Fouad Chehab.

Preparation for the coup

As soon as the United Arab Republic (Syrian-Egyptian unity) collapsed on September 28, 1961, the SSNP found the perfect opportunity to assault Chehab’s regime, which had become barricaded by Syria and the anti-Nasserite Jordan. Despite the growing role of the Egyptian embassy’s intelligence, Jamal Abdul Nasser was no longer on the Lebanese borders to be able to intervene easily. Thus, the SSNP sensed that the time had come to break down the Chehabi-Nasserite alliance. Following a series of covert meetings held with the commander of the 1st sniper regiment in the Marjeyoun barrack Captain Chawqi Khairallah, and the commander of the 2nd armored battalion in the Tyre barrack Captain Fouad Awad, the SSNP leader Abdullah Saadeh set to launch a military coup against Fouad Chehab. The two officers conveyed to Awad what they considered complaints from the Lebanese Army officers about the policy adopted by the President of the Republic, thus laying the grounds for a significant and critical role of the army in the coup and facilitating its success by using soldiers and military equipment. The officers, who were loyal nationalists even before joining the Military School, reported to Awad the indignation dominating the army’s ranks and the possibility of relying on other indignant political figures who would later provide a political cover for the coup, especially that its success would instantly have them rallying to claim credit for it. Following the first meeting in October 1962 and a few successive ones, the SSNP leader communicated the idea with the party’s Higher Council and obtained its approval by a majority vote, with a few members expressing reserve over daring such a dangerous move, particularly if it did not succeed. Secret deliberations led to the outlining of a plan for the coup: arresting the president at his residence and confining the Speaker of the House, the premier and all high-ranking officers who were closely associated with the president.

It was agreed to initiate the coup at midnight on December 30, 1961, for soldiers and officers were usually off duty on New Year’s Eve and low alert levels could prove beneficial. However, the risk lied in counting on a small military force to carry out the strike, which was an armored regiment summoned from Tyre to invade the Ministry of National Defense.

Captain Chawqi Khairallah was arrested for disciplinary reasons in the wake of Independence Day on November 22, 1961 and was jailed for 60 days in a room at an officer’s house near the Fayyadieh barrack, a move that prevented the participation of his Marjeyoun regiment in the coup, which had already failed by the time of his release and arrival at the Ministry of Defense.

Another aspect of the plan, which was more precise and likely to avail, entailed the dispatch of a force of armed nationalists lead by officer Ali Haj Hussein to Jounieh, to arrest the President at his residence. Shortly past midnight, the armored battalion commanded by Captain Fouad Awad, headed from its barracks for the Ministry of National Defense. It arrived at around 2 am and confined senior officers including Antoun Saad (Head of Intelligence), Ahmad Haj, Fawzi Khateeb, Iskandar Ghanem, Jean Nakhoul, Sami Tabbara and Aniss Abou Zaki. During their gathering at Antoun’s residence, they received from intelligence agents news suggesting that many nationalists were spreading in certain Lebanese regions in preparation for what might be, according to many reports that had flooded the Intelligence Division for several days, a military insurgence. The officers hurried to the Ministry of National Defense at 1 am to follow up the matter, heedless that this could be an attempt for a coup d’etat. By the time they arrived, Fouad Awad’s battalion had been on its way to the Ministry, passing near three large army barracks: the 1st anti-aircraft regiment of Fouad Chehab’s barrack, the armor regiment of Prince Fakhreddine’s barrack and the artillery regiment of Prince Bashir’s barrack. Although the convoy did not encounter any army checkpoints or elicit the alertness of the Intelligence Division, the coup miscarried for two correlative reasons: failure to invade the Ministry of National Defense, and failure to arrest the President.

Fouad Awad blockaded the Ministry’s building without breaking in and arresting the officers, who had succeeded, thanks to an internal phone line, which survived the vandalism acts, to establish a connection between the office of Commander-in-Chief Iskandar Ghanem and the transportation regiment at Youssef Trabolsi’s barrack. The officers enclosed inside the Ministry were able to reach out to the army forces, put them on alert and warn the President. Meantime, the non-coordination among members of the nationalist force lead by Lieutenant Ali Haj Hassan and tasked with the arrest of the President delayed its arrival at his house, and resulted in foiling its plot and tracking its men in the nearby hills, especially after the force failed to contrive alternative measures and make use of time. Army units set off from the barracks in the vicinity of Beirut to capture Fouad Awad’s nationalist gunmen, while military aircrafts flew at low-level above the mountain and Jounieh. Communication was restored between all barracks and military units in the Lebanese regions, and the blockade of the Ministry was lifted shortly past 6 am, after the army had dispersed all over the place.

Following the death of 6 soldiers, the army re-tightened its hold over security and the masterminds and accomplices behind the coup, including the three officers, were arrested, while some other SSNP figures managed to flee first to Syria and then Jordan.

The SSNP was dissolved after over 10 000 of its members were hauled to prisons, most of which were military barracks or rooms in the Cite Sportive.

They were subjected to several transgressions and offences during the investigation, until they were transferred, two years later, on November 22, 1963, to civil prisons such as the Raml Prison in Beirut and another one in Tripoli, noting that thousands of innocents were released. All 140 soldiers who participated in the coup were also arrested and taken to Henri Chehab’s barracks for interrogation. The majority were later freed, as evidence proved they were not involved voluntarily in the rebellion, but were unknowingly tricked into being part of Fouad Awad’s secret scheme, save 26 members who joined Awad while besieging the Ministry of National Defense.

The Second Division was never hesitant to influence the judiciary and the course of investigation, portraying the coup as a threat to the regime and an attempt to undermine it by using violence, and planning to kill the President of the Republic. It also chased the SSNP proponents, closed down its offices in all Lebanese regions and banned all its meetings and activities. The houses and offices of the Syrian nationalists were subject to inspection and their families were interrogated and put under surveillance.

The trial of the SSNP lasted for months, until finally the Military Court of Cassation rendered on November 15, 1963, irrevocable verdicts following the reserve of Judge Emile Abou Kheir over classifying the coup attempt as a regular crime and his insistence to consider it a political one, a stance to which military judges objected, but the President resigned. The purpose was to overturn the death penalty verdicts against officers Fouad Awad, Chawqi Khairallah and Ali Haj Hassan and other senior SSNP figures including Abdullah Saadeh, Mohammad Baalbaki, Bashir Oubeid, Mohsen Atrash and Joubran Atrash and sentence them to hard labor for life rather than capital punishment. Other nationalists were sent to only one year in prison.

Rumors suggested that the anti-Nasserite Jordan and Briain’s allies were encouraging and financing the coup, which they believed would be a harsh blow against both President Chehab and Abdul Nasser, a finding that needs further exploration.

Nicolas Nassif. “The Republic of Fouad Chehab.” November 2008.