How does Al-Qaeda deal with its enemies and adversaries and what is the plan it adopts to confront them at the political, military and media levels?

“The premise that drives enemies into action is a material premise. The infidels’ ideology of conflict is for the most part a material and earthly ideology and their mundane motives are often eclipsed by false and pretentious religious or civil ones. Despite its being regarded by ignorant followers as a strong driver, the traditional ideological factor is not the sole factor that leads enemies into battle. Their action is in fact fueled both by material interests and the desire to survive. They are fighting for that and they do not accept just any kind of survival; they want the survival that ensures them an unruffled life of luxury and welfare and guarantees that their allies and advocates will maintain their alliance as long as interests are derived from this alliance. We should be fully aware of that.

Their most paramount political principle is therefore the principle of interests, which is devoid of all ethical values. It rather controls all other values. Friendship or enmity… peace or war… they are all decided based on interests.

Politicians of the West have summed it up in a slogan that reads “In politics, there does not exist permanent friends or enemies; only permanent interests.” The conflict of interest between them has thus triggered the bloodiest wars. However, this does not distract us from the fact that common hostility towards Islam constitutes a common ground for cooperation between infidels and apostates of every denomination. But we may also say that their ideological alliance against Islam is both fragile and limited as to the ceiling of the material interests assigned for each party. For this reason, we should devise our military and political plans only after a sound understanding and estimation of the ceiling of interests that undermines the action of each of our enemies and we should work towards expanding the gap of interests between adverse parties. The map of interests must be clearly perceived by the minds of our leaders, for it is as important as the military maps.

These are some attributes of the political position of the enemies, which affect directly the conflict between Islam and its enemies. Regarding different Islamic movements, Al-Moujawiroun, their approach is predicated on a mixture of Islamic politics and the same principles espoused by the enemies, particularly the principle of interests, with an alteration of the texts aimed at deluding people into believing the legitimacy of their mixture. Undoubtedly, some might be taken aback by their ability to exercise political maneuvering and make deals while no military force is available at their disposal. But reflective observers come to realize that their manipulation stems from those staggering numbers of youths they have and which can pose a threat only in one case: when leaderships fall owing to their lack of true worth and the youths disintegrate, the enemy will be fearful that those members might join the jihadist ranks. What we care to elucidate here is that the most paramount principle for which Al-Moujawiroun are maneuvering and the highest interest for which they would sell out religion and dispose of all religious interests is survival… survival… survival.

Of course, all that preceded is a set of signs. The Command and the bases should expand as much as possible to deepen their comprehension of the policies of both parties. Their study should alienate from the stereotype suggesting that the enemy is driven by religious impulses, especially when they find out that the religious motive is of secondary and even dwindling importance for numerous enemy members. The researcher who will qualify to join the political committees alongside his military tasks should perform profound history readings and have the ability to scrutinize. He is expected to have readings in psychology and to study sociology with special focus on the role of tribes and clans in our Arab and Islamic World as well as on the difference between commendable and reprehensible tribalism and the changes that the modern Jahiliyyah has made to tribal structures by dismantling tribes, either by blending them into modern civil institutions or by swerving them into the tribalism of Jahiliyah.

It is insufficient for the Muslim political leadership to be at such a high level that allows it to take superior political action, for Islamic bases should also enjoy a high degree of knowledge and awareness and engage in political decision making.

Highest among the benefits of political studies is the determination of reactions towards any step we plan to take then the pressing ahead with this step or its postponement until the circumstances are favorable or conditioning the circumstances so that they become favorable. This includes for example the identification of which enemy categories we are to start with, which requires every group to draw up a list of all the targeted enemies within its scope.

I have drawn attention to the significance of understanding the political game of the enemy and Al-Moujawiroun and of mastering politics. However, it is equally important not to overlook the perusal and understanding of religious policy while dealing with the ranks of Mujahideen or with those enemy members who choose to join the Islamic ranks and sometimes even the Jihadist ranks all at once. We should learn how to act if there ever comes a day when, among us, emerge kharijites, rebels, infidels, seekers of senior positions, voices demanding work-regulating statutes at odds with religious provisions, calls for membership in the United Nations, liquor drinkers or whatever needs to be halted. All such types are expected especially since our work is based on turning our Jihad into a Jihad of the nation rather than a mere movement. The manifestation of these types during the battle yields highly sensitive and complex situations and addressing such situations cannot be realized through the religious evidence of a stable state, but through an accurate religious policy inspired from the approach of our Prophet, peace and prayers be upon him, and the course of his companions.

The human structure of the enemy is frail in terms of combat, a disadvantage compensated for by the use of equipment, which cannot always be relied upon either. The false media halo and the use of media cunning and distortions throughout every move and in the face of any Jihadist operation are also ways to make up for weak manpower. This is why it is highly important to understand and cope with the information policy of one’s foes in order to gain both the military and the political battle. Central to the success of our information policy is the transmission of information material to their targeted recipients. Some media committees have been reproached in previous stages for their failure to reach out to the targeted segments particularly the public and our materials of information were reaching only the elite at a time when many non-Islamic movements succeeded to communicate their statements and content with every household and age group. This point should not be missed out because we want to transmit clearly to people our religious military and political stances and the reasonable and legitimate justification that makes them in the interest of the nation. To that end, a group should be formed, tasked with driving home the messages that we wish to impart to people, even if that would mean its exposure close to the danger of a combat operation.