

- CONTRACT WORKERS AND 3147 VACANT POSTS
- KOURA BY-ELECTION
- “THE MONTHLY” INTERVIEWS AMIN SALEH

## 2013 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

MARCH 8 FORCES WIN BY PROPORTIONALITY  
AND MARCH 14 BY PLURALITY



## 4 2013 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

8 CONTRACT WORKERS AND 3147 VACANT POSTS AT ELÉCTRICITÉ DU LIBAN

11 KOURA BY-ELECTION

18 INCREASE IN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES MEMBERS

21 SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITION OF YOUNG WOMEN IN LEBANON

24 MEDICAL SENSE & COMMON SENSE: DR. HANNA SAADAH

25 A HUMAN UPON REQUEST: ANTOINE BOUTROS

26 THE STATUS OF LEBANON'S RULE FROM 1861 UNTIL 2012 (1): SAID CHAAYA

27 INTERVIEW: AMIN SALEH

29 SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS IN THE SPACE

30 TAMANNA

32 POPULAR CULTURE

33 DEBUNKING MYTH #60: THE EIGHT-HOUR SLEEP

34 MUST-READ BOOKS: THE REPUBLIC OF FOUAD CHEHAB

35 MUST-READ CHILDREN'S BOOK: "THE CLOUD", "FLYING"

36 LEBANON FAMILIES: HOUBAISH FAMILIES

37 DISCOVER LEBANON: KHAT EL-PETROL

38 CIVIL STRIFE INTRO (6)



P: 40



P: 24



P: 8

40 GHASSAN TUEINI: STANCES AND STATEMENTS

41 JUNE 2012 HIGHLIGHTS

45 ALGERIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

47 REAL ESTATE PRICES IN LEBANON - JUNE 2012

48 FOOD PRICES - JUNE 2012

50 FACTS ON INJURIES AND VIOLENCE

50 BEIRUT RAFIC HARIRI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - JUNE 2012

51 LEBANON STATS



## LONG LIVE THE TROIKA!

The Hrawi prize bestowed upon Speaker Nabih Berri has awakened the memory of the Lebanese to the glories of the Hrawi era. With a deep sigh of longing for the past and a firm awareness that the future will be bleaker, they all recalled together: “Those were the days!” Those were the days indeed, for as Speaker Berri put it, the troika<sup>1</sup> was the pyramid that paved the way for the paradise we are savoring today. The late Ghazi Kenaan, may he rest in peace, lavished his countless blessings on all of us and particularly on the national, Arab and revolutionary parties, which had no other concerns but to kiss his hand and gossip about their enemies, friends and comrades equally. Nobody amassed wealth quickly in an indecent manner during the Hrawi era and nobody dared to violate the sanctity of human life. Emigration rate hit the bottom during that golden age with only 300 000 people (around 8% of the population) leaving the country for good. Around 200 000 individuals were “accidentally” naturalized. Public debt soared to roughly USD 16.5 billion and profits from currency and treasury bills rigging skyrocketed to USD 30 billion. Those Lebanese leaders who screamed “Syria out” were in fact indebted to Ghazi Kenaan and his successor Rustom Ghazali but ironically rewarded them with accusations of treachery.

Fares Boueiz sat on the throne of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 8 years and Elie Hobeika (the ally of Syria and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, for whom we shall forever be grateful) on that of the Ministry of Electricity and Water Resources for 5 years after he was appointed Minister for Social Affairs, the Handicapped and the Displaced. Most of Lebanon’s Zu’ama showed their true colors by becoming jesters for the lowest Syrian intelligence officer. That era laid the foundations for the calls for liberty, sovereignty and independence and the former first lady Mrs. Mona Hrawi was seen, alongside the other ladies of the upper crust, at the forefront of the March 14 demonstration in 2005 demanding the termination of the Syrian domination of Lebanon. How unfair that era was to her!

And pardon us, the naïve ones, if we have overlooked that the Hrawi era was an era of more humor than wit. It was that that of the S-S (Syrian-Saudi) and the A-F (American-French) formulas and (...) let the Lebanese fill in the blank.

There was, however, a single bright spot during the term of that man, which was his insistence on the optional civil marriage law, which is still shelved in the “Grand Serail”, may God keep it an uncontested privilege to us, the Sunni.

— Jawad N. Adra

# 2013 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

## PROPORTIONALITY, PLURALITY AND DISTRICTS DETERMINE THE WINNER

### MARCH 8 FORCES WIN BY PROPORTIONALITY AND MARCH 14 BY PLURALITY

The current parliamentary term expires on June 20, 2013. According to Article 42 of the Lebanese Constitution, “General elections for the renewal of the Chamber shall take place within a sixty-day period preceding the expiration of its mandate.” Thus, the elections are supposed to occur between April 20 and June 19, 2013 but the electoral law to be adopted is still unknown. Three electoral formulas are being laid down:

- The current law, known also as the 60s law, according to which the 2009 elections were carried out.
- A proportionality voting system and a re-division of districts, which is the proposition put forth by Minister of Interior and Municipalities Marwan Charbel.
- A plurality voting system and the division of Lebanon into 40 districts, which is the proposition examined currently by the Bkerke gathering committee.

The adoption of any of the above-mentioned formulas determines beforehand the identity of the winner. In this article, we will shed light on the prospective results should they settle on the 2009 law or the proportionality law according to the current divisions.

#### 2013 elections according to the current law

Should the 2013 elections take place according to the current law and in keeping with the current available data, the results would be settled in 16 districts including 77 deputies as follows:

- In favor of March 14 Forces in 7 districts including 37 seats: Beirut 3 – Aley - Chouf- Mennieh-Dennieh – Bsharri – Akkar – Saida
- In favor of March 8 Forces in 9 districts including 40 seats: Baabda – Jbeil – Baalbeck and Hermel – Zahrani – Jezzine – Nabatieh – Bint Jbeil – Hasbaya and Marjeyoun – Tyre.

Another 7 districts including 37 seats would witness fierce elections but the results could also be quasi-final as follows:

- In favor of March 14 Forces in 5 districts including 26 seats: Tripoli (depending on the alliances) – Batroun – Koura – Zahle – Western Beqa’a and Rashaya.
- In favor of March 8 Forces in 2 districts (Kessrouan and Zgharta) including 8 seats

However, the remaining three districts, Beirut 1, Beirut 2 and Matn, with their 17 representative seats would experience fierce battles and the outcome would be difficult to predict. Basically, the actual electoral contest would be confined in 10 districts, but the real race would be for only 10 seats out of 51 as strong candidates are believed sure to win the other 41 seats.

**“Should the 2013 elections take place according to the current law and in keeping with the current available data, the results would be settled in 16 districts including 77 deputies”**

All in all, March 14 Forces might win 63 seats against 55 for March 8 Forces while the tip of the balance remains tied to the outstanding 10 seats which would decide who gains the majority of seats in Parliament, even though the indicators oscillate to the benefit of March 14 Forces.

Table 1 illustrates the electoral situation in each of the districts.

**Situation in electoral districts** **Table 1**

Electoral district	# of seats	March 14 Forces prospective results	March 14 Forces prospective results
Beirut 1	5	Tight competition and uncertain results	
Beirut 2	4	Tight competition and uncertain results	
Beirut 3	10	10	-
Northern Matn	8	Tight competition and uncertain results	
Baabda	6	-	6
Aley	5	5	-
Chouf	8	8	-
Kessrouan	5	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 8 Forces	
Jbeil	3	-	3
Tripoli	8	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 14 Forces according to the alliances which might differ from those of 2009	
Batroun	2	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 14 Forces	
Koura	3	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 14 Forces	
Mennieh-Dennieh	3	3	-
Zgharta	3	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 8 Forces	
Bsharri	2	2	-
Akkar	7	7	-
Zahle	7	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 14 Forces	
Baalbeck- Hermel	10	-	10
Western Beqa'a-Rashaya	6	Tight competition and the results are likely in favor of March 14 Forces	
Saida	2	2	-
Saida towns- Zahrani	3	-	3
Jezzine	3	-	3
Nabatieh	3	-	3
Tyre	4	-	4
Bint Jbeil	3	-	3
Hasbaya and Marjeyoun	5	-	5
<b>Total (26 districts)</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>40</b>

Source: 2009 parliamentary elections' results

### Proportionality voting system

There are numerous suggested formulas for the proportionality voting system, like the adoption of one or two preferential votes, the minimum requirements of a list to qualify for a parliamentary seat, the closed or open lists, the arrangement of candidate names within the lists and many other technicalities that affect the electoral results. Attention was also accorded to the distribution of districts. Will they adopt Lebanon or the Mohafaza as a single district? Or could they settle for a new district arrangement?

If we took the results of the 2009 elections, which occurred according to a plurality electoral system, and projected them onto a proportionality based voting (which is a systematic error in principle), the results would change and March 8 Forces would secure 68 seats against 60 for March 14 Forces as illustrated in Table 2. March 8 Forces would garner a plurality of 854 thousand votes against 716 thousand votes for March 14 Forces as illustrated in table 3.

Seats according to plurality and proportionality voting systems

Table 2

District	Seats	March 14 Forces		March 8 Forces	
		Current seats according to the plurality voting system	Potential seats according to the proportional voting system	Current seats according to the plurality voting system	Potential seats according to the proportional voting system
Beirut 1	5	5	3	-	2
Beirut 2	4	2	2	2	2
Beirut 3	10	10	8	-	2
Baabda	6	-	3	6	3
Aley	5	4	3	1	2
Chouf	8	8	6	-	2
Matn	8	2	3	6	5
Kessrouan	5	-	2	5	3
Jbeil	3	-	1	3	2
Tripoli	8	8	5	-	3
Koura	3	3	2	-	1
Batroun	2	2	1	-	1
Mennieh-Dennieh	3	3	2	-	1
Zgharta	3	-	1	3	2
Akkar	7	7	5	-	2
Bsharri	2	2	1	-	1
Zahle	7	7	4	-	3
Western Beqa'a-Rashaya	6	6	3	-	3
Baalbeck-Hermel	10	-	1	10	9
Saida	2	2	1	-	1
Saida Qada'a (Zahrani)	3	-	-	3	3
Nabatieh	3	-	-	3	3
Tyre	4	-	-	4	4
Bint Jbeil	3	-	-	3	3
Marjeyoun and Hasbaya	5	-	2	5	3
Jezzine	3	-	1	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>68</b>

Source: Parliamentary elections 2009

The popular size of March 8 and March 14 lists in Lebanon's electoral districts

Table 3

Electoral district	Registered voters in 2009	Actual voters in 2009	Average # of voters for March 14 Forces list	Average # of voters for March 8 Forces list
Beirut 1	92,764	37,284	19,533	16,791
Beirut 2	101,787	27,787	16,583	15,126
Beirut 3	252,165	103,243	76,618	21,382
Matn	170,744	96,748	45,680	47,582
Kessrouan	89,228	60,336	26,942	31,200
Jbeil	75,582	49,128	20,365	28,594
Baabda	151,590	84,546	36,444	45,011
Aley	116,181	59,779	35,117	21,596
Chouf	181,949	91,642	61,452	21,248
Western Beqa'a and Rashaya	122,487	65,237	34,466	27,812
Zahle	158,005	88,483	48,510	41,166
Baalbeck and Hermel	255,637	126,038	14,000	107,308
Saida	53,859	36,624	24,250	13,512
Zahrani (Saida towns)	92,995	50,217	3,300	44,236
Jezzine	54,188	29,225	6,400	14,650
Nabatieh	121,912	60,956	3,200	59,346
Tyre	153,060	74,941	2,000	68,800
Bint Jbeil	123,396	52,899	500	49,282
Marjeyoun and Hasbaya	138,844	64,975	12,000	47,745
Tripoli	196,149	89,886	55,690	31,143
Koura	57,794	27,417	14,141	12,100
Batroun	58,444	32,914	17,637	13,700
Zgharta	71,035	34,399	14,900	18,060
Bsharri	46,422	17,183	12,910	4,089
Mennieh-Dennieh	97,352	54,916	37,772	16,100
Akkar	223,538	120,608	75,780	36,700
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,257,107</b>	<b>1,637,412</b>	<b>716,190</b>	<b>854,279</b>

Source: Parliamentary elections' results in 2009

In a nutshell, we conclude that the plurality system adopted in 2009 is the preferred choice for March 14 Forces as it secures them the highest representation in Parliament, while March 8 Forces opt for a proportionality-based law according to the same 2009 divisions or adopting to the Mohafaza as an electoral district in order to win the majority of seats. The Lebanese parties are not divided over a law that guarantees fair representation and contributes to state building but rather over a law that grants victory to one of them over the other. ●

# CONTRACT WORKERS AND 3147 VACANT POSTS AT ELÉCTRICITÉ DU LIBAN

**EDL contract workers and bill collectors staged a protest at EDL headquarters in Mar Mikhael in Beirut preventing the employees from entering their offices and demanding to be awarded full-time employment especially that most of them have spent over 15 years in service without any medical, social or pension benefits.**

In response to the protests, the Minister of Energy and Water Gebran Bassil said that the demand for EDL personnel does not require the employment of over 600 people, stressing that the contract workers are not directly associated with EDL as they work for contractors at the service of the company.

Parliament approved on Monday, July 2, 2012 a draft law that suggests converting contract workers to employees on a full-time basis following a contest carried out by the Civic Service Board. This move lead to a drastic change in alliances as the Change and Reform Bloc sided with the Phalanges Party and the Lebanese Forces against Parliament's decision while the Future Movement, Amal Movement, Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party supported the move. So what is this case and what are its roots, sectarian backgrounds and political repercussions?

## Roots of the problem

In the early 1990 and the years that followed, EDL failed to fulfill its assigned duties due to the substantial lack of employees, and it resorted to contracting with contractors from different Lebanese regions to carry out the works and reforms it demands for a certain financial return. Those contractors employed a number of workers (without a contest) to assume the duties ordered by EDL, which contracted also a number of collectors tasked with collecting electricity bills. The number of workers employed by the contractors reached around 1970, of which 1520 work at the two directorates in Beirut and Mount Lebanon and the regions and 450 in other EDL divisions. Furthermore, the number of collectors amounted to 700 thus bringing the total up to 2670 employees who, as mentioned earlier, enjoy no benefits or guarantees or retirement salaries and are not registered in the SSNF.

All that those have been demanding was a bit of stability and a fair chance to progress and get promoted.

## Why now?

A reasonable question emerges in this context: If this was not a new demand then why has the crisis erupted right now and at this particular stage? The main reason is that the Ministry of Energy and Water has signed upon the approval of the Cabinet three contracts with three companies known as "Service Providers" to be in charge of the tasks that the contractors used to assume starting June 1, 2012 and thus stripping collectors and contract workers of their jobs, save the very few among them who managed to grab an employment opportunity in one of the three companies. Therefore, they took to the streets to maintain their jobs and impede the work of the new service providers. It is said that the cost of the contractors in the previous stage did not exceed USD 200 million per year while the cost of the current companies is as high as USD 330 million and some even estimate it at USD 700 million.

## Status of EDL staff

There are 5035 technical and administrative posts at EDL, of which 1888 are occupied and 3147 are vacant, which pushes the vacancy rate in EDL staff to 62.5%. 224 posts can be filled by adopting an upgrading system while the vacancy in the remaining 2923 posts can be resolved by employing the contract workers and bill collectors.

Table 1 illustrates the total number of the available, occupied and vacant posts distributed by grade and unit.

EDL available, occupied and vacant posts						Table 1
Unit	Grade/Rank	Posts	Occupied posts	Contract posts	Vacant posts	
Technical	2/ Rank 1	8	0	0	8	
	2/ Rank 2	29	5	0	24	
	3/ Rank 1	76	53	0	23	
	3/ Rank 2a	171	64	1	106	
	3/ Rank 2b	378	247	0	131	
	4/ Rank 1	528	464	3	61	
	4/ Rank 2	440	76	0	364	
	5/ Rank 1	1040	422	3	615	
	5/ Rank 2	818	53	4	761	
	6	9	0	2	7	
<b>Total</b>		<b>3497</b>	<b>1384</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2100</b>	
Administrative	2/ Rank 1	2	0	0	2	
	2/ Rank 2	9	9	0	0	
	3/ Rank 1	27	12	0	15	
	3/ Rank 2a	109	57	5	47	
	3/ Rank 2b	143	114	0	29	
	4/ Rank 1	258	49	5	204	
	4/ Rank 2	31	0	0	31	
	5/ Rank 1	400	186	3	211	
	5/ Rank 2	120	1	1	118	
	6/ Rank 1	413	43	0	370	
	6/ Rank 1	26	5	1	20	
<b>Total</b>		<b>1538</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1047</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5035</b>	<b>1860</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>3147</b>	

Source: EDL staff

## Partial employment

Against this alarming vacancy rate, and in order to secure the minimum number of employees necessary to keep EDL running, the Minister of Energy and Water has demanded the approval of the government to hire 600 employees to fulfill the different grades, but refrained from requesting the hiring of contract workers and collectors presumably for financial and other considerations.

EDL staff has room for all contract workers and more. It was set to include 5035 employees when the number of subscribers to EDL was still below 600,000. Today, the number of subscribers has soared to 1.6 million and thus there is a pressing need to fill the vacancies in the first stage and enlarge the staff afterwards.

Upon examination, it turns out that the majority of contract workers is Muslim and is distributed as follows:

**Shia'a: 50%**

**Sunni and Druze: 28%**

**Christian: 25%**

Awarding those permanent jobs at EDL would disturb the sectarian balance at a time when the Christian forces are struggling to diminish the sectarian disparities in all civil and military agencies. Those who challenge the decision attribute their opposition to other financial reasons since the process of converting 2500 contract employees and collectors to full-time employees costs LBP 140 billion per year but their rivals assure that this cost remains by far lower than the contracts that were signed with the contractors, or those signed with the service providers and that the actual cost would not exceed LBP 60 billion maximum, since the current cost of the 1888 employees is no more than LBP 58 billion.

### Full-time employment law

Parliament approved on Monday, July 2, 2012 a draft law that would enable many contract workers at EDL to become full-time employees at the state-run company after participating in a closed contest organized by the Civil Service Board. Christian parties of different backgrounds and affiliations challenged the draft law while Muslim MPs supported its endorsement, thrusting the divides in Lebanon back to their religious roots. And so, Christian MPs boycotted the parliamentary session that was scheduled the next day to discuss and approve the agenda, and the Change and Reform Bloc ministers refrained, in turn, from attending the Cabinet session scheduled that same day.

Achieving sectarian balance at EDL and other state-run agencies is a goal sought by most Christian parties and leaderships, but those are violating article 95 of the constitution, which stipulated the elimination of political sectarianism, and in the meantime (meaning currently), the following measures prevail:

- All sects should be represented fairly in the government.
- The sectarian representation rule adopted in the public agencies, the judiciary and the security and military institutions should be eliminated giving way to competence and qualifications in the hiring process, except for the Grade 1 posts and their equivalents where 50/50 split between Muslims and Christians shall remain the norm.

**“Most of the vacant posts in EDL belong to Grade 4 and below (2701 posts out of 3147 accounting for 86%) where no sectarian constraints are imposed”**

At a time when 50/50 split in Grade 1 posts has been respected, other posts are being monopolized by certain sects and Christian forces are still demanding equality in all and not only Grade 1 posts which is deemed a constitutional infringement.

Most of the vacant posts in EDL belong to Grade 4 and below (2701 posts out of 3147 accounting for 86%) where no sectarian constraints are imposed.

The Lebanese might be in need of a new national covenant that eliminates all the concerns and frustrations caused by demographic imbalances, and lays down new bases and criteria for the segmentation of power and administration far from sizes and numbers. So is it possible to achieve a proportional sectarian balance in power and administration in light of the sharp demographic imbalance? ●



Eléctricité du Liban -Photo by Mohammad Mashlab



Contract Workers protest -Photo by Mohammad Mashlab

# KOURA BY-ELECTION

## VOTING CHOICES AND ELECTORAL INCLINATIONS 2009-2012

### READINGS OUTSIDE THE SECTS

The parliamentary by-election in the Koura district ended, as expected, with the victory of the Lebanese Forces candidate, Fadi Karam, who was backed by the Future Movement against his rival Walid Azar from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), supported by the Marada Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement. Karam won 12,412 votes against 11,141 votes for Azar, i.e. by a difference of 1271 votes. These results held no surprises to anyone. However, they held a number of political, sectarian and patronage paradoxes and indicators that we must stop to examine.

**1-** There was a noticeable decline in the number of registered voters which decreased from 58,037 in 2009 to 57,537 this year, i.e. down by 500 voters. Given the number of voters registered in the past few years, it was estimated that there would be as many as 59,400 registered voters in 2012. The decline is due to a decrease in the birth rates which translates into lower population growth rates on the one hand, and to the updates and corrections that the voter lists undergo after deleting the names of the deceased and the married women who are transferred to other regions inside or outside the Qada'a on the other. The decline in voter numbers was evident in the following towns:

Amioun (243 voters)- Enfé (87 voters)- Batroumine (33 voters)- Btaaboura (34 voters)- Bdebbba (22 voters)- Bechmizzine (57 voters)- Bterram (73 voters)- Qalhat (54 voters)- Kfar Aqqa (90 voters)- Kousba (48 voters) and Mitrit (87 voters).

Muslim towns and villages witnessed an increase in voter numbers while the rates remained stable in the rest of the Qada'a.

**2-** Voter turnout in the current by-election amounted to 43.04%, down from 47.24% in 2009. This percentage is considered relatively high in comparison to the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2000, when the voter turnout stood at 41.5% and 39.1% respectively. Registering a lower turnout is a natural occurrence in a by-election. However, some towns have witnessed a substantial decrease in a voter participation: Ajdebrine (7%)- Al-Nakhlé (10%)- Enfé (7%)- Btouratij (17.3%)-

Badbhoun (7%)- Bednayel (22%)- Deddé (7%)- Ras Masqa Chmaliyé(15%)- Zgharta Al-Mtaouile(20%- noting that this is a small Shia'a town having no more than 185 voters)- Kafraiya (7%)- Dhour el-Hawa (18% noting that this is a small Alawi town having no more than 291 voters)- Kaftoun (11%).

The towns that registered higher turnout were: Mitrit (up from 16.3% to 21.6%) and Dar Bechmizzine (a 1% increase).

**3-** The March 14 Forces list gained in 2009 an average of 14,141 votes against 12,111 for the list of March 8 Forces, i.e. a difference of 2030 votes. The margin between the last winner (Nicolas Ghosn) and the first loser (Fayez Ghosn) was 1461 votes while 1829 votes separated the LF candidate Farid Habib and the SSNP candidate Salim Saadeh. The gap was narrowed down this year owing mainly to the shift in the voting behavior of the Sunni or the decline in their participation.

**4-** The number of blank ballots cast during the 2012 Koura by-election rose significantly to 566 up from 159 in 2009. 69 blank ballots were cast in Enfé compared to 12 in 2009, 41 in Amioun compared to 17 in 2009 and 65 in Deddé, up from only 11 in 2009. There were 42 blank votes in Rashdebbine this year while not even one was heard of in 2009. Similarly, blank votes were also evident in Ain Ekrin with 23 casting blank ballots up from 6 in 2009. 29 blank ballots were registered in Kfarsaroun, 20 in Kfarhazir, 43 in Kousba and 43 in Kafraiya compared to 3, 4, 8 and 12 respectively in 2009.

**5-** It is true, perhaps, that the sectarian factor contributed partly to determine the choices and preferences of the voters in Koura, but there were also other factors that came into play such as the influence of the Zu'ama, the role of networks in shaping the electoral behavior, and the financial and economic interests which dictated certain trends that will most probably play a major role in the upcoming elections, especially that Koura has historically been more or less independent of political considerations, which distinguishes it clearly from other districts.

**6-** There were two LF candidates, Youssef Asaad Skaff and George William Matar who received 1 and 0 votes respectively. The Lebanese Forces nominated them for the seat as a mere tactic to increase the number of delegates and the size of spending, which exposes the whole electoral round to appeal, especially that the votes between the winner and the loser did not exceed 1300, which suggests that around 650 votes could have tipped the balance. It is noteworthy that according to the current electoral law, candidates shall keep their spending under a defined expense ceiling amounting to LBP 150 million, in addition to LBP 4000 for each voter. Thus the total ceiling in Koura becomes LBP 380 million.

**7-** In 2009, the LF candidate Farid Habib won by 1829 votes against his SSNP rival Salim Saadeh. However, the difference between the 2012 competing candidates was narrowed down to 1271 votes. Furthermore, in 2009 the LF candidate received 50.3% of the total vote, a percentage that decreased slightly to 50% in 2012, while the share of the SSNP candidate rose from 43.7% to 45%. The results broke down in the largest towns as follows:

- **Enfé:** the LF candidate gained 62.7% of Enfé's votes against 33% for the SSNP candidate, i.e. a difference of 766 votes. In 2009 the candidate of the former group received 57% of the total votes against 34.5% for the latter. The comparison reflects a great progress for the Lebanese Forces and their ally Farid Makari in Enfé.
- **Amioun:** the LF candidate gained 486 votes accounting for 20% of the total votes against 75.1% for the SSNP candidate. In 2009 the former gathered 19.5% against 75.3% for the latter, which suggests stability in the electoral behavior of Amioun voters with a slight advancement for the Lebanese Forces in a town that historically has been a stronghold of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

- **Kousba:** the LF candidate gathered 51% of the total votes against 45.3% for the SSNP candidate compared to 51.7% and 43% respectively in 2009, thus reflecting a modest progress in favor of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
- **Kfarhazir:** 54.2% of the votes were for the LF candidate against 42.2% for his rival compared to 50% and 46% respectively in 2009, meaning one step forward to the Lebanese Forces and one backward to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
- **Kfar Aqqa:** 61% of the votes went for the LF candidate against 35% for his SSNP rival compared to 56.8% and 36% respectively in 2009, meaning a favorable turn for the Lebanese Forces and a slight decrease for the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
- **Dar Baaechtar:** the LF candidate received 58.8% of the total votes against 35.6% for the SSNP candidate compared to 58.2% and 35% respectively in 2009, which suggests that the choices of voters were quasi-stable with a slight progress for the Syrian Social Nationalist party in a town with a Maronite majority.
- **Deddé:** the LF candidate received 52.6% of the total votes against 42% for the SSNP candidate compared to 58.2% and 35.8% respectively in 2009 thus reflecting a progress for the SSNP at the expense of the LF in a town where 40% of the population is Sunni and 60% Greek Orthodox. It is worth noting that the LF candidate gained 53.8% of the Sunni votes in Deddé compared to 66.6% in 2009.
- **Kafraiya:** in this town which has a Sunni majority and a Maronite minority, 58% of the total votes were cast in favor of the LF candidate against 35% for his rival compared to 72% and 21% respectively in 2009, which suggests a leap for the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

**8-** Readings into the increasing or decreasing voting rates upon comparison between the 2009 and the 2012 elections according to town reveal the following:

The so-called Sunni towns witnessed noticeable modifications particularly in Kafraiya, Ajdebrine and Deddé. The votes favoring the SSNP candidate rose by 7.95% in Deddé and 58.79 in Kafraiya, while those backing the LF candidate decreased by 10.42% in Al-Nakhlé, 23.20% in Kafraiya, 28.57% in Bednayel and 17.33% in Deddé.

The results in Kousba, Enfé, Kfar Aqqa and Al-Nakhlé reflected lower turnout for both parties at varying rates. The votes decreased by 13.69% for the LF candidate and 7.60% for the SSNP candidate in Kousba. Similar decreases were evident in Kfar Aqqa with 11.6% for the SSNP candidate and 1.80% for the LF candidate. However, the latter managed to maintain stable votes in Enfé while the former lost 13.44% of his previous share. The decline was quasi-equivalent for both candidates in Nakhle.

### 9- Voter inclinations by sectarian affiliation

- **Greek Orthodox:** Walid Azar (SSNP) received 51% of the Greek Orthodox votes against 48% for Fadi Karam (LF) compared to 49% and 45% respectively in 2009.
- **Maronite:** Maronite voters channeled 70% of their votes for Fadi Karam and 28% for Walid Azar compared to 68% and 19% respectively in 2009.
- **Sunni:** 68% of the Sunni voted for Fadi Karam and 34% for his rival compared to 73% and 21% respectively in 2009.
- **Shia'a:** similarly to the 2009 elections, the sweeping majority of the Shia'a (99%) voted for Walid Azar.

### Readings outside the sects

Whereas the electoral power of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party has been proven in this round, that of its allies, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Marada Movement, should be subject to examination in light of the results of Kfar Aqqa (supposedly supporting Aoun) and Kousba (supposedly supporting Frangieh). Similarly, even if Farid Makari has shown a considerable weight in his hometown Enfé, without which it would have been difficult for the LF candidate to win, the position and the role of the Future Movement in the eyes of the Sunni in Koura should also undergo reassessment.

Despite the decline in the Sunni voter turnout and the shift in the orientations of some Sunni, the LF candidate owes his victory to them and to the high vote rates he received from the Maronite and Greek Orthodox voters. And so, the Lebanese Forces emerged victorious in 27 towns and the SSNP in another 18 while a near tie prevailed in one town, Bterram.

There have been common and multiple interpretations recently regarding the so-called “Sunni vote”, “Maronite

vote”, and “Orthodox vote”. However, readings into the Koura results raise a number of questions:

If the so-called “Sunni vote” was the factor that tilted the balance, then what about the 48% of “the Greek Orthodox vote” in favor of the LF candidate? And what do we have to say about the “Shia'a” who cast 99% of their vote to the SSNP candidate? And why did the Free Patriotic Movement and the Marada Movement fail to gather more than 28% of the Maronite vote for the candidate they support?

Why did the number of Sunni voters decrease from 4700 in 2009 to 3500 in 2012? And why did the share of the SSNP candidate increase from 21% to 34%? Is the matter tied to shifting political choices and orientations or to financial and cost of living pressures that might be addressed later by the Future Movement. And what about the important role played by Faisal Karami in general and in Deddé in particular?

Why did the results March 8 Forces achieved in Kfar Aqqa, Enfé and Kfarhazir in 2012 turn out differently compared to those of 2009?

It is time to analyze the voting orientations based on socio-economic non-sectarian factors and to measure the objective facts and data attesting to the strengths or weaknesses of all the contesting parties in Koura. The networks and connections weaved by the Future Movement and its follower Farid Makari who has been a staunch ally of the SSNP and the Marada Movement since the early 1990s until 2005 are worth a deeper scrutiny. Furthermore, the performance of the SSNP in Koura must be subject to reassessment as we are witnessing a decreased popularity among the voters that were traditionally supportive of the party, thus facilitating the infiltration of the LF, not to mention that the SSNP has displayed hesitance in contesting the elections and disturbance in its political rhetoric. The Lebanese Forces on the other hand have adopted a clear discourse rejecting political bequest and tribal considerations as if the party was the master of “modern thinking”. Despite all this, the SSNP was able to awaken its ranks and profit from the large base in Koura, which challenged the Lebanese Forces by casting blank ballots or voting for Walid Azar (11141 votes). Finally, it seems that the Lebanese Forces' banner “And Koura remains Lebanese” is in fact an accusation that the thousands who voted for Azar are not being Lebanese enough. ●

## Numbers of registered and actual voters and voter turnout between 2009 and 2012

#	Town	Sect	2012					
			# of registered voters	# of actual voters	Voter turnout %	Blank ballots	Invalid ballots	Valid ballots
1	Ajdebrine	Sunni + Maronite	815	496	60.9	8	5	488
2	El-Bahsas	Maronite	154	42	27.3	0	0	42
3	Majedl Wazkazouk	Maronite	626	370	59.1	10	1	360
4	Al-Nakhlé	Sunni majority+ Maronite minority	725	355	49.0	11	9	344
5	Amioun Sharqi	Greek Orthodox	3,491	1,227	35.1	25	14	1,202
	Amioun Gharbi	Greek Orthodox	3,277	1,199	36.6	16	5	1,183
6	Enfé	Greek Orthodox + Sunni minority	4,678	2,577	55.1	69	14	2,508
7	Batroumine	Greek Orthodox	1,180	381	32.3	8	5	373
8	Btaaboura	Greek Orthodox	650	209	32.2	3	0	206
9	Btouratij	Sunni	826	363	43.9	7	7	356
10	Bhabouch	Maronite majority + Shia'a minority	596	253	42.4	0	2	253
11	Bdebba	Greek Orthodox	885	302	34.1	4	8	298
12	Badbhoun	Sunni	176	85	48.3	2	0	83
13	Bednayel	Sunni	409	219	53.5	1	2	218
14	Barsa	Maronite majority + Greek Orthodox minority	1,241	455	36.7	4	6	451
15	Barghoun	Sunni	329	208	63.2	4	4	204
16	Bziza	Maronite majority + Greek Orthodox minority	1,043	472	45.3	9	3	463
17	Bechmizzine	Greek Orthodox	2,004	687	34.3	7	6	680
18	Bsarma	Greek Orthodox+ Maronite	1,308	413	31.6	10	8	403
19	Bterram	Greek Orthodox	1,906	522	27.4	19	3	503
20	Bkeftine	Greek Orthodox + Maronite + Sunni minority	383	147	38.4	1	6	146
21	Bnehran	Shia'a	392	209	53.3	3	0	206
22	Haret Al-Khassa	Maronite	337	101	30.0	2	1	99
23	Dar Baaechtar	Maronite	2,296	912	39.7	15	12	897
24	Dar Chmizzine	Greek Orthodox + Maronite minority	376	157	41.8	0	0	157
25	Deddé	Greek Orthodox + Sunni	3,858	2,022	52.4	65	21	1,957
26	Ras Masqa Chmaliyé	Sunni	335	182	54.3	6	3	176
	Ras Masqa Jnoubiyeh	Greek Orthodox + Maronite	758	253	33.4	2	0	251
27	Rechdibbine	Maronite	836	425	50.8	42	1	383
28	Zgharta El-Mtaouile	Shia'a	185	104	56.2	1	0	103
29	Zakroun	Maronite	257	176	68.5	3	0	173
30	Dahr Al-Ain	Maronite	188	81	43.1	0	1	81
31	Dhour Al-Hawa	Alawi	291	209	71.8	0	3	209
32	Aaba	Greek Orthodox	786	252	32.1	0	1	252
33	Aafsdig	Greek Orthodox majority + Sunni minority	866	382	44.1	7	6	375
34	Ain Aakrine	Maronite	1,118	577	51.6	23	4	554
35	Fiaa	Greek Orthodox	1,433	669	46.7	7	9	662
36	Qalhat	Greek Orthodox	1,120	461	41.2	17	7	444
37	Kaftoun	Greek Orthodox	451	174	38.6	1	1	173
38	Kfar Hata	Greek Orthodox majority + Maronite minority	996	552	55.4	5	2	547
39	Kfar Hazir	Greek Orthodox majority + Maronite minority	2,397	1,057	44.1	20	6	1,037
40	Kfar Saroun	Greek Orthodox majority + Maronite minority	747	298	39.9	4	0	294
41	Kfar Aqqa	Greek Orthodox majority + Maronite minority	3,413	1,521	44.6	29	10	1,492
42	Kfar Kahel	Sunni + Greek Orthodox	753	265	35.2	8	1	257
43	Kafraiya	Sunni majority + Maronite minority	1,276	829	65.0	43	6	786
44	Kousba	Greek Orthodox majority + Maronite minority	4,582	1,742	38.0	43	11	1,699
45	Mitrit	Maronite majority + Shia'a minority	788	170	21.6	2	0	168
46	Electoral employees	Multiple sects	0	0	0.0	0	0	0
	<b>Total</b>		<b>57,537</b>	<b>24,762</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>24,196</b>

	2009						Difference between 2009 and 2012				
	# of registered voters	# of actual voters	Voter turnout %	Blank ballots	Invalid ballots	Valid ballots	# of registered voters	# of actual voters	Blank ballots	Invalid ballots	Valid ballots
	784	532	67.9	4	2	530	31	-36	4	3	-42
	155	48	31.0	0	0	48	-1	-6	0	0	-6
	628	395	62.9	0	3	392	-2	-25	10	-2	-32
	694	403	58.1	3	7	396	31	-48	8	2	-52
	3,661	1,326	36.2	9	3	1,323	-170	-99	16	11	-121
	3,350	1,248	37.3	8	14	1,233	-73	-49	8	-9	-50
	4,591	2,853	62.1	12	19	2,834	87	-276	57	-5	-326
	1,213	437	36.0	4	2	435	-33	-56	4	3	-62
	684	238	34.8	1	2	236	-34	-29	2	-2	-30
	822	504	61.3	9	4	500	4	-141	-2	3	-144
	590	279	47.3	5	0	279	6	-26	-5	2	-26
	907	332	36.6	2	4	328	-22	-30	2	4	-30
	178	99	55.6	0	0	99	-2	-14	2	0	-16
	389	294	75.6	1	0	294	20	-75	0	2	-76
	1,226	462	37.7	0	3	459	15	-7	4	3	-8
	314	211	67.2	1	0	211	15	-3	3	4	-7
	1,031	520	50.4	2	4	516	12	-48	7	-1	-53
	2,061	781	37.9	7	6	775	-57	-94	0	0	-95
	1,344	470	35.0	1	0	470	-36	-57	9	8	-67
	1,979	570	28.8	3	2	568	-73	-48	16	1	-65
	393	169	43.0	0	0	169	-10	-22	1	6	-23
	402	228	56.7	3	0	228	-10	-19	0	0	-22
	331	107	32.3	1	0	107	6	-6	1	1	-8
	2,281	1,002	43.9	5	4	998	15	-90	10	8	-101
	364	148	40.7	0	0	148	12	9	0	0	9
	3,726	2,210	59.3	11	13	2,197	132	-188	54	8	-240
	321	222	69.2	0	1	221	14	-40	6	2	-45
	762	284	37.3	5	1	283	-4	-31	-3	-1	-32
	851	435	51.1	0	2	433	-15	-10	42	-1	-50
	174	132	75.9	1	0	132	11	-28	0	0	-29
	248	177	71.4	0	1	176	9	-1	3	-1	-3
	189	89	47.1	0	2	87	-1	-8	0	-1	-6
	267	213	79.8	0	0	213	24	-4	0	3	-4
	781	282	36.1	0	1	281	5	-30	0	0	-29
	839	398	47.4	2	0	398	27	-16	5	6	-23
	1,104	632	57.2	6	4	628	14	-55	17	0	-74
	1,466	751	51.2	9	3	748	-33	-82	-2	6	-86
	1,174	551	46.9	4	1	550	-54	-90	13	6	-106
	445	220	49.4	0	1	219	6	-46	1	0	-46
	1,009	568	56.3	4	15	553	-13	-16	1	-13	-6
	2,365	1,074	45.4	4	10	1,064	32	-17	16	-4	-27
	744	333	44.8	3	19	314	3	-35	1	-19	-20
	3,503	1,659	47.4	7	5	1,654	-90	-138	22	5	-162
	711	291	40.9	2	4	287	42	-26	6	-3	-30
	1,234	868	70.3	12	6	862	42	-39	31	0	-76
	4,630	1,990	43.0	8	10	1,950	-48	-248	35	1	-251
	875	143	16.3	0	0	143	-87	27	2	0	25
	247	240	97.2	0	0	240	-247	-240	0	0	-240
	<b>58,037</b>	<b>27,418</b>	<b>47.24%</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>27,209</b>	<b>-500</b>	<b>-2,656</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-3,013</b>

## Comparison between the numbers of votes gained by the LF candidate and the SSNP candidate in 2009 and 2012

#	Town	2012			2009			LF candidate %	
		# of voters	LF candidate Fadi Karam	SSNP candidate Walid Azar	# of voters	LF candidate Farid Habib	SSNP candidate Salim Saadeh	2009	2012
1	Ajdebrine	496	304	169	532	387	130	73	61
2	El-Bahsas	42	33	9	48	33	15	69	79
3	Majedl Wazkazouk	370	218	140	395	220	143	56	59
4	Al-Nakhlé	355	215	118	403	240	137	60	61
5	Amioun Sharqi	1,227	366	780	1,326	357	881	27	30
	Amioun Gharbi	1,199	120	1043	1,248	146	1,058	12	10
6	Enfé	2,577	1616	850	2,853	1,624	982	57	63
7	Batroumine	381	140	217	437	175	226	40	37
8	Btaaboura	209	54	146	238	47	172	20	26
9	Btouratij	363	273	70	504	386	85	77	75
10	Bhabouch	253	157	86	279	134	136	48	62
11	Bdebba	302	80	201	332	106	201	32	26
12	Badbhoun	85	52	27	99	76	17	77	61
13	Bednayel	219	160	54	294	224	68	76	73
14	Barsa	455	267	167	462	302	141	65	59
15	Barghoun	208	144	52	211	199	5	94	69
16	Bziza	472	249	210	520	257	242	49	53
17	Bechmizine	687	271	295	781	313	377	40	39
18	Bsarma	413	218	180	470	190	252	40	53
19	Bterram	522	244	249	570	245	314	43	47
20	Bkeftine	147	64	76	169	83	78	49	44
21	Bnehran	209	0	206	228	0	214	0	0
22	Haret Al-Khassa	101	86	12	107	73	23	68	85
23	Dar Baaechtar	912	536	325	1,002	583	349	58	59
24	Dar Chmizine	157	50	102	148	39	98	26	32
25	Deddé	2,022	1064	851	2,210	1,287	791	58	53
26	Ras Masqa Chmaliyé	182	95	78	222	142	62	64	52
	Ras Masqa Jnoubiyeh	253	159	92	284	165	83	58	63
27	Rechdibbine	425	315	69	435	372	55	86	74
28	Zgharta El-Mtaouile	104	0	103	132	0	127	0	0
29	Zakroun	176	151	21	177	146	31	82	86
30	Dahr Al-Ain	81	62	18	89	62	16	70	77
31	Dhour Al-Hawa	209	13	193	213	9	198	4	6
32	Aaba	252	109	139	282	115	141	41	43
33	Aafsdia	382	130	232	398	149	233	37	34
34	Ain Aakrine	577	467	77	632	505	103	80	81
35	Fiaa	669	259	382	751	297	424	40	39
36	Qalhat	461	155	279	551	184	319	33	34
37	Kaftoun	174	34	136	220	65	141	30	20
38	Kfar Hata	552	244	285	568	226	319	40	44
39	Kfar Hazir	1,057	573	446	1,074	538	495	50	54
40	Kfar Saroun	298	132	159	333	146	177	44	44
41	Kfar Aqqa	1,521	926	533	1,659	943	603	57	61
42	Kfar Kahel	265	105	151	291	145	137	50	40
43	Kafraiya	829	480	289	868	625	182	72	58
44	Kousba	1,742	889	790	1,990	1,030	855	52	51
45	Mitrit	170	133	34	143	88	53	62	78
46	Electoral employees	0	0	0	240	131	91	55	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>24,762</b>	<b>12,412</b>	<b>11,141</b>	<b>27,178</b>	<b>13,809</b>	<b>11,980</b>	<b>50.3%</b>	<b>50.1%</b>

NB: The above percentages are rounded to the nearest digit

SSNP candidate %		2009		LF candidate	SSNP candidate
2009	2012	Average of votes of the March 14 Forces list*	Average of votes of the March 8 Forces list*	% of increase or decrease in votes between 2009 and 2012	% of increase or decrease in votes between 2009 and 2012
24	34	391	129	-21	30
31	21	32	16	0	-40
36	38	220	161	-1	-2
34	33	255	130	-10	-14
66	64	392	809	3	-11
85	87	181	990	-18	-1
34	33	1,727	1,016	0	-13
52	57	180	232	-20	-4
72	70	61	163	15	-15
17	19	397	88	-29	-18
49	34	132	139	17	-37
61	67	116	201	-25	0
17	32	79	18	-32	59
23	25	226	64	-29	-21
31	37	300	146	-12	18
2	25	202	7	-28	940
47	44	249	248	-3	-13
48	43	339	396	-13	-22
54	44	189	259	15	-29
55	48	249	305	0	-21
46	52	84	84	-23	-3
94	99	2	218	0	-4
21	12	74	30	18	-48
35	36	572	397	-8	-7
66	65	46	94	28	4
36	42	1,327	770	-17	8
28	43	152	59	-33	26
29	36	168	99	-4	11
13	16	353	73	-15	25
96	99	2	129	0	-19
18	12	142	33	3	-32
18	22	60	23	0	13
93	92	12	199	44	-3
50	55	123	147	-5	-1
59	61	158	229	-13	0
16	13	499	113	-8	-25
56	57	311	415	-13	-10
58	61	199	327	-16	-13
64	78	78	133	-48	-4
56	52	234	314	8	-11
46	42	544	499	7	-10
53	53	147	176	-10	-10
36	35	907	669	-2	-12
47	57	153	124	-28	10
21	35	651	170	-23	59
43	45	1,003	918	-14	-8
37	20	85	56	51	-36
38	0	135	96	0	0
<b>43.7%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>14,141</b>	<b>12,112</b>		

\* The average of votes of the list is the total number of votes gained by all three candidates in each list divided by the number of candidates

# INCREASE IN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES MEMBERS

## SECURITY NEEDS OR SECTARIAN MOTIVES COSTING LBP 100 BILLION ANNUALLY?

The Cabinet decided to approve the recruitment of 6000 gendarmes, thus amending a previous decision that had set the number at 4000. This additional increase in gendarmerie (2000 members) and even the original number of 4000 members were justified by the need to keep up with the ever-rising security events and all their ensuing requirements, which necessitates a larger security apparatus placed on around-the-clock alert status, especially that the ISF General Directorate suffers from shortage of gendarmes. However, this justification conceals ulterior motives related to the sectarian balance within the ISF.

### Status quo

The number of jobs within the ISF personnel stands at 29,495. However, there are currently 23,041 officers, non-commissioned officers and gendarmes in service, which brings the vacancy rate to 22% with 6,454 unoccupied positions. The current personnel are distributed as follows:

- Officers: 855 officers of different ranks out of 1,718, i.e. a vacancy rate of 50% or 863 positions
- Non-commissioned officers: 11,477 out of 14,341, i.e. a vacancy rate of 20% or 2,864 positions
- Gendarmes: 10,709 out of 13,436, i.e. a vacancy rate of 20% or 2,727 positions

They are divided by religion as follows:

- Muslims: 15,182 members or 65.89% of the total personnel
- Christians: 7,859 members or 34.11% of the total personnel

### Achieving balance

On the face of it, the Cabinet approved recruitment of new ISF members to further manpower amidst constant security requirements. However, scratching beyond the surface reveals that the real reason lies in the need to achieve a sectarian balance as to the numbers of Muslims and Christians in the ISF. And so, the Cabinet agreed to recruit 4000 gendarmes of whom 3000 (75%) are Christian and 1000 (25%) are Muslim so that the religious distribution becomes as follows:

- **Muslims:** 16,182 members or 59.84% of the total personnel
- **Christians:** 10,859 members or 40.16% of the total personnel

Once the new members (4000) are added up, the vacancies would shrink down to 2,454. For this reason, the Cabinet approved recruiting an additional 2000 members of whom 1500 (75%) are Christian and the rest (25%) are Muslim so that the final religious distribution becomes:

- **Muslims:** 16,682 members or 57.44% of the total personnel
- **Christians:** 12,359 members or 42.56% of the total personnel

The future plan entails bridging the remaining gap (2,200 members or 7.44%) by appointing Christians for the positions that fall vacant following an annual discharge from service.

### Cost

The cost of recruiting 6000 gendarmes is estimated at LBP 80 billion. This cost increases every year owing to the promotions, pay hikes and marriages of the personnel, which furthers the benefits and provisions thus pushing the cost to over LBP 100 billion annually.

**Status quo (22% vacancy rate) and distribution of officers, non-commissioned officers and gendarmes by sect****Table 1**

Sect	Officers	Non-commissioned officers	Gendarmes	Total	%
Shia'a	185	3438	2944	6567	28.5%
Sunni	190	2986	3222	6398	27.77%
Druze	61	1076	777	1914	8.31%
Alawi	9	122	172	303	1.31%
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>7622</b>	<b>7115</b>	<b>15182</b>	<b>65.89%</b>
Maronite	243	2271	2165	4679	20.3%
Greek Orthodox	93	947	685	1725	7.49%
Greek Catholic	71	593	585	1249	5.42%
Armenian Orthodox	-	6	36	42	0.18%
Armenian Catholic	-	4	11	15	0.06%
Evangelical	1	6	8	15	0.06%
Minorities	2	28	104	134	0.58%
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>3855</b>	<b>3594</b>	<b>7859</b>	<b>34.11%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>855</b>	<b>11477</b>	<b>10709</b>	<b>23041</b>	<b>100%</b>

**The situation after the recruitment of 4000 members (3000 Christians and 1000 Muslims) reducing the vacancy rate to 9% and the distribution of ISF personnel by sect****Table 2**

Sect	Officers	Non-commissioned officers	Gendarmes	Total	%
Shia'a	185	3438	3364	6987	25.84%
Sunni	190	2986	3642	6818	25.21%
Druze	61	1076	897	2034	7.52%
Alawi	9	122	212	343	1.27%
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>7622</b>	<b>8115</b>	<b>16182</b>	<b>59.84%</b>
Maronite	243	2271	3725	6239	23.07%
Greek Orthodox	93	947	1345	2385	8.82%
Greek Catholic	71	593	945	1609	5.95%
Armenian Orthodox	-	6	276	282	0.18%
Armenian Catholic	-	4	71	75	0.06%
Evangelical	1	6	68	75	0.06%
Minorities	2	28	164	194	0.58%
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>3855</b>	<b>6594</b>	<b>10859</b>	<b>40.16%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>855</b>	<b>11477</b>	<b>14709</b>	<b>27041</b>	<b>100%</b>

**The situation after the recruitment of 2000 additional members (1500 Christians and 500 Muslims) reducing the vacancy rate to 2% and the distribution of ISF personnel by sect**

**Table 3**

Sect	Officers	Non-commissioned officers	Gendarmes	Total	%
Shia'a	185	3438	3574	7194	24.78%
Sunni	190	2986	3852	7028	24.20%
Druze	61	1076	957	2094	7.21%
Alawi	9	122	232	363	1.25%
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>7622</b>	<b>8615</b>	<b>16682</b>	<b>57.44%</b>
Maronite	243	2271	4505	7019	24.17%
Greek Orthodox	93	947	1675	2715	9.35%
Greek Catholic	71	593	1125	1789	6.16%
Armenian Orthodox	-	6	396	402	0.18%
Armenian Catholic	-	4	101	105	0.06%
Evangelical	1	6	98	105	0.06%
Minorities	2	28	194	224	0.58%
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>3855</b>	<b>8094</b>	<b>12359</b>	<b>42.56%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>855</b>	<b>11477</b>	<b>16709</b>	<b>29041</b>	<b>100%</b>

### ISF Cost

Prior to the recruitment of the 6000 gendarmes in the second half of 2012, the 2012 draft budget indicates that the budget allocated for the ISF General Directorate stands roughly at LBP 900 billion, of which LBP 691 billion are channeled to cover the salaries and benefits of ISF personnel. Introducing 6000 gendarmes would raise the cost to LBP 1000 billion.



# SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITION OF YOUNG WOMEN IN LEBANON: POLICY BRIEF

The present policy brief on School-to-Work-Transition of Young Women in Lebanon is prepared based on a survey research carried out between May 2011 and May 2012 jointly by UNESCO and Information International research consultants, as part of the project on “*Supporting Gender Equality in Education in Lebanon*” funded by the Italian Government. The research findings and preliminary recommendations were shared with national participants at a national seminar organized at UNESCO Beirut on May 11, 2012.

## 1. Context and Issue

Despite that female labor force participation brings benefits at micro and macro levels, the rate of women’s labor force participation in the Arab countries remains the lowest in the world (AHDR, 2005; ILO, 2008).

While education and skills enhance the productivity of both women and men and increase the opportunity for paid employment in the formal sector (ILO, 2008), growing educational attainments of women in the MENA region did not lead to a proportional increase in the female labor force participation rate (World Bank, 2004).

The reasons for this phenomenon have not been fully researched (ILO, 2009), nor has there been any concerted effort at designing and implementing appropriate public policies to curbe its negative consequences (Kabbanji, 2010). The high levels of women non- participation in the labor market and their corresponding rates of unemployment lead to serious wastes of resources invested in their education. As the Arab Human Development Report (2005) rightly puts it: “The failure to use human capital, especially highly educated women, curbs economic development and squanders important energies and investments, which might otherwise contribute to greater economic development (UNDP:AHDR 2005:9). Moreover, this may put great constraints on women’s rights to pursue their goals of self- realization and self-fulfillment and on their abilities to contribute financially to the well-being of their families. It also hampers the economic development of the countries and the effectiveness of enterprises lacking the necessary human capital with special talents and skills.

It is within this context that school-to-work transition is considered as a critical socio-economic life changing period for young people who seek to develop and build skills, based on their initial education and training and which helps them become more productive members of society.

Young Lebanese women (15-34 years) represent almost

half the female population, whose talents and skills, if properly utilized and developed, may add tremendously not only to the economic growth of the country, but also to their self-fulfillment, self-realization and to the general well-being of the their families as well. The lack of employment of young females costs the Lebanese economy 2% of its GDP (Chabaan, 2009).

## 2. School to work transition of Young Lebanese Women

- A little more than 40% of all females who are at the secondary and university levels constitute the school-to-work transition female aggregate that ought to be the center of attention and consideration of all educational institutions, employment agencies, career guidance specialists and public policies.
- Female university students make up over half of all university students, and therefore, could benefit as well from efforts developed to ease their transition to the world of work.
- Lebanese women have low labor force participation (29%) (Kabbanji, 2010), the majority of which had attained either secondary (23.3%) or university levels (43.3%). Therefore, it could be safely stated that there exists a positive correlation between university enrollment and work participation.
- Family responsibilities, including marriage, care for other family members and other household responsibilities, seem to hinder Lebanese women labour market participation in general.
- The low female labor participation can be explained by a variety of hurdles, personal, economic, institutional, cultural, legal, social and political that limit women’s labor force participation.

In light of the reviewed literature, and in view of the available data on Lebanese women, a field research was designed to answer the following questions:

- How do Lebanese young women experience school-to-work transition?

- What problems do young women face upon their exit from school to labor market?
- What are the strengths or deficiencies of the education and training systems in facilitating or hindering young women to participate in the labor market?
- What type of assistance/guidance or support services do young women need to facilitate their transition?
- What role does culture play in determining school-to-work transition of young women?
- What methods do young women use to secure employment?
- What are employers' hiring practices and criteria and how do they perceive young women abilities?
- What particular obstacles/challenges are faced by young women who choose to start their own business?

### 3. Aim and Methodology of the Survey

A survey was designed to assess its adequacy and relevancy in tapping the choices, actions, and challenges faced by female graduates in their school-to-work transition. It was guided by a theoretical framework that allows the clustering of all orientations and actions of female college graduates along the following three areas:

- Aspirations: represented by a set of questions related to job situations, interests, motives and plans of action.
- Realization: related to statements or questions about concrete steps that female graduates have undertaken to put their aspirations into action, the opportunity and restrictions they have encountered, as well as the necessary measures they have taken.
- Balancing: referring to questions through which female graduates assessed the consequences of their decisions and actions as well as experiences.

Due to the explorative nature of the research, a sample of eighty newly young female graduates from five universities in Lebanon was selected. This sample was originally designed to comprise twenty (20) female graduates from each of the five selected universities representing different systems of education: Lebanese American University (LAU), American University of Science and Technology (AUST), University Saint Joseph (USJ), Lebanese University (LU) and Beirut Arab University (BAU). The sample was to be equally distributed across four groups of disciplines: a) IT and Graphic Design, b) Business, c) Sciences, Engineering, Medicine and Pharmacy, and d) Social Sciences, Humanities, Education and Journalism.

Two rounds of semi-structured interviews were conducted with each female graduate in the sample over a six-month period:

**Round 1:** after three months of the females' college graduation

**Round 2:** after six months of the females' college graduation

In addition, two focus group discussions were held and involved career guidance centers of universities and human resource department of private sectors.

Distribution of majors among fresh graduates					Table 1
Major	Non working		Working		
	Number	%	Number	%	
Business	8	19.5	4	10	
IT/Graphic Design	3	7.3	4	10	
Sciences/Professions	13	31.7	20	50	
Social Sciences/Humanities/Media	17	41.5	12	30	
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Information International UNESCO survey 2011

### 4. Key findings from the research

The research is exploratory and could bring following findings for both working and non-working female graduates:

- Families exert a great influence on young women's choice in relation their academic majors and on the type of work.
- Young women complain of lack of career guidance and counseling in their job search, including internship and trainings, at the university level.
- Young women expressed the importance of "Wasta" (social connection) in finding a job, at the expense of other formal means and qualifications.
- There is no existing systematic information on available job vacancies, and labor market demands.
- While half of young women graduates expressed their intention to keep working after marriage, still another half has chosen not to do so.
- Female graduates are willing to accept jobs abroad.
- Female graduates who are willing to start their own business seem to be lacking not only organizational skills, but access to appropriate financial facilities or resources as well.
- Some young female graduates feel not only frustrated and depressed from their job search experience, but also feel marginalized and excluded from the mainstream of society.

**What type of help do you need to get a job? Table 2**

	Number	%
Internship	22	53.7
Trainings/workshops	12	29.3
Vocational guidance	10	24.4
Support to establish own business	9	22.0
Mastering of languages	6	14.6
Computer literacy	2	4.9
Favoritism	1	2.4
Pursue job search	1	2.4
To be given a job opportunity	1	2.4
Not to be discriminated based upon religious and political affiliations	1	2.4
Unspecified/no answer	6	14.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>173</b>

Source: Information International UNESCO Round 1 Survey – Non Working fresh graduates

**If yes what are the obstacles that hinder you from doing so? Table 3**

	Number	%
Lack of financial facilities	17	81.0
Fear of failure	8	38.1
Lack of business management skills	4	19.0
Social obstacles related to woman's work	3	14.3
Lack of organizational skills	3	14.3
Lack of leadership skills	2	9.5
Unspecified	1	4.8
Lack of parental support	1	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>186</b>

Source: Information International UNESCO Round 1 Survey – Non Working fresh graduates

**Do you need any of the following help/guidance to help you find a job? Table 4**

		Yes	No	Total
Guidance on ways for looking for a job	Total	10	9	19
	%	52.6	47.4	100.0
Information on vacancies	Total	18	1	19
	%	94.7	5.3	100.0
Guidance on training opportunities	Total	11	8	19
	%	57.9	42.1	100.0
Opportunities in training and educational programs	Total	11	8	19
	%	57.9	42.1	100.0

Source: Information International UNESCO Round 2 Survey – Non Working fresh graduates (merged)

## 5. Overall recommendations: Research and Policy Linkages

- Given the complexity of the youth unemployment issue, which relates at least to industry, labour, economic, education, migration and social protection policies in a more and more globalized economy, we have no choice but to coordinate and work together through an interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral approach.
- Awareness and understanding of reverse effects of difficult labour participation of young women on the economic and social development needs to be shared among policy makers.
- Quantitative and qualitative data collection and gender analysis needs to be improved to better inform policy making with gender sensitivity.
- Education is a policy area priority, where a breakthrough can be found to promote a smoother and more diversified school to work transition with gender responsiveness. UNESCO's technical advice is more relevant and highly expected.
- In addition, the following among others should be done in order to secure a smoother school to work transition:
  - Eliminating gender stereotypes from school curricula and teaching practices to address social and cultural constraints that limit or prevent women's labour participation.
  - Improving and expanding career orientation and guidance for female students starting at intermediate level.
  - Involving parents in the awareness raising and career guidance of young women

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Dr. Hanna Saadah

## MEDICAL SENSE & COMMON SENSE

**“I have backache but the doctor will not order an MRI.” “I have bronchitis but the doctor will not give me an antibiotic.” “I am menopausal but the doctor refuses to test my hormones.” “I feel fine but the doctor says that I need a heart-valve operation.” Conflicts between medical sense and common sense are prevalent because the two disciplines use different, unrelated systems of logic. In the case of backache, an MRI is only useful if one is considering surgery or suspecting a tumor or a fracture.**

**Otherwise, the MRI, being confusing and expensive, could actually lead to unintended harm.**

Bronchitis, with a few exceptions, is a viral illness, which does not respond to antibiotics and giving antibiotics is harmful. Treating menopause is based on treating only the symptoms, regardless of the measured hormone levels, which can be confusing and may lead to false treatments. In the case of aortic heart-valve stenosis, waiting until symptoms develop may prove deadly due to weakening of the heart muscle. *“Common sense is judgment without reflection, which is shared by an entire class, a people, a nation, or the whole human race,”* said Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744). *“All true knowledge contradicts common sense,”* said Mandell Creighton (1834-1901).

Unlike common sense, medicine is a scientific discipline in constant flux, always ready to challenge its own ideas and replace them with the ones closer to newer truths. For years stomach ulcers were treated with antacids or surgery while now they are cured with antibiotics because they have been shown to be bacterial infections. Beta-blockers, which block the adrenaline from reaching the heart, were contraindicated in heart failure but are now used as its main treatment. Screening for prostate cancer with the PSA test was thought useful but is now deemed harmful.

If one reasons correctly but from the wrong premise, one arrives at the wrong conclusion. If an older person thinks that aspirin is good for headaches, he would know to take aspirin should he develop a sudden, violent headache. However, if he knew that a sudden, violent headache could be an indication of a brain bleed, he would not take aspirin if he also knew that aspirin is a blood thinner.

If one uses the Internet as a source of knowledge one would be confusing information with knowledge. Whereas information can be learned by anyone at any time, knowledge can only be earned after years of study and experience. Thus, when researching the Internet one may be convinced that a certain medication is too dangerous to take, given its adverse effects, while the medical facts may indicate that taking it is far safer than not. Good examples can be found in information such as ‘cars kill’ when it is actually safer to drive than to walk or bicycle to work. Confusing information with knowledge led the American poet, T. S. Eliot to pen the following lines in his poem, The Rock:

*“Where is the Life we have lost in living?  
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?  
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?”*

If one generalizes from stories and testimonials instead of published evidence, one also risks arriving at the wrong conclusion. A patient who develops arthritis in his hip while taking a cholesterol medicine may hear that a friend, John Smith, stopped his cholesterol medicine and his arthritis cleared. However, as a consequence of stopping the cholesterol medicine, our patient suffers a massive heart attack. If he had also known that cholesterol medicines could cause generalized arthritis but not single-joint arthritis he would have avoided a heart attack. This human tendency to generalize from testimonials instead of evidence led the British philosopher, A. C. Grayling to remind us that, “One thing that is more dangerous than true ignorance is the illusion of understanding.”


Fear, a friend of common sense, is the enemy of knowledge. One awful story about a treatment may frighten people from ever seeking it, even if all the scientific evidence is in that treatment’s favor. Hence some refuse vaccines that can save their children’s lives; others refuse to have mammograms, colonoscopies, or other examinations; and others refuse treatments for blood pressure, cholesterol, or osteoporosis. *“One should never underestimate human ingenuity in search of support for implausible views,”* says A. C. Grayling in *Thinking of Answers*.

Putting information into rational use requires the wisdom of knowledge. *“Knowledge shrinks as wisdom grows,”* said the British philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). Were it not so, we could all read the airplanes’ instruction manuals and become instant pilots. Epictetus (CAD 50-120) divided humanity’s tendency for false impressions into four categories. *“Appearances to the mind are of four kinds,”* he said. *“Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim in all these cases is the wise man’s task.”*

Being medically proactive is good but not when it is done with the illusion that information is knowledge and that knowledge is wisdom. ●

## A HUMAN UPON REQUEST

| Antoine Boutros |



**The human Genome (genetic map) consists principally of 23 pairs of chromosomes, each numbered from 1 to 22 according to its size, in addition to two sex chromosomes, a large female chromosome (X) and a small male chromosome (Y).**

One can see the chromosome clearly through a regular microscope. The closest description of a chromosome would be two long-sided semi circles with narrow openings, attached in a reverse manner, one tending upwards and the other downwards. Each pair of chromosomes is totally identical, one copy of each chromosome is inherited from the female parent and the other from the male parent. This explains why children inherit some of their traits from their mother and others from their father. However, the sex chromosomes differ from each other not only in size but also in form. Any unnatural change in the form of any chromosome may result in an illness or a disability. Children born with a missing cornea and suffering from mental retardedness, sexual anomalies and kidney cancer, are usually those diagnosed with Wilm's tumor. Such tumor occurs due to a deletion of the short arm of chromosome 11, noting that the absence of the arm of chromosome 5 manifests in another mental disorder known as the Cri-du-chat syndrome and associated with a cat-like cry of affected children.

Drawing a genetic map can be done in two ways.

One can go about mapping in a systematic manner, starting from the beginning of the DNA spiral helix until its very end. The location of the genes can be spotted by cutting the chromosomes by special enzymes characterized by their ability to produce DNA fragments at specific points where the pair-base sequence differs, i.e. where the code changes thus making each fragment independent with its own genetic instructions.

The second mapping manner is selective and entails determining the correlation between the missing or the relocated parts of certain chromosomes and the respective illnesses and anomalies. Then, the defected chromosomes should be compared to non-faulty and complete ones in order to detect the genes behind the illnesses and move to neighboring genes in keeping with one of the most important principles governing the relation between the genes and the chromosomes, the linkage.

Many people whose predecessors have once suffered from illness or disability fear having predisposition to develop the same risk and thus desire to examine their genes as a precautionary measure that might help them pick the right

spouse and protect their off spring.

For instance, sickle cell anemia occurs only in children whose both their parents carry the disease. Furthermore, this can help anticipate long-stage diseases like the Huntington's Disease whose symptoms do not appear until after age 30 or 40 by which time patients will have had children.

On a scientific level however, knowing the genetic code assists in revealing the mysteries surrounding the development of the fetus and understanding the principles of growth and aging. In other words, such an achievement may help science tighten its grip on genetics, which offers wide horizons for exploration in the future.

Eliminating mental illnesses, cancers and cardiac disorders is not the sole dream of scientists. In some of their experiments, they succeeded in extending life in laboratories by reducing feeding and retarding growth and they hope to apply the same on humans.

Scientists strive to increase the brain size in order to offer further room for the grey matter to grow, while others argue that such a step is premature especially that humans are still ignorant of how to exploit their grey matter in the most favorable manner. Others advocate the necessity of transplanting genes that allow human beings to have another stomach (the cow has four) to be able to digest cellulose and take in animal feeds should there be a severe shortage of food. Some even foresee the day when people shall be born without feet to prepare them to become astronauts that occupy little room in spacecrafts, and children shall master languages and the multiplication table just like baby birds are innately programmed to fly shortly after their birth.

If scientists were able to create a human being with greater competencies and larger mental and instinctive skills in a smaller body almost as perfect as a machine with the ability to replace his impaired organs with new ones, would he still be a standard human being, or would he be the incarnation of the Superman advocated by brave visionaries like Bernard Shaw and Huxley? Have we reached the level of wisdom that allows them to manipulate the fate of the greatest achievement in the history of life as we know it in our solar system that is tampering with life? ●●

Said Chaaya

Researcher at the Paris-Sorbonne University



## THE STATUS OF LEBANON'S RULE FROM 1861 UNTIL 2012 (1) HAS ANYTHING CHANGED IN OVER 150 YEARS?

**“If we give consideration to what we are, explicitly or implicitly, examining regarding the matters of the government and the population of Lebanon, we realize that we are in fact filled with troubles and turmoil ... People are seeking different ends given their sectarian divides and each party wishes to have a government compatible with their desires, which makes it hard to reach one settlement. The presence of dissimilarities is an undisputed reality and it becomes difficult to grant everybody equal rights and privileges... so each embarks on a quest to reach his own goals.”**

The above excerpts are still applicable to our current status quo. They do not belong to a political analyst or a pundit scrutinizing the events of 2012, but are quoted from an article written in 1862 by prince Mohammad Amine Arslan (1838-1869). The then Qa'imaqam (governor) of the Druze in Mount Lebanon, exposed with the utmost precision and objectivity the status of the government and the rule of Lebanon soon after the creation of the Mutasarrifiyya.

It is common knowledge that Lebanon witnessed in the 19th century several conflicts that resulted in generating different systems, but always with the participation of all parties in power. Among those systems, the last was the Mutasarrifiyya system which was introduced in 1861 following the incidents of Mount Lebanon and the ending of the Qa'im Maqamatein (two administrative districts) rule which divided Lebanon into two districts, one ruled by a Druze prince and the other by a Christian. The Beirut-Damascus highway road, in addition to other dividing features that we will highlight in a future article, separated the two districts. A Mutasarrif appointed directly by the Grand Vizier in Istanbul and assisted by an administrative council representing all the then Lebanese parties headed this rule system. Despite the amendments applied to this system and the complaints of those whose interests were incompatible with it, the system remained in force until the end of the World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

We will not dwell long on the reasons that lead to the establishment of the Mutasarrifiyya, however, we will look at the nature of the rule and the work mechanisms of the government, which many believe to be the first consensual, autonomous and direct rule of Lebanon.

No matter how we speak of the rare and unparalleled qualities of prince Mohammad Amine Arslan in this particular stage of Lebanon's history, words fail to do this man justice. Suffice it to say that he was the founder and president of the Syrian Scientific Society in Beirut in 1868, and his numerous oeuvres are a witness that he was a just ruler, an enlightened human being and a virtuous scholar. We leave it to the reader to realize the integrity and nobility of this man who attempted, with all the power at his disposal, to unite the Lebanese and strengthen the ties between them with a spirit of fraternity and coexistence, and with the hope of mending the rule in the country of marvels and wonders, Lebanon.

“The reverberating news about the justice and the strength of the government and the contentment and tranquility of the people is

in fact a misleading camouflage, for the equity of the government is practiced in words, not actions, and its strength is imposed on those who choose to obey and surrender to its will. How can one feel contented at a time when the Governor is only absorbed by fulfilling his desires and serving his personal interests, and the employees are divided into those silenced by extravagant salaries and those lured by the praise of the Governor, while the major concern of both of them is to satisfy the Governor to maintain their jobs at the expense of the people.”

The state of the Lebanese government is troubled as a result of the derelictions in the public administration. The government cannot be just and strong unless it regains stability. Inequality has become evident among sects, as the power in the government is monopolized by a single sect, referred to hereafter as “Sect 1” while the rest of the sects are called “Sect 2”. The employees of Sect 1 are always the ones with the final word and no one dares to disobey them especially that the Mutasarrif has succumbed to their will, thus allowing them to act of their own volition. And so, the employees of Sect 2 find themselves forced to satisfy those of Sect 1, and he who does not have friends to serve by granting them money or showing total compliance with their wishes, fails to earn his salary or to stand up for the rights of his fellows. As for the Pasha, he would love and bless the person they praise before him and detest and bear grudges for anyone they defame. The rights of Sect 1 members are never lost and if one of them filed a suit against another party, his allies would trip among themselves to prove their fellow right, even when he is wrong. Nobody can oppose them, and he who does, incurs upon himself the risk of losing his job as they would exploit their amiable relation with the Mutassarif to talk him into kicking him out at any cost.

Feebleness is also evident on the decisions that are pending on most levels, and this does not stem from the absence of a military power but rather from the mismanagement and the unwillingness of the Mutasarrif to carry out their powers. For this reason, the current government in Lebanon fails to have a genuine authority except over those belonging to Sect 2. As for the others, the government has never had any control over them in the first place because they refuse to obey the commands, although they sometimes endeavor to display the opposite. Sect 1 defies the commands and the government fails to make them bend, not to mention that the power is inexistent in most of their governorates but instead, stands independently. ●

# THE MONTHLY INTERVIEWS

PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE  
ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED  
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (LACPA)

## AMIN SALEH

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ASSOCIATION  
AND DRAFTING TAXATION LAWS

Although deemed by many a marginal syndicate compared to its counterparts, the Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants is in fact a primal syndicate for it is not restricted to only one field but its role expands to cover financial, economic and banking affairs. Therefore, the political forces have been striving to take control of it, which lead to instability in the Association's management for about 3 years. The Monthly interviewed the new LACPA President Amin Saleh on his vision of how to develop the syndicate and promote its role.



**Why, in your opinion, has the LACPA witnessed instability and changes in its board in the past three years especially that one President failed to complete his term and two boards served for only 10 months each?**

Undoubtedly, the LACPA is affected negatively or positively by the general political situation in Lebanon. In the past few years, the conflicts have intensified among the Lebanese political forces over the management of syndicates so that they promote their power and popular positions. Our Association was among the most sought-after syndicates given its influence on the financial and economic life in the country, not to mention that its members are legally certified to audit the financial accounts of all economic institutions and to form an opinion regarding the validity of their financial statements, which made it the center of a financial, political and economic contest. The LACPA is tightly connected to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice. First, it prepares the accounts of the financial institutions and thus affects the taxation status, and second, the Ministry of Justice appoints LACPA members to express their views on the

commercial and financial disputes that erupt between the financial institutions and their clients on one hand, and them and the state administrations on the other. Therefore, the reports drafted by the certified accountants wield a great influence on the pertinent verdicts issued by the civil courts. Furthermore, our accountants play a significant role in auditing public accounts. This major role that the LACPA has in the financial and political arenas is what incites political and economic forces to battle for it. Then again, the gaps in the by-laws and regulations of such a relatively new syndicate lead to a couple of flaws in management which furthered competition among the accountants themselves. For all these reasons, there was a rivalry over the management of the LACPA and not one party succeeded in running the association alone, even in the case when some political parties had gained all board members' seats.

The disharmony among the members and the lack of a clear work plan upon which candidacy is decided, results

in clashes over the management of the LACPA. Sadly, this has been the case in the past few years and it has crippled the work of the syndicate and offended its members as the syndicate failed to live up to the hopes they pinned on it to develop the profession and promote their status.

**What are the projects you are willing to carry out with the assistance of the Board to empower the accounting profession and improve the conditions of accountants?**

Our current Board won in its entirety in the elections that occurred on April 2, 2012 upon the resignation or dismissal of the three previous boards. True, it is backed by a certain political party, but it has a clear agenda aimed at upgrading and institutionalizing the syndicate, thus transforming it to an institution resting on specific apparatuses with clear capacities. Our purpose is to restructure the syndicate so as to yield a lucid administrative organization that specifies the job descriptions and capacities, the qualifications, requirements and responsibilities of the employees, which prevents anyone from having any discretionary power outside the organizational frame of the syndicate.

We are also seeking a new financial system based on an internal control system monitoring all spending and collecting operations in order to have the financial statements ready within the legal deadlines.

The most important project is the expansion of the syndicate's scope of work in terms of numbers and functions. Speaking of numbers, we are pushing toward the amendment of the law so that no one can practice the accounting profession, in all its forms, without being a member at the LACPA and having its authorization to do so (this requirement is restricted currently to the auditors only and does not include accounting experts). This move helps organizing the accounting profession in both private and public sectors and is reflected positively on the financial and economic decisions, thus promoting an environment of trust in the Lebanese economy, while simultaneously protecting the auditing profession which is responsible above all for judging the validity and legality of financial statements. Hence, if the LACPA succeeded in mandating membership for both accountants and auditors, it would have achieved integration between the two professions within one legal organizational frame. This project also suggests that anyone subjected to the VAT is required to have an auditor and that anyone undertaking an independent economic activity must have a legal accountant to ensure the transparency of accounts and provide wider employment opportunities for the fresh

graduates entering the market. However important it is, the LACPA cannot accomplish this project alone and needs assistance from the government, Parliament and all economic committees for the best interests of everyone.

Our future plans include the activation of the Retirement Fund and the increase of benefits granted to retired experts, which entails the assistance of the state, likewise the contributions it has provided to other syndicates. We are currently in the process of drafting a law that ensures the contribution of the state to the Retirement Fund by 5/1000 WHAT? per thousand from the VAT returns, which accounts to around LBP 2.5 billion annually.

**What are the major obstacles confronting the LACPA?**

The obstacles we face are numerous. Some are internal and others are external. Internally, the absence of an administrative apparatus translates into a decline in the services and benefits provided to the members and a decreased trust in the LACPA board. We also suffer from low recruitment levels, the lack of mutual respect between the LACPA and the public administrations and the absence of a higher council for tax legislation which we deem necessary to tackle all taxation affairs. We also need to implement the law regulating the profession of certified accountants and discard completely the Higher Council of Accounting because accounting and auditing fall within the expertise of the syndicate alone.

**What are your views regarding the Lebanese tax law?**

It is unacceptable to keep on adopting the current tax system, which includes 55 different taxes and fees, the majority of which are non-economic taxes that we can dispense of and maintain only 12. The introduction of the unified income tax and the gradual elimination of customs duties are also a must along with the decrease of all unconstitutional fees on some state services, especially those regarding telecommunications fees.

**Any last words you would like to add?**

I would like to address the officials and reiterate that our accounting offices have the ability and the competence to manage and regulate the public accounts without the need to resort to foreign accounting firms. We must have faith in our accountants and auditors whose experience and qualifications are hard to find in most of the countries worldwide. But as usual, we in Lebanon destruct everything and have little confidence in ourselves. ●●

## SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS IN THE SPACE

A few decades ago, humans started feeling that the earth is threatening their lives and becoming lacking in safety and security, so they shifted their attention to the outer space. Up to date, humans, armed with science and technology, have not given up their endeavor to explore the space. And so, heated competition arose in this arena and manifested best between the Russians and the Americans during the Cold War. Humans dreamed of traveling to space and are today living their dreams. They fulfilled their aspirations and succeeded in studying the space, its planets and their movements. Recently, and after sending the Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft on a mission to Mars, scientists were drawn aback by the possibility of finding water, and thus the likelihood of life on the red planet. Should humans move to settle on Mars, this would be in favor of Mother Earth and mankind equally. However, the question that comes into play is: can humans leave their evils on earth and only carry their values and morals to this foreign planet? Can they kick off a noble new start? And what obligations should they meet to ensure their welfare?

Pollution is one of the most severe threats jeopardizing Mother Earth nowadays. The seas are polluted and so are the soil and the air. There is nothing left sound and intact to preserve the human presence on our planet. Both organic and harmful waste is being buried into the soil, toxins and waste water are flowing into the sea and trees are being cut randomly. If we continue in similar ways, the earth would suffer fatal results. Therefore, if we wish to live in space, we should organize things right from the start and employ technology to dispose of waste in a useful manner and have a pollution-free environment.

Second, we should consider the values of liberty, justice and equality and bury our covetousness and bitterness deep down in the ground and start a new chapter. The first thing to do is to achieve equality among all races and to abolish poverty and oppression and need, so that all inhabited planets become a common property to all people. To that end, we should lay down an agreed upon system that creates the real spatial democracy rather than the fake mundane one in order to grant everybody new rights and better lives that know no distinction and caste systems and where no strong can eat the weak.

Finally, in our new spatial world, we should bind ourselves by moral and spiritual values. So let us commit ourselves to love rather than hate, let us be righteous rather than hypocrite, let us forgive rather than hold grudges. In such a climate, there will be no room for conflicts, bloodshed, destruction and grief. The planet would rather be an oasis of happiness, reconstruction, love and unity. This way we can evolve, unleash our innovative side and leave retardation behind.

Is all this possible? This could be the new dream for us to pursue and achieve. But why can we not start from scratch as we are still on earth? Why can we not get rid of our greed and resentment? Why can we not toss our weapons and distress and wars on Mars? People do not change depending on their location but rather thanks to their will power wherever they were.

**Sary Fayyad**  
(Life Sciences) Al-Ahliyah School

# TAMANNA

## YOUR WISH IS OUR COMMAND



NGOs have become major players in the socio-economic development in Lebanon, as they assist the state in providing help and relief to the needy and the disadvantaged in order to contribute to the welfare of the community and achieve social justice. Tamanna is one of the Lebanese NGOs that strive to bring hope and joy to children with a life threatening illness by granting them their most cherished wish.

### Establishment

Conscious of the importance of a sound and happy childhood in the creation of healthy adults, Tamanna emerged in December 2005 as a non-profit association that dedicated itself to soothe the pain of children with critical illness and turn their tears into laughter. It was founded in memory of the five-year old Karim Rayess and at the initiative of seven people, including President Diala el-Fil and Managing Director Nadine Akkaoui, who shared the same vision and joined hands to turn the dreams of sick children into reality and draw a smile on their faces, thus empowering them to hold onto hope and win their battle against illness.

### Wishes

In order to qualify for a wish, a child needs to be between 3 and 18 years of age and must be diagnosed with a critical illness such as cancer, cystic fibrosis, cardiac or renal disorders, etc. and living or being treated in Lebanon.

The cost of the wish ranges from USD 300 up to USD 4000 depending on its nature. Most wishes fall into four categories:

#### I wish to go

Some Tamanna children want to travel to a dream destination, see the snow for the first time, or attend a concert. The most desired destination is usually Disney Land and Tamanna grants this wish only after obtaining consent documents from the parents and the doctors authorizing the travel of the sick child.

#### I wish to meet

Many want to meet popular figures such as their favorite politician, athlete, or singer.

#### I wish to have

Children often want a special gift, like a computer, a playstation, an iPad, a new room or a shopping spree.

#### I wish to be

Many children wish to be someone for a day- an astronaut, a pilot, a bride.

Wishes that Tamanna does not grant include:

- Gifts of designated sums of money
- Renting or purchasing a home



- Motorized vehicles
- Coverage of medical costs
- Gifts related to weapons
- Wishes that may create an ongoing financial burden to the family

Since its establishment, Tamanna has granted over 900 wishes with an average of three wishes per week. The priority is always given to the requests of the most critical cases.

## Hospitals

Tamanna cooperates with a number of physicians and hospitals, most of which are located in Beirut as the majority of sick children receive their treatment in the capital's largest medical centers. The association worked first with Saint Jude hospital and then expanded its sphere of services and started accepting requests for granting wishes from other hospitals. It has since become a part and parcel of the overall treatment process. Below is a list of the hospitals that Tamanna deals with:

- Abou Jawde Hospital
- Al Zahraa Hospital
- American University Hospital
- Bahmand Hospital
- Children's Cancer Center – St. Jude
- Hammoud Hospital
- Hotel Dieu Hospital
- Jitawi Lebanese Hospital
- Makassed Hospital
- Mar Youssef Hospital
- Notre Dame des Secours (Jeil)
- Rafik Hariri University Hospital
- Roum Hospital

**“Since its establishment, Tamanna has granted over 900 wishes with an average of three wishes per week”**

## Support and donations

Tamanna would not have survived and flourished had it not been for the ongoing sponsorship of its official partner, Persil, and the generous support and donations it keeps amassing from companies and individuals.

In keeping with their commitment not to deny a child's wish due to lack of funds, and as part of their social responsibility pledge, Persil started sponsoring Tamanna in 2008. They have conceptualized a way to involve the public to donate to a selfless cause, by launching the “LBP 1000 campaign”, which pertains that with an each pack of Persil sold, LBP 1000 is donated to Tamanna. In 2009, an amount of LBP 150,000,000 was raised through this campaign and Persil is aiming to expand the scope of this campaign to raise LBP 300,000,000 and thus become able to fulfill wishes on a daily basis.

Tamanna welcomes cash contributions, which, however small, can make a difference and a dream come true. In-kind donations count as well and can include products or services provided free of charge or at a substantial discount.

Tamanna also promotes corporate giving by encouraging companies to sponsor its events and forge a strong relationship between their brand and the charity.

Schools can also make a contribution to Tamanna's philanthropy by creating and managing fundraising projects. Such projects help students develop team spirit as they work towards a common goal and a good cause. ●



## AT SOUK EL-GHARB SCHOOL

I spent lengthy hours during summer days studying mathematics, English and Arabic for the test I was going to sit for.

The school principal, Aziz Elia was from Saida. He gave me a warm welcome and said: "You will sleep in the master bedroom, the second rank." There were around twenty students and one span between each two beds. I was very delighted to see my pal Daher Hamza.


The entrance exam started the next day. I walked into the hall frightened. What if I failed the test? It would be scandalous. But God was merciful. The exam was easy, especially Arabic. I solved all the algebraic equations and the mathematical exercises and the English test was a piece of cake. My features softened up: I was going to pass the exam.

And so, the classes began. Our school life was too monotonous and disciplined. Our head teacher was an American army officer who had served during the World War I. His name was George Scherer and he kept on wearing his military uniform. He, who has an army officer as a chief, should discipline himself. No almonds, no apricots and no morning gatherings with the Oud player. After dinner, we used to gather at the large hall to study for one hour and a half. And once we headed to sleep, the supervisor would come in with a lamp to make sure everybody was in their beds.

Shaker Nasser taught us algebra and Fouad Sarrouf plane geometry. Our English teacher was an American missionary and priest Bechara Baroudi gave us Old Testament lessons.

The American missionary was taken aback by the students' ability to learn and speak English fluently, for he had spent two years studying Arabic but still failed to ask for a glass of water in Arabic! He used to admire us and he gave us high grades that displeased our school principal.

Our school life in Souk el-Gharb was dull and sometimes pretty boring. There was a tight discipline and a lack of entertainment. On holidays, I used to go to and return from Ras el-Matn on foot to save money. But I learned tennis and mastered it despite my short figure.



# THE EIGHT-HOUR SLEEP NECESSITY OR MISCONCEPTION?

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**Myth:** *The eight-hour sleep cycle that our bodies have been accustomed to is a necessity for our daytime performance and efficiency. Doctors have recognized these continuous and uninterrupted hours as the natural pattern of sleep for humans.*

Who among us has not read or heard about the required eight hours of sleep? Apart from specifying the hours of sleep we need, this also suggests that we are expected to have sleep that is continuous. These misconceptions have led to a lot of anxiety about insomnia and wakefulness.

**Reality:** However, recent research has revealed that the initial sleeping pattern that falls in line with human nature is actually segmented. In his book “At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past”, Roger Ekirch, through extensive literature review, discovers that prior to the spread of artificial lighting, sleep comprised of two sleeping periods broken by an hour or two of wakefulness. This pattern of first and second sleep has been made accessible to us through the accounts of different historians, writers, and medical doctors. Ekirch looks into 500 resources from books, records and diaries, from classical writers such as Homer, to pre-industrial Europe and to a number of African tribes (Hegarty). This implies that the research was in no way confined to one context. All these texts, when mentioning sleep, referred to a first sleep and a second sleep. Ekirch claims that when in wakefulness, people mostly prayed or contemplated. In some accounts, people even woke up to visit neighbors, an indicator of the commonality of this practice (Ekirch).

Aside from the ample examples provided by Ekirch, an experiment conducted by Thomas Wehr found that when put in complete darkness for 14 hours a day for about a month, participants’ sleep fell into a similar pattern. Two periods of four-hour sleep were interrupted by one or two hours of alertness. This thus shows that when the human body is left alone, it will develop a preference for this cycle.

What all these participants have in common with pre-industrial Europe and tribal regions in Nigeria is the absence of artificial light. The absolute darkness that was taken for granted then has become rare today; consequently, the tradition of two sleep times has disappeared from our conception since the 1920s. In Europe, this shift began in the 17th century when the use of artificial light began to spread. At first it was only available in aristocratic households, but it soon became available to everyone, in their homes and on the streets. With this the night became a time for legitimate socialization, an attitude that was further reinforced during industrialization.

Historians have long ignored this initial manner of sleep, possibly because of the tranquility of today’s sleeping habits (Ekirch). Our pattern of continual sleep is then a relatively recent phenomenon, partly because of our widespread use of light. So the next time we find ourselves awake and anxious in the middle of the night, it wouldn’t hurt to remember that “waking up during the night is part of normal human physiology” (Hegarty). ●

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## THE REPUBLIC OF FOUAD CHEHAB

by Nicolas Nassif. Published by Dar An-Nahar. First edition.

Before exploring *The Republic of Fouad Chehab*, it is important to underline the dedication written by Nicolas Nassif at the beginning of his book, as it was not a general dedication, but rather a particular one addressed to those “who are seeking a President of the Republic, in whom they can see themselves in an era where real men... the men of state... are rare to find.”

Popular opposition drove President Bechara el-Khoury to resign his post in 1952. Choosing a successor to President el-Khoury was not a simple decision made on the spur of the moment. After a fierce political conflict between Camille Chamoun who supported the Americans and Hamid Frangieh who was an advocate of Abdul Nasser, the Mukhtara leader Kamal Jumblat proposed excluding Camille Chamoun to avert any potential disturbance of the local and political balance in Chouf and nominated General Fouad Chehab for the presidency.

However, Fouad Chehab held a different opinion since he wanted to disassociate the army from all political intricacies. Hence, the battle was confined between Deir el-Qamar and Zgharta and ended with the victory of Camille Chamoun by 45 votes.

The year 1958 was earmarked by an Arab conflict that started with the coup led by Abdul Karim Qasim in Iraq. The coup toppled the royal family and claimed the lives of a number of royal members. It also resulted in the killing of the Americans' ally Nouri al-Said and concluded with a sharp dispute between Egypt and the West over the Suez Canal. This dispute manifested in armed clashes in the streets of Lebanon as the Lebanese were divided into supporters of Abdul Nasser and supporters of America.

As things deteriorated further, and as the end of Chamoun's presidential term approached, Jamal Abdul Nasser summoned the American ambassador to his office to discuss the aggravated situation in Lebanon and he suggested choosing a trustworthy president who could cease the fighting and reconcile the conflicting parties, proposing the name of General Fouad Chehab.

Despite his firm belief that he belonged to the Army Command, Chehab was concerned that his consent to assume office might pave the road to potential military members who might covet this post in the future. After extensive deliberations and after the deterioration of security conditions in Lebanon, Parliament convened and elected Fouad Chehab as the President of the Republic, disappointing all other candidates such as Pierre Eddeh, Charles Helo, Elias Khoury, etc...

The book highlights the golden age Lebanon lived in during the term of Chehab, who is considered the savior who put Lebanon's pieces together and bridged the distance between Muslims and Christians after the civil war. It also



sheds light on the comprehensive reforms that Chehab introduced, for he succeeded in achieving social justice and balanced development in all regions and he renewed all state institutions and provided unprecedented public services. Chehab's term witnessed an outstanding economic boom and the President established sound relations with the neighboring Arab countries, particularly Syria and Egypt. He was a wise and an exemplary figure that rose above and beyond personal gains and interests, which made him stand out among all the politicians of that era.

The failed coup attempt led by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in 1961 was one of the major events that marked Fouad Chehab's term. So the author dedicated a part of the book to outline the chronicles of the Lebanese Military Intelligence through the “second division” known commonly as the “second office”. And so, he underlines the role that the Lebanese Intelligence played back then, stressing their position in power and their interference in the national and political life. He also reveals ample information about how the second division came about and how it encroached upon the President, stressing its relation with the Syrian and Egyptian Intelligence bodies.

Chehab tendered his resignation in 1960 but changed his mind upon popular request. However, he refused the extension of his term for a second time in 1964, because term renewal necessitates a constitutional amendment which can pave the way to wider participation of other sects in power at the expense of the Christians who dominated the biggest share.

Upon expiry of Chehab's term, he chose Charles Helo to replace him as President for he was an honest man and a Chehabi loyalist. President Chehab thought that recommending him would facilitate the execution of the Chehabi reforms and the protection of the Chehabi political school, the Army and the Intelligence. But the relations between the two began to lose its luster.

The conclusion of the book aimed to establish in the mind of the readers the rarity and the importance of people like Fouad Chehab. The author says at the end that Fouad Chehab was the first president to die poor, and wonders if it is possible to ever imagine a president of these days die penniless ●●

## STEP BY STEP

From the series *Step by Step* by Hanadi Dayya and Manal Shamma. Illustrations by Nadine Kaadan.

### THE CLOUD

The cloud used to wear her white dress in spring and summer and her grey one in winter and fall. But the cloud loved colors and wished to have a colorful dress. The cloud became sad when everybody refused to lend her some of their colors so that she could weave her own dress. "Sorry, I cannot give away my yellowness. If you wore a yellow dress, people would think that there is another sun in the sky," the sun said to her. Similarly, the moon refused to grant her its silver rays and told her to go to the stars. Those disappointed her too by arguing that if she wore their twinkling, people would not be able to see her in daylight and would think that the sky had become cloud-free. In their turn, the birds turned down the request of the cloud as abandoning their colorful feathers would prevent them from flying, so they told her to try her luck with the rainbow, for it has seven colors. However, the rainbow advised her not to change her colors because they help people forecast the weather, so she felt happy and special. This story aims to teach children colors and help them understand the importance of contentedness.

"The cloud went to her friend, the sun. She looked at her beautiful yellow dress and said: "You are my dear friend. Will you give me your yellowness to make a new dress for myself?" The sun replied: "But you already have two dresses, a white one and a grey one. Why do you wish to have a yellow dress too?" The cloud explained: "Because colors are very appealing to me and I feel like changing my color."

### FLYING

This story introduces children to the means of air transportation to incite their curiosity for knowledge and exploration. The wise bird decided to fly near other alien birds to recognize who they were. He flew towards an inflated bird and inquired from the people in the basket why the bird was flying them in it, and he learned that the bird was a zeppelin. He later caught sight of a triangle-shaped bird, and as he approached, he noticed that it was tied to a string held by a little girl, so he learned that the bird was a kite. He then heard the roar of a huge bird so he flew right after him until he saw him land and noticed people coming out so he asked one of them: "what were you doing inside that villain bird? Did he swallow you?" So he learned that the bird was an airplane flown by a pilot. And so, the pondering bird figured out the truth behind these birds and narrated his adventure to all his friends, who admired his bravery.

"There were many things that fly in the sky. A pondering bird wanted to figure out what those were. At times, he would see a large inflated bird fly up the sky, holding a big basket soaring high, then falling down. At other times he would see another bird in the shape of a triangle with a thing and long tail. The bird would fly with the wind and then disappear. And every now and then, a huge bird with a very loud roar would spread his wings, unintimidated by the lightning or the thunder, and fly above the clouds with his eyes glittering in the darkness of the night." ●●



# HOUBAISH FAMILIES

## YEMENI SABEANS WHO CONVERTED TO CHRISTIANITY

Linguistically speaking, the Arabic word “houbaish” means a person who has strength and charm. The name “houbaish” was given to the children emerging from marriages between the Hawazen tribe (a Christian tribe in Yemen) and the clans of Habesha (Ethiopia).

The Hawazen tribe used to belong to the Sabean religion (worship of the planets, the stars, the sun and the moon) but was converted to Christianity in the first century by Thomas the Apostle. As Islam started to spread widely in the Arab Peninsula, the numbers of Christians decreased and they moved to other regions. Al-Hawazen tribe headed to Iraq, then to Palmyra in Damascus before the 7th century AD when they moved to Lebanon and first settled in Deir al-Ahmar (near Baalbeck), then in Al-Kherbi and later in Yanouh, which became a stronghold for the Maronite Bishops thanks to the protection of the Haoubaishis. After numerous disputes with the Shia’a, they migrated to Ghazeer in the early 16th century. Some moved to Baabda and were given the Mallat family name, others settled in Eddeh in Jbeil and were given the Eddeh family name and a good few returned to Deir al-Ahmar and assumed the Habshi name. Those who went to Akkar maintained the Houbaish family name.

Therefore the kinship between the Houbaish families is still unknown, especially between those residing in Saida or Tibeh and those in Jounieh or Akkar.

There are 551 Houbaish members, most of whom (75%) are Maronite, with a minority belonging to the Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Catholic and Shia’a sects.

The Houbaishis are distributed over sects and regions as follows:

**Maronite:** there are 44 Maronite members distributed in:

Ghazeer (Kessrouan): 105 members

Qbayyet (Akkar): 94

Kfarhaoura (Zgharta): 81

Zan (Batroun): 70

Zahrieh (Tripoli): 17

Hay Mar Youhanna (Bsharri): 15


Baatouta (Kessrouan): 12

Hazmieh (Baabda): 7

Harhraya (Kessrouan): 6

Sahel Alma (Kessrouan): 6

There are 45 **Sunni** members in Hay al-Share’e (Saida)



**Greek Orthodox:** there are 43 Greek Orthodox members distributed in:

H (Akkar): 22

Ashrafieh (Beirut): 20

**Greek Catholic:** there are 25 Greek Catholic members distributed in:

Sheikh Mohammad (Akkar): 17

Ras Beirut: 8

The **Shia’a** members are 24 and are distributed in Tibeh (Marjeyoun) ●

# KHAT EL-PETROL

## A NEW VILLAGE

The name Khat el-Petrol was not familiar to the Lebanese until a few months ago, when they started hearing about this northern new village located at the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Lebanese residents of Khat el-Petrol were subject to several abduction operations performed by the Syrians who accused them of smuggling weapons to their country. The village was also home to many protests manifested by road blocking.

### Etymology

The origin of the name of this village has still not been determined with certainty, but there seems to be a concurrence among the residents that the village was dubbed Khat el-Petrol prior to 1975 when oil pipes used to run through it to transport petroleum from Iraq to Lebanon.

### Location

Khat el-Petrol is located in the Wadi Khaled region in the Qada'a of Akkar at an altitude of 550 m above the sea level. It is about 160 km from Beirut and the village spreads on the riverbed of the southern great river.

### Establishment


This village was not officially recognized until 2001 when law No. 242 dated August 6, 2001 and introducing 33 new villages in the Qada'a of Akkar was issued.

Similarly to other villages in Akkar, Khat el-Petrol was established because all official records listed the residents of that area as belonging to Wadi Khaled. This was not a big deal at first, as most of Wadi Khaled residents are non-Lebanese holding an under-consideration Lebanese nationality or hailing from unknown origins. However, following the issuance of the nationality decree in 1994, it became necessary to register the inhabitants according to the villages they were residing in and after introducing those villages to the administrative distribution in Lebanon.

### Population

The number of registered inhabitants in the village's Personal Status Register is estimated at 350 people including 200 eligible voters belonging to the Sunni sect in their entirety.

Khat el-Petrol includes the following families: Rakhou, Moussa and Khaled.



### Municipality formation

A new municipality was formed in Khat el-Petrol pursuant to decision No. 604, dated April 10, 2012 and issued by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities in response to the demand of the Moukhtar and the residents of the village.

### Problems

The village suffers from a lack of services and high unemployment rate as most inhabitants make their living from agriculture or smuggling weapons between Lebanon and Syria. There are no schools in Khat el-Petrol. ●●

# CIVIL STRIFE INTRO (6)

## DIALOGUE COMMITTEE: 20 FIGURES LAY DOWN THE SOLUTION

Following the formation of the new government, which aimed at curbing the deterioration of events, the lapse into war seemed final and inevitable and thus, there was a consensus over the need to establish a dialogue committee on September 24, 1975 to ensure security détente and political agreement.

### Announcement of security accord

... After concluding the meeting, PM Rashid Karami stated the following: “In order to reinforce security and stability and return to normal life, a meeting was held at the Serail in my presence and the presence of President Camille Chamoun and the deputy prime minister of Syria, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdul Halim Khaddam, in addition to Abou Ammar, Zouheir Mehsen and Abou Hassan, and after lengthy deliberations, the following was agreed:

- To demilitarize the areas of Beirut and its suburbs and to withdraw all the military manifestations including checkpoints and weapon bases as of September 24, 1975 starting at 5 pm.
- To cease all acts of violence in all regions immediately
- To release all the abducted members affiliated with all groups and in all regions
- To assign the Internal Security Forces to assume their responsibilities in all regions.”

### Formation of a dialogue committee

...Afterwards, PM Karami returned with Camille Chamoun and Abdul Halim Khaddam to the Baabda Palace and briefed President Frangieh on the details of the accord. He later headed to the Cabinet Hall and summoned journalists and reporters and issued the following statement:

“What shall I say to you at this particular moment after all that has happened and continues to happen in Lebanon? It is sad and painful to experience such heinous and hideous events. We address you today giving thoughtful attention to the aftermath of clashes. The casualties sustained and the havoc wreaked on the country will only motivate us to exert further efforts to reconstruct what we destroyed, restore what we ruined and compensate all those on whom we inflicted severe damage. We have unwavering belief in the Lord and in this lofty nation, which accustomed us to uphold its faith and stamina and to survive the crises and rise from the ashes stronger than before. We are all aware of the criticality of the historical phase laying ahead, and this strengthens our belief in the urgency of sharing responsibility and prompts us to exert all efforts necessary to achieve and maintain and promote national unity in response and fulfillment to the wishes of all the Lebanese. National

unity guarantees the stability of this country and the safety of its people. Lebanon, this beautiful country which stands out for its amiable relations with the Arab world and the foreign countries, is today entrusted in our custody. This country has always carried a message of love, peace and fraternity and has similarly proved itself capable of responding to any rightful case or demand. Therefore, it has always been the source and authority defending the Palestinian cause, which finds amid the liberty and the democracy practiced in Lebanon, favorable winds to stand for the values of justice and welfare.

And so, we find ourselves compelled, as we address these kind people, to extend our thanks to all those who stood by us amidst the ordeal, particularly Syria and the Syrian President Hafez Assad, who sent Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam and Syrian army Chief Hekmat Chahabi to represent him. We highly appreciate the fraternal compassion they showed, and the assistance they provided helped us realize that Lebanon, being an Arab country and a part of this region, will always find comfort in the friendliness of the neighboring Arab countries and will be reassured that the ship will reach its destination. We trust our Arab fellows and we have a firm belief that Lebanon will learn lessons from the many hardships it encountered, for the cooperation and solidarity between the members of a family is the only way to serve the ends and fulfill the wishes.

As I mentioned earlier, we are very keen on Lebanon’s national unity, which is a prerequisite for the stability of this country and its capacity to achieve its goals and to fulfill its aspirations to promote social justice and economic development and to provide financial comfort to all the members of this family in the various Lebanese regions.

When those dire events kicked off, on a small scale initially and on a larger one afterwards, taking their toll on all the Lebanese regions, the government did not hesitate for a split second to take all the measures necessary to restore order and try to contain the violence and curb its drastic repercussions. However, and despite our efforts, what happened was shocking and atrocious but it is time to tighten the grip on it or rather put an end to it. I have heard many wonder why we did not order the

deployment of the army to avoid the bloodshed and nip the strife in the bud and to those I say that the Lebanese Army is the institution responsible for the protection of both Lebanon and the Lebanese. We would not have spared this institution had we been sure that summoning it into the field would solve the issue. On the contrary, we believed that it would prompt further brutality and damage.

In any case, I said it in the Cabinet and I repeat it now: the political solution is the best and wisest means to address this challenge and this is what we were seeking as of the first moment. We had continuous and consistent meetings with the various parties and I dare declare that, thanks to God and our relentless efforts, we managed to form a national dialogue committee representing the national unity. This committee shall work to fulfill the wishes of the Lebanese and lay down a work plan including the basic principles under which we will all cooperate for the best of the people and the sovereignty of the country.”

### Committee members

“The dialogue committee includes: Kamel Asaad, Rashid Karami, Camille Chamoun, Abdallah Yafi, Saeb Salam, Majid Erslan, Philippe Taqla, Ghassan Tueini, Kamal Jumblat, Pierre Gemayel, Raymond Eddeh, Rene Mouawad, Khachik Babakian, Rida Wahid, Elias Saba, Abbas Khalaf, Najib Karanouh, Edmond Rabbat, Assem Qanso and Hassan Awada, and it is invited to convene tomorrow at 10 am in the morning at the Presidential Palace. May peace be upon our victims and martyrs and may Lebanon enjoy long-lasting stability and tranquility.”

### Stances regarding the dialogue committee

#### Sheikh Pierre Gemayel

He refrained from commenting on the dialogue committee but sources at the Phalanges Party asserted that he would attend the meeting.

#### Joseph Skaff

MP Joseph Skaff reported that he had sent a telegram to President Suleiman Frangieh and Camille Chamoun voicing protest, in the name of the MPs of Zahle and Western Beqa’a, for not representing Beqa’a in the dialogue committee, especially that Zahle and its neighborhoods had tasted the bitterness of war more than anyone else. He added that he and his bloc’s MPs insist that the Beqa’a be represented fairly in the dialogue committee.

#### Hussein Husseini

MP Hussein Husseini said that: “This committee is solely working to unite the parties who engaged in military battles

and this is the goal we have been supporting and seeking. However, it would have been possible to convene a meeting without this poor formulation, as the committee was formed without the knowledge of all parties and it does not speak for the people, for its members do not represent all the parties in the various regions and the disadvantaged areas or reflect our demands and point of view. Hence, we care little about it and we express reserve over its formation, especially that we are not among the fighting parties in the country.”

### National Movement

Following its meeting, the National Movement issued the following statement:

“...From a political perspective, we must admit that the final solution reached and entailing the formation of a national committee for dialogue, as revealed by the Prime Minister, fails to rise to the challenge that confronts the country for the time being.

However, and despite our reserve, we resign to participating in the dialogue and the representatives of the national and socialist movements shall constitute a single and united team working together inside the committee.”

### Kamal Jumblat

Jumblat said “the meeting does not fall under the principle of tribal or political reconciliation and is not disconnected from the decisions of the national forces supporting the Palestinian cause.”

Yasser Arafat phoned Mr. Jumblat in the afternoon and briefed him on the formula, which Minister Khaddam had discussed at the Presidential Palace and which was an amended version of the one proposed by Jumblat earlier with a difference in the names, so Jumblat gave his approval.

### Saeb Salam

He refused to make any comments regarding the formation and the mission of the committee and he revealed that he was summoned to the first meeting to be held at the Presidential Palace but he would delay his final decision until after meeting Raymond Edde.

### Najah Wakim

“... As a matter of fact, I am unfortunately pessimistic and I believe that the country is heading towards the abyss at a fast pace. Some are trying to depict the battle as a battle between Muslims and Christians but this is not the case, as the purpose of the conflicting parties is to divide the country. I say there should be a national meeting including all parties challenging division to outline a plan to confront Lebanon’s enemies.” ●

# GHASSAN TUEINI

## STANCES AND STATEMENTS

**MP, journalist, politician and former minister and ambassador Ghassan Tueini died after 86 years of dedicative work in politics and journalism.**

**On this occasion, The Monthly sheds light on the most significant stances and statements of the late Ghassan Tueini.**



“My country might not always be right, but I will always side with my country.”

“A single, but quite painful black spot in our press history: An-Nahar failed to race ahead of the world press in revealing the Sabra and Shatila massacres and seeking its real dimensions because the Israeli occupation was confusing the Lebanese press.”

Tueini described each of the following presidents of the republic as follows:

- Bechara Khoury: big vision victimized by little deeds
- Camille Chamoun: their wittiness beat his endurance
- Fouad Chehab: courageous words and oppressive actions
- Charles Helo: eloquent but not powerful
- Suleiman Frangieh: affection hidden behind the tyranny
- Elias Sarkis: he ruled until they exhausted his patience
- Amine Gemayel: quick to hesitate
- Elias Herawi: being witty does not always mean being right

“Purification is inevitably coming, but it is the people who will purify the Serail and the country because purification necessitates pure hands.”

“Yes for a Lebanese President who supports Syria but no for a candidate who comes from Damascus without any welfare or peace neither to Lebanon nor to Syria.”

“The salvation of Lebanon must stem from Lebanon or else the country shall remain a plaything in the hands of those who fight upon its land.”

“If it is time for the Lebanese to repent, wake up and escape the inferno they got themselves into, then it is time for the Arabs to wake up as well and beware the fires: their fires, the fires of Lebanon and the wars of others, before they devour them.”

“How can we urge a regime to reform the state and the society when it is even incapable of reforming the prisons!?”

“Education cannot be dogmatic but shall rather be free and civilized.”

“Those whose lives are at stake due to famine should fight death at any cost, no matter what the tool of death was, for they should know that a nation whose rulers fail to assume their duties and to govern justly is a jungle rather than a real nation.”

“...And if they proposed a constitutional amendment (to extend the presidential term of Elias Herawi), let one candidate for presidency among the deputies break his silence, or rather fear, and dare to argue to save the honor of Parliament, and that of the constitution and the remains of the Lebanese democracy so that we can well deserve the aspiration for more.”

“The Lebanese press is very sublime and very retarded at the same time, and either way it is beautiful and appealing.”

“Freedom does not need any laws to protect it and does not fear any states of emergency. Freedom is stronger and more sublime than laws and its enemies. Free democratic people fear nothing and no one.”

On this occasion, I call not for revenge and hatred and bloodshed but rather hope that we bury with Gebran all our grudges and disagreements.

And finally, the strongest statement and stance: “let my people live.” ●

# JUNE 2012 HIGHLIGHTS

- NASRALLAH CALLS FOR A NON-SECTARIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE
- CLASHES AND CASUALTIES IN TRIPOLI
- SEXUAL ABUSE IN SCHOOLS
- ROAD BLOCKING AND TIRE BURNING
- LBP 600 BILLION FOR TRIPOLI AND OTHER REGIONS
- NATIONAL DIALOGUE WITHOUT THE LEBANESE FORCES
- AMIN MAALOUF MEMBER IN THE FRENCH ACADEMY
- AL-ASSEER THREATENS BERRI AND NASRALLAH AND BLOCKS SAIDA ROAD
- ASSAULT AGAINST AL-JADEED TV
- MIKATI PAYS BAIL TO RELEASE ISLAMIST DETAINEES

## June 2

- President Michel Suleiman arrives in Saudi Arabia and meets King Abdullah. He also attends lunch banquet at the residence of the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal in the presence of former PM Saad Hariri.

- On the 22nd anniversary of the death of Imam Khomeini, Hezbollah's Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah proposes a non-sectarian national conference and urges kidnappers to release the abducted pilgrims and settle.

- PM Najib Mikati returns from Turkey and meets a delegation of families of the kidnapped pilgrims.

- Future Movement hands the UN secretary general representative Derek Plumbly a memo urging the UN to put an end to the Syrian violations of Lebanon's sovereignty.

- Minister of Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour reveals that the abducted Lebanese pilgrims are in good health.

- Former PM Omar Karami calls for the reconsideration of the amnesty law during the commemoration of Rashid Karami's assassination and the Lebanese Forces party replies to him and demands that all files be opened.

## June 4

- President Michel Suleiman visits Kuwait and meets Prince Sheikh Sabah Ahmed Sabah stressing that Lebanon is at ready to welcome the Kuwaitis. The Prince reiterates Kuwait's ongoing support to Lebanon.

- Clashes between Jabal Mohsen and Bab Tebbaneh result in the deaths of 12 people and injures 57; the army succeeds in containing the fights.

- Qatar beats Lebanon 1-0 in a football match held at the Cite Sportive in Beirut.

- MP Walid Jumblat deems it wrong to address Hezbollah with force.

- Mayor Ziad Homsy who served three years in prison for collaboration with Israel gets released from prison accompanied by his lawyer Nicolas Fattoush. Homsy was sentenced originally to 15 years.

- Syrian forces release the Lebanese abducted in Aboudieh.

## June 5

- PM Najib Mikati visits Patriarch al-Rai in Bkerke and stresses that the government will continue to assume its responsibilities and no better alternative is available at the moment.

- Hariri and Seniora condemn the burning of Alawi shops in Tripoli.

- Arida- Aboudieh road opens after the release of an Arida member

who was detained in Syria.

- Principal of Saint Joseph School Aintoura holds a press conference to discuss the sexual assault case that shook the school, and the parents' committee criticizes the administration's mishandling of the incident. The sexual abuse story elicits the interest and follow-up of the Lebanese community.

- A Phalanges statement supports Nasrallah's call for a national dialogue provided that the political, military and security decisions rest with the state solely.

- The STL Trial Chamber to hold sessions on June 13 to hear arguments on the jurisdictions and legality of the tribunal.

## June 6

- President Michel Suleiman signs a decree appointing five members at the Higher Judicial Council.

- MP Mohammed Kabbara lashes out at Grand Mufti Mohammed Rashid Kabbani for verbally attacking Hariri and accuses him of false allegations stressing that "Hariri did all that he could to conceal the perpetrations of Kabbani and his corrupt son."

- MP Sami Gemayel submits a draft law suggesting the banning

of the law of foreign acquisition of property and the adoption of long-term lease agreements.

- The families of the abducted pilgrims recognized one of the kidnappers in an LBC report on Free Syrian Army members along the Turkish-Syrian border but the FSA denies any involvement with the kidnapping.

- Families of the abducted pilgrims block the airport road in protest.

- The UAE deport dozens of Lebanese for alleged sectarian reasons.

## June 7

- President Michel Suleiman visits the UAE and Qatar and meets with both his counterparts. He also requests the UAE to fully consider the conditions of the Lebanese before deporting them.

- Ministers Mohammed Safadi, Gebran Bassil, Mohammed Fneish and Ali Hassan Khalil meet at the Serail to discuss financial issues prior to the Cabinet session.

- “We will confront Hezbollah if they attempt to disrupt the elections,” LF leader Samir Geagea says.

- In response to the criticism of Aoun and Hezbollah, Fouad Seniora’s office issues a statement over the funds that the state had received following the 2006 July war.

- Syrian gunfire kills one person and injures two others in the border town of Ersal and the town’s residents deny that the victims were smuggling arms to Syria.

## June 8

- The Cabinet convenes at the presidential palace and approves LBP 10,394 billion for the 2012 state spending in addition LBP 650 billion for development projects in Tripoli and other areas across Lebanon.

- Former MP and minister and owner of An-Nahar Ghassan Tueini dies at the age of 86.

- German Minister of Foreign Affairs visits the Army Commander in his office in Yarzi and voices his appreciation of the efforts exerted by the Army.

- German Foreign Affairs Minister Guido Westerwelle arrives in Lebanon for an official visit.

- Najib Mikati’s convoy collides with a car driven by MP Samer Saadeh’s bodyguard on the Jbeil road.

- The Army Commander receives MP Walid Jumblat in his office in Yarzi and the latter voices his appreciation of the efforts exerted by the Army.

- Families of the abducted pilgrims block the airport road.

- The Lebanese Military Judiciary files a lawsuit against the Syrian Army over the killing of Al-Jadeed photographer Ali Shaaban.

## June 9

- Lebanon elected Vice President of the UN General Assembly for one year.

- 3 dead and 3 injured in sniping rounds between Jabal Mohsen and Bab Tebbaneh.

- “Governments come and go but the state remains solid and it is unacceptable to destabilize the state to change the government,” PM Mikati says in the annual meeting of the INSEAD alumni in Phoenicia.

- French President Francois Hollande phones his Lebanese counterpart to discuss the Syrian spillover to Lebanon and reiterate the importance of national dialogue.

## June 11

- Mach 14 Forces hand over a memo regarding their stance from dialogue to President Suleiman, stressing that they support the formation of a neutral salvation government and a plan to handle the weapons issue. Seniora assures that the Future Movement will participate in the dialogue.

- Head of the Lebanese Forces’ Executive Committee Samir Geagea tells Al-Jadeed TV that the dialogue is a trap and that he will not participate in it, stressing that the problem with Patriarch al-Rai will be solved in two weeks.

- Mutual kidnappings in Wadi Khaled take a sectarian turn between the Sunni and the Alawis. The incidents started upon the kidnapping of a Sunni citizen from Wadi Khaled in an Alawi region, thus prompting counter kidnapping operations.

- Al-Jazeera broadcasts a video showing the 11 abducted pilgrims in Syria and one of them voices his support of the Syrian revolution, assuring that nobody pressured him to make such a statement.

- MP Asaad Hardan re-elected as head of the SSNP.

- “Mikati is the best PM at the moment. The security forces are contributing to the armament of fighters in Tripoli and there is no state but rather a bunch of militias,” MP Suleiman Frangieh tells As-Safir.

## June 12

- The national dialogue committee convenes at Baabda Palace in the presence of all participants save the Lebanese Forces which boycotted the dialogue and Minister Mohamed who was absent due to health conditions. The post-meeting statement reiterates support of the army, refusal of weapons and adherence to the Taef accord.

- The committee is to meet again on June 25.

- Former President Amine Gemayel tells As-Safir that he is ready to meet Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah should there be convenient circumstances for such a meeting.

- The UNHCR reveals that 26000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon profit from their assistance.

### June 13

- PM Najib Mikati visits the Army Command and meets the Defense Minister, the Army Commander and high ranking officers, stressing support of the army and reiterating the disassociation policy from the events in Syria.

- Syrian authorities free Wadi-Khaled resident Suleiman Ahmad and hand him over to the Lebanese authorities. In return, Wadi Kahled's armed men release four Alawi abductees (two Syrian and two Lebanese).

- The Cabinet convenes at the Serail and approves two loans to restore power plants. It also appoints members to the Justice Council and adjourns the budget session due to the illness of Minister Finance Mohammed Safadi.

- Minister of Interior and Municipalities sets July 15 as the date for Koura's by-election.

- Armed clashes in the southern suburb of Beirut between Mekdad and Zaiter families result in a number of injuries.

- The Future Movement deplors the false information broadcasted by LBC regarding Suleiman-Hariri meeting in KSA and denies all allegations made by Hariri against Hezbollah.

### June 14

- Head of the Lebanese Forces' Executive Committee Samir Geagea nominates Fadi Karam (hailing from Amyoun) for the parliamentary seat, which fell vacant following the death of MP Farid Habib.

- Syrian infiltration into Eرسال ends with the burning of the mayor's house.

- STL defense lawyers challenge the legality of the court during the session held by the Trial Chamber.

- Ehden commemorates the 35th anniversary of the assassination of Tony Frangieh and his family.

### June 15

- Lebanese novelist Amin Maalouf joins the elite French Academy.

- US Secretary of the State Hillary Clinton phones PM Najib Mikati in support of the moves taken by the government, the Army and Banque du Liban.

- The Cabinet approves LBP 11 billion for the 2012 spending.

### June 16

- "There cannot be parliamentary elections given the current circumstances," General Michel Aoun tells As-Safir.

- President Michel Suleiman receives a delegation of the families of the abductees in Syria.

- One dead and a few injured during clashes between the Lebanese army and residents of Nahr al-Bared in the north, and the tension spreads to reach the Baddawi and Ain el-Helwi camps.

- Dr. Moussa Abou Hamad arrested for medical negligence that resulted in the death of a pregnant woman and his fellow doctors announce strike in protest of his arrest.

### June 19

- Demonstrations and road blocking across a number of Lebanese regions in protest of constant power cuts.

- Families of the abductees stage a protest on the airport road.

- Information leaked about an assassination plot targeting a number of Lebanese political figures including Fouad Seniora and 7 others.

- Two dead and 32 injured, including three army members, during the funeral of the man who was killed earlier in Nahr el-Bared.

- The second Muslim-Christian summit opens in Beirut under the title "Christians and Muslims for Peace."

### June 20

- Lebanese figures and delegations arrive in Saudi Arabia to convey condolences over the death of Saudi

Crown Prince Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz; Hariri and Jumblat shake hands during the service.

- The first batch of the 7 Islamic detainees gets released from prison after PM Najib Mikati had paid their bail. 100 other detainees are supposed to be freed before July 15, date of retirement of General Prosecutor Said Mirza.

- Dr Moussa Abou Hamad released on a 50 million LBP bail.

### June 21

- PM Najib Mikati and a number of ministers head for Brazil to participate in the UN Conference for Sustainable Development.

- MP Walid Jumblat lashes out at Gebran Bassil calling him the son-in-law of FPM's Sultan.

- A Hezbollah statement read by MP Mohammad Raad assures that Bassil has done all that he could regarding the electricity issue.

- Verbal skirmishes between the Future Movement and the FPM and Hezbollah over the fate and the disposition of the donations received by Seniora's government.

- AUB students and teachers protest at the university's decision to honor Zionist Donna Shalala.

### June 22

- La Fete de la Musique ceremonies sweep over a number of Lebanese regions.

- PM Najib Mikati delivers a speech during the global summit convening in Brazil.

- Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dispatches Fatah leader Azzam al-Ahmad to Lebanon and the latter visits Lebanese officials to discuss the issue of the Palestinian camps.

- Islamic organizations in Tripoli launch a popular movement aimed at dismissing the Syrian ambassador from Lebanon.

- Ministers of foreign affairs of Sweden, Bulgaria and Bologna? Isn't this a town? Should be a country

instead, Poland? arrive in Lebanon and meet Lebanese officials.

### June 23

- The head of Libya's National Transitional Council Mostafa Abdul Jalil tells Al-Arabiyya TV that Imam Moussa As-Sadr has never left Libya and that a grave was found where As-Sadr and his companions might have been buried. The grave was opened in the presence of a Lebanese delegation and bone remains were taken two months ago for the DNA test.

- Patriarch Al-Rai meets a delegation of March 14 Forces in Bkerke.

- The Saudi Embassy in Lebanon denies having asked Saudi expats to leave Lebanon before the end of this month.

- Former President Amin Gemayel hosts a lunch banquet in Bekfaya for a number of March 14 Forces figures including the former PM Fouad Seniora.

- MP Michel Aoun starts a three-day visit to Zahle and MP Skaff boycotts the visit.

- AUB students disrupt the speech of the former US Secretary of Health Donna Chalala accusing her of Zionism.

- Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir brings up the issue of the toy machine guns that have a recording calling for the killing of the wife of Prophet Muhammad, Aicha, and threatens Speaker Nabih Berri and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

- "I will not participate in dialogue," Head of the Lebanese Forces' Executive Committee Samir Geagea says, stressing that he supports the proportionality law or the division of Lebanon into 61 electoral districts.

### June 25

- The SSNP nominate Walid Azar for Koura by-election.

- MP Michel Aoun concludes his visit to Zahle and says: "a group

in the government is impeding our work and MP Akram Chehayeb is the king of evil."

- Imam As-Sadr committee in Lebanon replies to Mostafa Abdul Jalil asserting that the DNA tested remains do not belong to Imam As-Sadr.

### June 26

- A group of gunmen burn tires at the entrance of Al-Jadeed TV and the guards and residents of the area manage to arrest one of them and hand him to the army. People block roads in Basta and Zqaq el-Blat in protest of the arrest and sources claim that the arrested man is affiliated with Hezbollah, but the latter denies any connection to him.

- The national dialogue committee convenes and reiterates the inappropriateness of using weapons locally, adjourning the discussion of the defense strategy until the next session on July 24.

- Renewal of real estate fights in Lasa between the town's Shia'a residents and the Maronite patriarchate.

### June 27

- President Michel Suleiman heads to Bahrain and meets with King Hamad Bin Issa al-Khalifa.

- MP Michel Aoun lashes out at MP Walid Jumblat labeling him as the "Sultan" who met the former Israeli PM Shimon Peres.

- One mine and two unexploded bombs found in the garden of Notre Dame du Liban Hospital in Jounieh.

### June 28

- The Cabinet convenes at the Baabda Palace and approves the lease of power generating ships from Turkey. President Suleiman announces that blocking the airport road will be forbidden from this day on.

- The Minister of Interior and Municipalities Marwan Charbel announces starting an implementation of a security plan in

the southern suburb of Beirut.

- Protestors block the airport road and Salim Slam road demanding the release of Wissam Alaeddine, one of the vandals who attacked Al-Jadeed TV.

- Maronite Patriarch Mar Bechara Boutros al-Rai heads for Antakya-Turkey on a pastoral visit for the first time.

- The supporters of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir stage an open-ended and peaceful protest in front of Bahaa Din Hariri mosque calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

- Protests and riots erupt at the Justice Palace in Baabda owing to the delay in rendering verdicts, which result in 5 injuries.

### June 29

- Sheikh Ahmad al-Aseer proceeds with his protest in Saida after the Interior Minister failed to persuade him out of it. "I am peaceful and I will carry on with my protest until resolving the issue of Hezbollah weapons which trampled the dignity of the Sunni," he says.

- Female members join ISF patrols in Beirut for the first time in Lebanon's history.

- In a speech delivered before delegations from the Western Beqa'a, President Michel Suleiman wonders how the officials could seek to please those who assault and attack the army.

- Former President Amine Gemayel visits the Tashnag headquarters and stresses that what happened between the two parties is a minor misunderstanding.

### June 30

- Religious and political dignitaries in Saida call for the opening of Saida roads and all other roads in order to avert strife and Al Aseer replies by saying that "no one will open the road even if the Security Council intervened." ●

# ALGERIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

## WOMEN OVERSHADOW ISLAMIST PARTIES

Algeria witnessed on May 10, 2012 new parliamentary elections that yielded a set of changes on the Algerian political scene. The results emphasized the dwindling of the Islamists, making Algeria the notable exception to the general trend of an Islamic rise to power in other neighboring countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. An increase in women's representation was also evident in the elections.

### Electoral system

Algeria has a proportional electoral system, whereby seats are awarded to the party winning a majority of popular vote. In the absence of an absolute majority, the party with a plurality of votes receives 51 percent of the seats and the remaining seats are proportionally divided among all the other parties receiving at least 7 percent of the total popular vote. Algeria has 48 electoral districts.

### Voters

Registered voters (who must be 18 years or older) amounted to 21,664,348 in the 2012 elections, of whom 9,178,056 cast their ballots. Voter turnout stood at 42.5% compared to 35% in the 2007 elections. The valid votes cast reached 7,509,549 while 1,668,507 invalid votes were eliminated.

### Candidacy

There were 24,916 candidates running for Algerian elections including 7700 women as the electoral law requires that women constitute 30% of the electoral lists.

The candidates represented 44 parties and political bodies in addition to 186 independent lists that contested over 452 seats for a five-year term, noting that the parliamentary seats stood at 389 in 2007, thus increasing by 73 places in 2012.

### Results

The results yielded the victory for the National Liberation Front (FLN) with a plurality of 220 seats, of which 68 were assigned to women. In contrast, the Islamists (Green Algeria Alliance) obtained only 48 seats, down by 13 seats from their parliamentary share in 2007, thus contradicting all the propaganda that had been promoting their victory. What is significant about the Algerian elections is that women took over 148 seats compared to 31 previously. The National Rally for Democracy, a liberal party having an amiable relationship with the ruling party, won 68 seats of which 13 were for women.

### Results by province and party

Province	# of seats	Seat by party
Adrar	5	• FLN (2) • Future Front (2) • National Rally for Democracy (1)
Chlef	13	• FLN (7) • National Republican Alliance (2) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (3)
Laghouat	6	• FLN (2) • National Front of Independents for Understanding (1) • Knights Independent List (1) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Oum el Bouaghi	8	• FLN (8)
Batna	14	• FLN (8) • Rightly Guided Governance List (2) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Algerian National Front (2)
Bejaia	12	• FLN (3) • Socialist Forces Front (7) • National Rally for Democracy (2)
Biskra	9	• FLN (4) • Light of the Youth Independent List (3) • National Rally for Democracy (2)
Bechar	5	• FLN (2) • National Front for Social Justice (1) • Openness Movement (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Bouira	9	• FLN (6) • National Rally for Democracy (3)
Blida	13	• FLN (7) • Al Aseel List (2) • Workers Party (2) • Algerian National Front (2)
Tamanghasset	5	• FLN (1) • National Front for Social Justice (1) • Free List for Further Development (1) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Tebessa	8	• FLN (5) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Tiaret	11	• FLN (9) • National Rally for Democracy (2)

Province	# of seats	Seat by party
Tizi Ouzou	15	• FLN (4) • Workers Party (1) • Socialist Forces Front (7) • National Rally for Democracy (3)
Algiers	37	• FLN (13) • Socialist Forces Front (1) • Workers Party (7) • National Rally for Democracy (3) • Green Algeria Alliance (13)
Tlemcen	12	• FLN (12)
Djelfa	14	• FLN (7) • National Rally for Democracy (7)
Jijel	8	• FLN (2) • Union of Social and Democratic Forces (2) • Justice and Development Party (1) • Algerian National Front (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (2)
Setif	19	• FLN (8) • National Republican Alliance (3) • Algerian Rally Party (3) • Green Algeria Alliance (5)
Saidan	5	• FLN (3) • Ahd 54 (1) • New Dawn (1)
Skikda	11	• FLN (7) • National Rally for Democracy (4)
Sidi Bel Abbes	8	• FLN (8)
Annaba	8	• FLN (3) • Workers Party (1) • Justice and Development Party (1) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • National Democratic Front (1)
Guelma	6	• FLN (3) • National Rally for Democracy (3)
Constantine	12	• FLN (6) • Justice and Development Party (2) • Workers Party (2) • National Rally for Democracy (2)
Medea	11	• FLN (5) • Youth Party (2) • Algerian Rally Party (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (2)
Mostaganem	9	• FLN (6) • National Rally for Democracy (3)
M'sila	12	• FLN (3) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (3) • New Dawn (2) • Change Front (2)
Mascara	10	• FLN (4) • Algerian Popular Movement (3) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Ouargla	7	• FLN (2) • New Dawn (1) • National Party for Solidarity and Development (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (2) • Dignity Party (1)
Oran	18	• FLN (11) • Workers Party (4) • National Rally for Democracy (3)
El Bayadh	5	• FLN (1) • Change Front (1) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1) • New Dawn (1)
Illizi	5	• FLN (3) • Change Front (1) • National Rally for Democracy (1)
Bordj Bou Arreridj	8	• FLN (6) • Patriots List (2)
Boumerdes	10	• FLN (3) • Change Front (1) • Liberal Party (1) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Socialist Forces Front (3)
El Tarf	5	• FLN (2) • Workers Party (1) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Justice and Development Party (1)
Tindouf	5	• FLN (3) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Algerian Renewal (1)
Tissemsilt	5	• FLN (2) • National Rally for Democracy (2) • Algerian Popular Movement (1)
Eloued	8	• FLN (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (6)
Khenchela	5	• United Independent List (3) • Light Party (2)
Souk Ahras	6	• FLN (3) • Dignity (1) • Justice and Development Party (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Tipasa	7	• FLN (5) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Social Justice Party (1)
Mila	10	• FLN (3) • Movement of Free Citizens (2) • Ahd 54 (1) • National Rally for Democracy (3) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Ain Defla	10	• FLN (5) • Algerian National Front (3) • National Party for Solidarity and Development (2)
Naama	5	• FLN (3) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (1)
Ain Temouchent	5	• FLN (2) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Green Algeria Alliance (2)
Ghardaia	5	• FLN (1) • Independent List (2) • National Rally for Democracy (1) • Algerian National Front (1)
Relizane	10	• FLN (6) • Algerian Popular Movement (2) • Green Algeria Alliance (2)
Expatriates	8	
<b>Total</b>	<b>462</b>	

# REAL ESTATE PRICES

## JUNE 2012

The real estate transactions witnessed an unprecedented decline in June 2012, which led to an ongoing descent in the prices of expensive apartments. Affordable apartments have also witnessed a slight decline, which might become sharper should the current real estate trends continue to linger in the summer, especially that the market experiences a seasonal stagnation in Holy Ramadan (from July 22 till August 21).

Real estate experts hold two contradictory opinions:

- The first group believes that the stagnation is circumstantial and temporary and the prices are likely to soar, not to drop down in the near future.
- The second group has concerns over the current stagnation and fears that it might lead to a greater collapse in real estate prices which in turn yields crises and bankruptcies especially in the banking sector.

Tables 1 and 2 show the prices of some apartments and estates sold in June 2012

Prices of some estates sold in June 2012			Table 1
Region	Area (m2)	Price (USD)	USD/ m2
<b>Beirut</b>			
Msaytbeh	630	5,670,000	9,000
<b>Baabda</b>			
Hadath	980	1,421,000	1,450
Baabda	850	1,700,000	2,000
<b>Matn</b>			
Ain Saadeh	3,720	3,273,600	880
Beit Mery	850	935,000	1,100
Baabdat	1,500	630,000	420
<b>Aley</b>			
Chemlan	1,200	480,000	400
Bshamoun	1,050	378,000	360
Reshmayya	3,600	288,000	80
<b>Kessrouan</b>			
Kfardebian	1,800	396,000	220
Qlay'at	1,000	310,000	310

Source: Information International

Prices of some apartments sold in June 2012			Table 2
Region	Area (m2)	Price (USD)	USD/m2
<b>Beirut</b>			
Ashrafieh- Rizk	200	550,000	2,750
Sioufi	300	1,050,000	3,500
Tallet Khayyat	250	837,500	3,350
Mar Elias	200	470,000	2,350
Clemenceau	165	643,500	3,900
Ain Tineh	250	1,375,000	5,500
Bristol	220	715,000	3,250
<b>Baabda</b>			
Hazmieh- Mar Taqla	250	475,000	1,900
Hadath- Hay Al-Amerkan	340	493,000	1,450
Yarzi	300	750,000	2,500
Jomhour	150	300,000	2,000
<b>Matn</b>			
Awkar	180	291,600	1,620
Jal el-Dib	200	270,000	1,350
Ain Saadeh	170	348,500	2,050
Beit Mery	200	500,000	2,500
Rabiya	400	1,200,000	3,000
Broumana	185	249,750	1,350
<b>Aley</b>			
Doha Hoss	210	319,200	1,520
Bshamoun-Madaress	140	165,200	1,180
Doha Aramoun	160	160,000	1,000
Khaldeh	180	198,000	1,100
<b>Kessrouan</b>			
Zouq Mikael	140	126,000	900
Sahel Alma	200	280,000	1,400
Zouq Mosbeh	160	216,000	1,350
Adoniss	150	180,000	1,200
Adma	270	499,500	1,850

Source: Information International

# PRICES OF 100 FOOD PRODUCTS IN JUNE 2012

Stable prices dominated the market of the majority of the 100 items we track every month, with 62 items witnessing no price fluctuations, 15 declining slightly and the remaining 23 registering higher prices. This trend reflects the stagnation in the market on the one hand and the price declines worldwide on the other, especially against the backdrop of the decline in the Euro exchange rate and the global slowdown. Table 1 shows the prices of food products in June 2012 (in LBP).

Prices of food products in June 2012 (in LBP)			Table 1
Item and Brand	Prices beginning of June 2012	Prices beginning of July 2012	% of price change
<b>Oil</b>			
Afia corn oil (3.5 liters)	16,850	16,000	-5
Mazola corn oil (3.5 liters)	18,000	17,400	-3,3
Mazola corn oil (1.8 liters)	9,000	8,750	-2,8
Slim corn oil (2 liters)	8,750	9,000	+2,8
Wesson corn oil (2 liters)	9,000	9,000	0
Ghandour soya oil (3.8 liters)	12,500	13,750	+10
Alfa corn oil (4 liters)	18,000	17,500	-2,8
Al-Wadi olive oil (1/2 liters)	6,500	6,400	-1,5
<b>Ketchup and Sauces</b>			
Libby's Ketchup (567 g)	1,500	1,500	0
Extra Ketchup (340 g)	1,100	1,100	0
Extra Ketchup (2.2 kg)	5,500	5,500	0
Dolly's Mayonnaise (500 ml)	4,250	4,500	+5,9
Al-Wadi Mayonnaise (500 ml)	4,000	4,250	+6,2
Al-Bsat Tahina (900 g)	6,950	6,950	0%
Al-Bsat Tahina (450 g)	3,850	3,850	0
Taous tomato sauce (70 g)	725	750	+3,4
Taous tomato sauce (425 g)	3,200	3,200	0
Tala tomato sauce (675 g)	3,150	3,150	0

Prices of food products in June 2012 (in LBP)			Table 1
Item and Brand	Prices beginning of June 2012	Prices beginning of July 2012	% of price change
<b>Dairy Products</b>			
Candia full cream milk (1 liter)	2,500	2,500	0
Candia full cream yoghurt (1 kg)	3,000	3,250	+8,3
Bonjus labneh (1 kg)	4,890	4,890	0
Taanayel labneh (500 g)	5,500	5,500	0
Candia labneh (500 g)	5,250	5,250	0
Taanayel yoghurt (1 kg)	3,900	4,100	+5,4
Smeds cheese (400 g)	4,850	4,850	0
Picon cheese (360 g)	3,900	3,900	0
Picon cheese (160 g)	1,975	1,975	0
Double-crème cheese (1 kg)	10,000	10,750	+7,5
Fresh country cheese (1 kg)	10,000	10,000	0
Kashkawan cheese (1 kg)	12,250	12,000	-2
Lurpak butter (200 g)	2,500	2,750	+10
Tatra butter (200 g)	2,250	2,500	+11,1
Al-Malaaqtain margarine (2 kg)	7,850	7,850	0
Al-Baqara al-Haloub margarine (2 kg)	35,000	35,000	0
Vegetaline margarine (2 kg)	18,950	18,950	0
Nido full cream milk (bag) (2,250 g)	21,850	21,850	0
Nido full cream milk (bag) (2,500 g)	26,250	26,250	0
Tatra full cream milk (1,800 g)	20,250	20,250	0

Prices of food products in June 2012 (in LBP)			Table 1
Item and Brand	Prices beginning of June 2012	Prices beginning of July 2012	% of price change
<b>Cereals</b>			
Khater white lentils (1 kg)	4,050	4,100	+1,2
Khater chick-peas (1 kg)	5,000	5,000	0
Khater beans (1 kg)	2,000	1,950	-2,5
Peeled wheat (1 kg)	2,250	2,250	0
Pineal Lima Bean (1 kg)	3,850	3,850	0
Brown Fine Burgul (1 kg)	2,000	2,000	0
Egyptian rice (1 kg)	1,750	2,100	20+
American rice (1 kg)	1,750	1,750	0
Italian rice (1 kg)	2,350	2,350	0
Al-wadi Hommos Tahina (380 g)	1,500	1,500	0
Chtoura Hommos Tahina (380 g)	1,450	1,450	0
California Gardens beans (450 g)	1,400	1,400	0
Al-Wadi beans (450 g)	1,250	1,150	-8
Chtoura beans (480 g)	1,350	1,250	-7,4
Libby's corn (340 g)	1,750	1,750	0
<b>Pasta</b>			
Barilla spaghetti (500 g)	2,250	2,250	0
Antonio Amato spaghetti (500 g)	2,200	2,200	0
Monte spaghetti (500 g)	2,300	2,300	0
<b>Sugar</b>			
Sugar (2 kg)	3,000	3,000	0
Al-Ousra sugar (5 kg)	8,500	8,500	0
Salt (700 g)	350	300	-14,3
Box of salt (738 g)	1,500	1,400	-6,6
<b>Meat, Fish and Eggs</b>			
Zwan chicken (200 g)	2,550	2,550	0
Zwan beef (200 g)	2,500	2,500	0
Luncheon meat beef (198 g)	2,000	2,000	0
Al-Mona chicken (200 g)	2,150	2,150	0
Al-Taghzia beef (200 g)	1,750	1,750	0
Al-Taghzia chicken (200 g)	1,750	1,750	0
Geisha sardine (125 g)	1,500	1,500	0
Deli sardine (125 g)	1,500	1,250	-16,6

Prices of food products in June 2012 (in LBP)			Table 1
Item and Brand	Prices beginning of June 2012	Prices beginning of July 2012	% of price change
Milo sardine (125 g)	1,200	1,150	-4,1
Geisha tuna (200 g)	4,000	4,000	0
White Bell tuna (200 g)	2,800	2,750	-1,78
White Diamond tuna (200 g)	2,750	2,750	0
Skipper tuna (185 g)	2,250	2,400	+6,6
Eggs (30 eggs)	6,500	7,000	+7,7
Beef (1 kg)	15,000	15,000	0
Sheep (1kg)	22,000	23,000	+4,5
<b>Coffee and Tea</b>			
Najjar coffee (1 kg)	16,500	17,000	+3
Brazil coffee (1 kg)	15,500	15,500	0
Al-Hisan tea (180 g)	2,750	2,750	0
Nestle (250 g)	2,000	2,000	0
<b>Halvah and Jam</b>			
Al-Wadi halvah (454 g)	4,200	4,400	+4,8
Al-Bsat halvah (450 g)	3,500	3,700	+5,7
Chtoura apricot jam (1 kg)	6,500	6,500	0
Al-Wadi apricot jam (1 kg)	6,000	6,000	0
<b>Tissues and Detergents</b>			
Mimosa tissues (500 g)	2,900	2,850	-1,7
Fine tissues (200 tissues)	1,400	1,400	0
Primo tissues (200 tissues)	1,400	1,400	0
Gipsy tissues (300 tissues)	2,850	2,850	0
Mimosa toilet papers (4 rolls)	5,250	5,500	+4,7
Yes detergent (750 g)	2,600	2,600	0
Clorox (1 liter)	1,500	1,500	0
Persil (4 kg)	16,500	19,500	+18,1
Ariel (4 kg)	20,250	20,250	0
<b>Fruit and Vegetables</b>			
Oranges (1 kg)	1,500	1,500	0
Tomatoes (1 kg)	500	750	+50
Cucumbers (1 kg)	500	750	+50
Bananas (1 kg)	1,000	1,000	0
Lemons (1 kg)	1,250	1,750	+40
Apples (1 kg)	2,000	2,000	0
Potatoes (1 kg)	800	800	0

Source: Information International

## Facts on Injuries and Violence

- **9%** of all deaths and **16%** of all disabilities and injuries every year are due to violence, traffic accidents, burns, falls or drowning.
- **1 in 5 women** and **1 in 10 men** report having been sexually abused as children.
- **Number 1** cause of death for children and youths between the ages 10 and 24 is **traffic accidents**.
- **About 1.2 million people** die every year as a result of traffic accidents- **up to 50 million** more are injured or disabled.
- **Over 300,000 people** die from fire-related burns every year.
- **About 23 000 children** die every year as a result of poisoning; hundreds of thousands more accidentally ingest poisonous substances or drugs.
- **Estimated 600 million people** live with disabilities, the vast majority in low-income and middle-income countries, around the world.
- **More than 3000 people** die on the world's roads every day.
- **Every US\$ 1** invested in a motorcycle helmet can save **US\$ 32** in medical costs.
- **Tens of millions** of accident and emergency hospital visits.
- **Millions more** are left with lifelong disabilities and disfigurements from such injuries, and often suffer from resulting stigma.
- **People with lower socioeconomic status** are at higher risk of injury, suffer greater consequences and benefit less from prevention programs in most societies.
- **Many more people die from homicide** than in a war, and even more die from suicide.
- **Most violence happens to people behind closed doors** and results not in death, but often in years of physical and emotional suffering.
- **Sexual abuse contributes to a large number of health consequences** that can last a lifetime, including sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and mental health challenges.
- **Burns** are the only form of injury that kill more women than men.

Source: World Health Organization



Rafic Hariri International Airport passenger traffic registered in June an increase by 23.8% and 5.9% compared to May 2012 and June 2011 respectively. The number of passengers who used the airport in the first six months of the year amounted to 2,758,703 passengers compared to 2,430,361 during the same period last year, i.e. up by 13.5% or 328,342 passengers. Table 1 illustrates the airport traffic in June 2012 compared to May 2012 and June 2011.

# Beirut International Airport

## Rafic Hariri International Airport Traffic- June 2012

Airport traffic in June 2012 compared to May 2012 and June 2011					Table 1
Traffic	May 2012	June 2012	June 2011	% of change May/ June 2012	% of change June 2011/ June 2012
Arriving airplanes	2,560	2,468	2,655	- 3.6	- 7
Departing airplanes	2,555	2,470	2,670	- 3.3	- 7.5
<b>Total No. of airplanes</b>	<b>5,115</b>	<b>4,938</b>	<b>5,325</b>	<b>- 3.4</b>	<b>- 7.2</b>
Arriving passengers	229,138	316,551	305,439	+ 38.1	+ 3.6
Departing passengers	209,432	228,828	207,916	+ 9.3	+ 10
Transit passengers	4,758	3,784	5,159	- 20.5	- 26.6
<b>Total No. of passengers</b>	<b>443,328</b>	<b>549,163</b>	<b>518,514</b>	<b>+ 23.8</b>	<b>+ 5.9</b>
Imported goods (per ton)	4,009	3,848	3,414	- 4	+ 12.7
Exported goods (per ton)	2,947	3,304	2,632	+ 12.1	+ 25.5
<b>Total amount of goods (per ton)</b>	<b>6,956</b>	<b>7,152</b>	<b>6,046</b>	<b>+ 2.8</b>	<b>+ 18.3</b>

Source: Information International and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation

# Stats & Numbers

- **USD 145 million** is the size of the forecast advertising and promotional expenses in Lebanon in 2012 including USD 55 million for TV ads.
- **4,023** is the number of posts in Grade 1, Grade 2 and Grade 3 in public administrations (ministries), of which only 2,642 posts are occupied, thus bringing the vacancy rate to 34.3%.
- **30 m<sup>2</sup>** is the area granted by a Beqa'a municipality to a Christian monastery to construct a school and a cultural religious center, noting that the monastery owns large areas suitable for construction in the region.
- **LBP 125 million** is the compensation paid to the members of the Colloquium Examination Committees for the 2011 second round.
- **13,000** is the average number of speeding tickets issued in Lebanon per month, thus providing a financial return of LBP 6.6 billion annually.
- **839** is the number of vehicles that have been stolen from January until July 2012, of which 428 or around half have been recovered.



Photo by Alaa Sakr

## Publications

### Publications by Information International (in Arabic):

- 1- Salaries and Remunerations in the Public Sector
- 2- Public Seaside Properties
- 3- Lebanon's Parliamentary History 1920-2000
- 4- Taxes and Fees
- 5- Lebanon in Figures 1992-2002
- 6- Lebanon in Figures 2003-2004
- 7- Lebanon in Figures 2005-2006
- 8- Lebanon in Figures 2007-2008
- 9- Lebanon's MPs and Lebanese Parliamentary Elections 1960 - 2009
- 10- 2009 Parliamentary Elections by ballot box, candidate and confession-North District
- 11- 2009 Parliamentary Elections by ballot box, candidate and confession-Beirut District
- 12- 2009 Parliamentary Elections by ballot box, candidate and confession-Mount Lebanon District
- 13- 2009 Parliamentary Elections by ballot box, candidate and confession-Beqa'a District
- 14- 2009 Parliamentary Elections by ballot box, candidate and confession-South and Nabatiyeh District
- 15- Municipal Elections 2010

### Publications by Kutub (in Arabic):

- 1- Trablous Al-Sham
- 2- Jeniyat Al-Nabi
- 3- Mokhber Al-Konsoliya
- 4- Antoun Saadah 1932-1949
- 5- Antoun Saadah, A Biography, Volume 1. The Youth Years
- 6- The Face of the Prophet, Khalil Gibran and the Portraits of the Temple of Arts
- 7- May Ziadeh, Evolution of a Free Female Thinker
- 8- USA in the Middle East
- 9- Alone Together

### Publications by INMA (in Arabic):

- 1- "I am Responsible, All of Us are Responsible"
- 2- "Our Environment is Our Home"
- 3- "My Society is My Responsibility"
- 4- "My Society is My Responsibility" Workbook
- 5- "I am a Student, I am a Citizen: Ways Towards State Building"
- 6- "I am a Student, I am a Citizen: Ways Towards State Building" Workbook
- 7- "Lebanon Wars, why?"
- 8- Discrimination in Lebanon

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# THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (INMA) AND THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

## GREEN LEBANON

The Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture has launched an afforestation project with the cooperation of the Lebanese Army, Lebanon's municipalities and the Social and Cultural Development Association (INMA). The Ministry provided those municipalities wishing to plant their municipal areas with the appropriate plants that matched the nature of the soil and the climate, while the Lebanese Army undertook the digging and the planting process. INMA ensured the provision of water tanks and irrigation systems while the municipalities took care of supplying water and carrying out the irrigation.

The project included 29 municipalities distributed in the Aqdiya of Nabatieh (3), Tyre (1), Bint Jbeil (2), Jezzine (2), Chouf (4), Akkar (2), Kessrouan (1), Matn (1), Western Beqa'a (3), Baalbeck (7), Hermel (1), Hasbaya (1) and Rashaya (1). Over 100,000 saplings (pine, oak and carob) were planted in an area of over 500 m<sup>2</sup>.

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