Pre-agreement Facts

The Palestinian guerillas, Fatah Movement in particular, had been active in Lebanon since 1963. After the 1967 June War, their weapons spread unrestrainedly and their military activities escalated, drawing sharply divided reactions among the Lebanese. While the majority of Muslims supported the armament, a staunch opposition was evident on the Christian side.

The Tripartite Alliance, a Christian coalition that stemmed from the 1968 parliamentary elections (Phalanges Party, National Liberal Party and National Bloc), objected to the pro-Chehabi government led by Rashi Karami and called for an open-ended strike until formation of a new government. In response, accusations were thrown at the coalition for harboring sectarian leanings and an intent to overshadow the Lebanese Army by summoning international forces to Lebanon, in order to keep it on the sidelines of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On heels of the clashes that broke out between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerillas in the town of Kfarhala, South Lebanon, on April 16, 1969, leftist parties called for demonstrations in protest of the Army’s endeavor to abort the Palestinian cause. Fierce confrontations erupted between the demonstrators and the Army, starting in Saida and expanding to Beirut and the town of Bar Elias in Beqa’a. Tens of deaths and injuries were sustained on both sides, driving PM Rashid Karami to submit his resignation arguing that the Lebanese need to unify their stance towards this controversy or no government will be able to face it.

A month later, the Lebanese Army Commander brokered a deal with the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, in a bid to solve the escalating crisis. However, President Charles Helou, who refused that the Lebanese state sign a written agreement with an armed militia, thwarted the deal.

The situation went from bad to worse and the clashes showed no signs of slowing down. Amid rising tension, caretaker PM Rashid Karami ceased performing his government duties. On their part, Muslim leaders held a meeting chaired by Grand Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled on October 23, announcing that their participation in power can only be discussed after all the measures hindering the action of Palestinian militants are cancelled. At this juncture, President Charles Helou realized that this national political crisis cannot be eased except through dialogue with the Palestinians under the auspices of Egypt.

Cairo Agreement

It was decided that the caretaker PM Rashid Karami should preside over the negotiating delegation dispatched to Egypt. However, having refused to attend the negotiations in Egyptu for unknown reasons, Karami was replaced by the Lebanese Army Commander Emile Boustany who chaired a delegation consisting of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Najib Sadaqa, Major Sami el-Khatib and the Lebanese Ambassador to Egypt Halim Abou Ezzedine.

The delegation arrived in Egypt on October 26, 1963. Three days later, Sadaqa, who objected to the suggested draft agreement, withdrew from the negotiations under the false pretense of sickness and returned to Beirut. President Charles Helou greeted the final draft form, which was reached after five rounds of negotiations, with uncertainty. In his memoir, Minister Fred Boutros highlights his reaction when he was shown the draft agreement by President Helou by saying: “Either you refuse it and bear the consequences of immediate confrontations, or you approve of it and expect a war in five years.”

Major Sami El-Khatib provided accounts of the last moments before signing in his book Eye of the Storm. “..The first to counter the accord was President Charles Helou who dispatched Sadaqa to Egypt immediately on November 3, 1969. Sadaqa landed at 11:00 am and called me from the Cairo Airport saying he was carrying an urgent message from President Helou. He requested that I inform General Boustany not to sign before his arrival to the conference hall at the Ministry of Defense. By the time I relayed the message to General Boustany, the agreement had already been endorsed and sent to print and journalists had been called in to cover the event. “Since he is on the line, tell him that it is too late to undo the signing now. We are sorry,” he replied. Within my earshot, he added addressing Ambassador Ezzedine: “We, too, are keen on our dignity. This move harbors mistrust, disrespect and underestimation towards us, and me in particular, and I will never accept that.”

“Dr. Sadaqa arrived to find that General Boustany and Abou Ammar had signed, sealed and delivered all three copies of the Agreement and notified us that President Helou wanted to insert some amendments to the agreement for fear that some of its clauses might have undesirable effects triggering a backlash by the opposing parties. Here, and for the record, I care to note that General Boustany used to call President Helou from his hotel suite everyday between 7:00 and 8:00 pm, in our presence, to keep him posted on the latest updates. He would even read each and every clause to him and put him in light of the discussions and the opinions made, answering all the questions he raised about any detail, however its weight or significance. This is why we were all taken aback by the sudden appearance of Dr. Sadaqa.”

“It has been reported that General Boustany was fully aware that the Agreement would jeopardize Lebanon’s security and sovereignty, but nevertheless chose to press on with it to win over Abdul Nasser and realize his own presidential aspirations. As for President Charles Helou, he was hoping that the upcoming circumstances would curb the Palestinian presence and delay the eruption of the conflict.”

“It is noteworthy that the signing of the Cairo Agreement on November 3, 1969 allowed the formation of a new government under the premiership of Rashid Karami on November 25, seven months after his resignation.”

Strictly Confidential

On Monday, November 3, 1969, a Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander, General Emile Boustany and the PLO delegation headed by PLO Chief Yasser Arafat, met in Cairo in the presence of the United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Riad and the Defense Minister General Mohammad Fawzi.

In accordance with the bonds of fraternity and common destiny, relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance must always be conducted on the basis of confidence, integrity and positive cooperation for the benefit of both parties and within the framework of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security. The two delegations agreed on the following principles and measures.

Palestinian Presence

It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following basis:

• The right to work, residence and freedom of movement for Palestinians currently residing in Lebanon.
• The formation of self-governing local committees within the camps tasked with protecting the interests of refugees in cooperation with the local Lebanese authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty.
• The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle inside the camps for the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure good relations with the Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution.
• Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the Palestinian revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of the sovereignty and security of Lebanon.

Commando Activity

It was agreed to facilitate the commando activity by means of:

• Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and reconnaissance in the border areas.
• Safeguarding the road to the ‘Arqub region.
• The Armed Struggle shall undertake to control the conduct of all the members of its organizations and [to ensure] their non-interference in Lebanese affairs;
• Establishing a joint command control of the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army.
• Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides
• Conducting a census of Armed Struggle personnel in Lebanon by their command.
• Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese Army headquarters to participate in the resolution of all emergency matters.
• Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas which will be agreed with the Lebanese Army command.
• Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle personnel.
• Removal of the Jiyrun base.
• The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and supply centers for commando activity.
• Releasing detained personnel and confiscated arms.
• It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall continue to exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all circumstances.
• The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of Lebanon as well as in that of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs.
• This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only.