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THE 2026 ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR

136 DAYS OF CONFLICT, "CEASEFIRE",
AND UNENDING LOSS

Lebanon's Prison Crisis
Chronic Overcrowding
and Delayed Reforms

Lebanon's Cement Industry
Between Economic Necessity,
Pollution and Monopoly

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
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Baath, Isis and FIFA

By Jawad N. Adra



This article was published in The Monthly editorial, issue no. 144- July 2014

Things are not what they seem. The Baath party failed to fulfill its “eternal” objectives set out for the lands lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. Da’esh (known as ISIS or ISIL- Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Syria- in Western media) is not laying the grounds for an Islamic Caliphate that would take us back to the days of Muawiyah, Omar or Andalusia, and FIFA is far from reviving football at grassroots level, in every corner of the world, as it is pretending to do.

Is it not heartbreaking to see both Iraq and Syria in ruins? Is it not heart breaking that Egypt is incapable of quieting the rumbling stomachs of its over 90 million citizens? Is it not a tragic irony that the leftists and nationalists opposing Gulf countries are betting on a US-Iran rapprochement? Is it not also a tragic irony that the Gulf countries are lecturing us on democracy?

What we are seeing is, to put it mildly, surreal. Ridiculous. Tear-inducing. Tragic. Bloody. Devastating. A fatal, gloomy future. It makes one wonder about the reasons behind those smiley faces worn by Arab rulers in Damascus, Iraq, Tehran, Riyadh, Doha and Cairo, not to mention John Kerry’s proud smile in Baghdad. What could possibly be the reasons for these smiley faces? Baath, Da’esh and FIFA could be one of many.

Did we need Da’esh to reminisce on the unity of Iraq and the Levant? What were the Baathists in Damascus and Baghdad working for since 1970 until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003? Did we have to wait for Da’esh to remind and prove to us that the Fertile Crescent was predominantly rural and Bedouin? Did both Iraqi and Syrian regimes not appeal to “tribal leaders” when western threats were aimed at them? Tribal leaders and Baathism? After more than thirty years of absolute power? In fact, Iraq and the Levant are today worse off than they were in the days of Bani Othman. Our land has been ravaged but both rulers and Da’esh have been enriched.

As for FIFA, which proclaims itself a non-profit organization, its revenues are likely to surpass USD 4 billion this year. Today’s football does not compare with yesterday’s and sports are doing little to unite people and lift them up. Our basketball teams, Sagesse and Riyadhi, best exemplified this in the championship-final, which was held without any fans attending the game to avoid a potential “sectarian mishap”. All this brings us down to the common denominator among Baath, Da’esh and FIFA: players amassing power and wealth in the absence of the concerned audience: we, the people.

Things are not what they seem to be and players are not what they pretend to be. Slogans are nothing but a cover for tyranny and money. And all three are simply pawns maneuvered by the puppet master to blind and divert the masses. Noam Chomsky warned that the world’s political and financial powers always seek to divert public attention from vital issues towards more thrilling yet futile ones. What matters though is us, not Baath nor Da’esh or FIFA.

Who are we? Why are we what we are? How do we lay the foundation for a better future? This is the essential and existential matter we are missing as we become more absorbed with Baathists fighting with Da’esh in Iraq, Baathists fighting against it in Syria and a football World Cup without even a team to represent us. Games and wars in which, the people, have no say.

Leader



THE 2026 ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR

136 DAYS OF CONFLICT, "CEASEFIRE", AND UNENDING LOSS

- 9,767 Israeli violations documented by UNIFIL.
- More than 500 people killed or wounded.
- Five border positions remain under Israeli occupation.
- All within 460 days of a supposed "ceasefire," which was followed by renewed war in Lebanon and Iran.

On 27 November 2024, a ceasefire agreement was announced following US-mediated negotiations. The proposal called for an end to more than a year of hostilities, a war which Hezbollah referred to as Uli Al-Ba's, or "Battle of The Mighty," while Israel named it "Operation Northern Arrows." Announcing the agreement, US President Joe Biden said it was intended to bring the fighting to a permanent end. The deal was approved by Israel's Security Cabinet and Hezbollah's leadership, and was welcomed by Lebanon's caretaker government under Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

The Return of War and Escalation

The war resumed on 2 March 2026 amid the broader US-Israeli regional confrontation with Iran, when Lebanon fired six rockets towards Northern Occupied Palestine. Israel responded with an extensive air campaign, followed by ground incursions and military operations across southern Lebanon.

The fighting quickly spread beyond the border region, with Israel striking South Lebanon, Nabatieh, the Beqaa Valley, the outskirts of Beirut, as well as civilian neighborhoods and vital health and public service infrastructure.

During the opening weeks, the conflict was marked by intensive airstrikes, evacuation orders, the destruction of roads, bridges and homes, and a gradual expansion of Israeli ground control in South Lebanon. According to Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs, 6,814 airstrikes had been recorded by 11 April, while evacuation orders affected more than 300 towns and villages.

The human toll escalated rapidly. By 30 March, the Ministry of Public Health had reported 1,247 people killed and 3,680 injured. By 10 April, those figures had risen to 1,953 dead and 6,303 wounded, illustrating the intensity of the war's initial phase.

**6,814 airstrikes had been recorded by 11 April,
and evacuation orders more than 300 towns and villages**

Until March 30

1,247
fatalities

3,680
injuries

Until April 10

1,953
fatalities

6,303
injuries

Until June 26

4,243
fatalities

12,186
injuries

Until July 5


4,304
fatalities

12,203
injuries

Until July 15

4,324
fatalities

12,223
injuries



The First Ceasefire and Continuing Hostilities

An initial ceasefire came into effect on 16 April, but it failed to produce a genuine or lasting halt to military operations. The World Health Organization documented 8,171 military incidents between 2 March and 17 April, followed by another 8,263 incidents between 17 April and 21 May despite the formal cessation of hostilities.

While the truce occasionally reduced the intensity of combat, it did not stop airstrikes, shelling or military operations in southern Lebanon.

Over time, the conflict evolved from a nationwide aerial campaign into a concentrated war of attrition in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, characterized by drone strikes, artillery fire, targeted assassinations and clashes with Israeli forces operating inside Lebanese territory. Demolitions of homes and civilian structures also continued within the area Israel designated as a security buffer zone. (Readers may refer to the previous issue for a detailed discussion of the “Yellow Line” and its implications.)

The health sector was among the hardest hit. By mid-June, the World Health Organization had documented 203 attacks on healthcare facilities, with more than 130 health workers targeted and the closure of 44 primary healthcare centers and three hospitals.

The June Ceasefire

On 15 June, the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) helped reduce the level of fighting but did not bring it to an end. An Israeli drone strike targeted the town of Kfartebnit, while Hezbollah responded by launching drones, rockets and artillery shells at Israeli forces stationed in southern Lebanon.

A ceasefire was agreed on 19 June under US pressure. Nevertheless, Israeli airstrikes continued for approximately one hour after the truce officially took effect before subsiding, while Israeli forces remained deployed inside southern Lebanon.

This period is therefore better described as a reduction in the intensity of the war rather than its conclusion. Israel did not withdraw, Hezbollah was excluded from the subsequent political arrangements, and Israeli attacks on the south continued. Particularly notable was the systematic demolition of vacant homes and large tracts of land in numerous villages in southern Lebanon.

The Trilateral Framework, 26 June

On 26 June, Lebanon, Israel and the United States signed a trilateral Framework Agreement in Washington.

The accord was not a final peace treaty but rather an interim mechanism providing for the transfer of two pilot areas to the Lebanese Armed Forces, accompanied by a gradual and conditional Israeli withdrawal. Further withdrawals were explicitly linked to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the dismantling of its military infrastructure. The agreement also established a trilateral military coordination mechanism under US supervision.

The agreement’s principal weakness was that it imposed no immediate or unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Israel declared that it would maintain its presence inside the security zone until it judged Hezbollah to no longer pose a threat. In effect, Israel assumed the dual role of both a party to the agreement and the authority responsible for determining whether its conditions had been met. Hezbollah rejected the framework outright, arguing that any agreement conditioning Israeli withdrawal on its disarmament was invalid.

Violations After the Framework

The signing of the Framework did not bring Israeli military operations to an end.

On the day the agreement was signed, Israel dropped leaflets over the town of Mansouri, urging residents to evacuate, and carried out strikes that it said had targeted Hezbollah members near Israeli deployment areas.

On 27 June, an Israeli drone struck the Nabatieh al-Fawqa area, which lies outside the security belt declared by Israel, demonstrating that military operations were no longer confined even to the areas under Israeli occupation or those claimed to be necessary for force protection.

At the end of June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Israeli troops inside southern Lebanon and reiterated that no withdrawal would take place until what Israel considers the Hezbollah threat had been eliminated. His remarks underscored that Israeli military control remained firmly in place and that the Framework had yet to translate into an actual withdrawal or the full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over the territory.

Official casualty figures also continued to rise after the agreement. On 26 June, Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health reported 4,243 people killed and 12,186 wounded. By 5 July, the figures had increased to 4,304 dead and 12,203 injured. Although these increases may include delayed fatalities, recovered bodies and statistical updates rather than exclusively new attacks, they nevertheless demonstrate that the agreement failed to halt the human cost of the conflict. The demolition of homes across numerous border villages also continued.

The Current Situation on the Ground

(As of the first half of July, when this report was prepared.)

The situation in southern Lebanon remains that of a fragile ceasefire under partial occupation.

Israeli forces continue to control a security belt extending in some areas up to ten kilometers inside Lebanese territory, while conducting raids, demolitions and persistent drone surveillance. Large numbers of residents remain unable to return safely and permanently to their villages.

According to the latest figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 499,784 people remained internally displaced as of 1 July, while around 646,107 people had begun returning home. Yet return does not necessarily mean recovery, as many villages have suffered extensive destruction or remain within areas under Israeli military control.

Preliminary assessments indicate that more than 90,000 housing units had been damaged or destroyed by mid-June, alongside widespread damage to hospitals, water and electricity infrastructure, roads and productive economic facilities.

The reality on the ground can therefore be summarized as follows: partial occupation, recurring attacks, the constant risk of renewed war, large-scale displacement, and reconstruction delayed pending a political and security settlement that has yet to materialize.

Perhaps the conflict's most significant social consequence has been the emergence of what may be described as a fragile solidarity born of necessity. Communities in Lebanon displayed remarkable generosity through mutual assistance, relief efforts and the hosting of displaced families, while at the same time retaining deep political disagreements and mutual anxieties.

Debate over responsibility for the war, Hezbollah's weapons, the role of the Lebanese state and the Israeli occupation did not disappear. Instead, these divisions largely shifted from the streets into political and media discourse. The relative scarcity of internal unrest also reflected Lebanon's enduring memory of the civil war and a widespread determination to avoid any slide back into sectarian conflict. Political parties, municipalities and ordinary citizens alike recognized that even isolated local incidents could rapidly acquire dangerous political or sectarian dimensions. Across much of the country, restraint and prudence prevailed.

Against this backdrop, the fact that crime rates and serious public disorder did not rise significantly, despite the displacement of nearly one million people across Lebanon, stands as a positive indicator of Lebanese society's capacity to avoid internal collapse and preserve a shared sense of national coexistence. It should not, however, be interpreted as evidence that the country's deep political divisions have been resolved. Rather, it reflects a collective awareness of the devastating cost of renewed internal conflict and the dangers of allowing instability to spiral out of control.

Until July 1

499,784

displaced people

Until June 15

90,000

housing units damaged

Daily Report on Victims of the Israeli Offensive

Table showing the daily number of casualties resulting from the Israeli offensive, broken down by men, women and children, from 3 March to 14 July 2026.

Date	Daily Death Toll	Daily Male Deaths	Daily Female Deaths	Daily Child Deaths	Daily Injuries	Daily Male Injuries	Daily Female Injuries	Daily Child Injuries
02/03/2026	31	-	-	-	149	-	-	-
03/03/2026	9	-	-	-	97	-	-	-
04/03/2026	37	-	-	-	281	-	-	-
05/03/2026	46	-	-	-	156	-	-	-
06/03/2026	94	-	-	-	115	-	-	-
10/03/2026	*353	439	45	86	*646	898	284	262
11/03/2026	64	57	2	5	142	112	17	13
12/03/2026	53	31	15	7	188	132	27	29
13/03/2026	86	81	-	5	159	116	21	22
14/03/2026	53	47	3	3	76	71	4	1
15/03/2026	24	22	1	1	96	86	6	4
16/03/2026	36	31	1	4	36	32	3	1
18/03/2026	82	67	10	5	291	226	41	24
19/03/2026	33	29	2	2	152	132	11	9
21/03/2026	23	24	-	-	156	146	5	5
23/03/2026	15	14	-	-	136	114	12	10
24/03/2026	33	28	2	3	90	82	6	2
25/03/2026	22	22	-	-	153	129	11	13
26/03/2026	22	20	2	-	110	100	6	4
27/03/2026	26	25	-	1	86	80	2	4
28/03/2026	47	42	3	2	112	97	9	6
29/03/2026	49	48	1	-	116	109	3	4
30/03/2026	9	25	-	-	137	127	5	5
31/03/2026	21	3	1	1	70	65	-	5
01/04/2026	50	47	3	-	185	169	10	6
02/04/2026	27	27	-	-	105	101	3	1
03/04/2026	23	23	-	-	98	93	2	3
04/04/2026	54	51	2	1	156	136	12	8
05/04/2026	39	32	4	3	136	123	11	2
06/04/2026	36	31	4	1	209	166	29	14
07/04/2026	33	32	1	-	173	165	4	4
09/04/2026	358	370	118	33	1280	1222	519	153

Date	Daily Death Toll	Daily Male Deaths	Daily Female Deaths	Daily Child Deaths	Daily Injuries	Daily Male Injuries	Daily Female Injuries	Daily Child Injuries
11/04/2026	132	61	28	2	344	341	44	27
12/04/2026	35	31	4	-	152	136	13	3
13/04/2026	34	33	-	1	174	158	12	4
14/04/2026	35	31	2	2	159	153	4	2
15/04/2026	43	33	6	4	140	120	14	6
16/04/2026	29	29	-	-	124	102	17	5
17/04/2026	98	70	14	5	359	260	56	43
24/04/2026	197	380	3	-	175	877	2	1
25/04/2026	5	5	-	-	6	6	-	-
26/04/2026	13	13	-	-	30	23	7	4
27/04/2026	12	12	-	1	49	44	5	-
28/04/2026	13	10	3	-	59	49	10	5
29/04/2026	42	36	6	3	99	72	27	13
30/04/2026	10	-	10	3	58	46	12	8
01/05/2026	32	29	3	-	74	71	3	4
03/05/2026	61	86	39	2	135	352	262	10
04/05/2026	17	17	-	-	35	35	-	-
05/05/2026	6	6	-	-	47	47	-	-
06/05/2026	13	10	3	-	42	36	3	3
07/05/2026	12	10	1	1	85	58	7	20
08/05/2026	32	27	3	2	74	71	2	1
09/05/2026	36	25	8	3	74	64	3	7
10/05/2026	51	47	2	2	107	84	10	13
11/05/2026	23	18	1	4	37	37	-	-
13/05/2026	27	24	1	2	94	73	8	13
14/05/2026	39	26	5	8	93	65	17	11
15/05/2026	16	15	-	1	71	56	9	6
16/05/2026	18	18	-	-	124	98	22	4
17/05/2026	19	15	4	-	98	71	16	11
18/05/2026	32	26	4	2	63	52	4	7
19/05/2026	22	21	1	-	28	23	3	2
20/05/2026	31	24	3	4	61	52	6	3
21/05/2026	16	15	-	1	35	26	5	4
22/05/2026	22	21	-	1	35	25	10	-

Date	Daily Death Toll	Daily Male Deaths	Daily Female Deaths	Daily Child Deaths	Daily Injuries	Daily Male Injuries	Daily Female Injuries	Daily Child Injuries
23/05/2026	12	12	-	-	74	59	12	3
24/05/2026	28	21	6	1	65	51	7	7
25/05/2026	34	33	1	-	62	51	7	4
26/05/2026	28	23	2	3	104	92	5	7
29/05/2026	142	109	20	13	358	249	63	46
30/05/2026	16	9	1	6	34	27	3	3
31/05/2026	41	37	3	1	140	112	17	12
01/06/2026	21	19	1	1	126	113	7	6
02/06/2026	35	30	3	2	182	121	50	11
03/06/2026	48	42	5	1	97	95	1	1
04/06/2026	10	9	1	-	59	43	13	3
05/06/2026	32	32	-	-	137	121	11	5
06/06/2026	35	31	4	-	120	109	9	2
07/06/2026	20	19	1	-	82	76	3	3
08/06/2026	24	21	1	2	116	96	12	8
09/06/2026	29	26	3	-	133	108	18	7
10/06/2026	30	27	3	-	92	140	3	1
11/06/2026	15	13	2	-	70	16	2	-
13/06/2026	45	43	2	-	149	132	9	8
14/06/2026	27	23	4	-	67	64	3	-
15/06/2026	15	11	4	-	82	76	5	1
16/06/2026	28	27	1	-	70	70	-	-
17/06/2026	58	56	2	-	5	1	-	4
18/06/2026	28	28	-	-	17	16	1	-
19/06/2026	68	56	9	3	128	100	15	13
20/06/2026	77	68	8	1	120	80	18	22
21/06/2026	49	45	3	1	32	29	2	1
22/06/2026	69	65	3	1	11	7	1	3
23/06/2026	17	17	-	-	7	7	-	-
24/06/2026	19	18	1	-	2	2	-	-
25/06/2026	19	19	-	-	6	6	-	-
26/06/2026	13	13	-	-	7	6	-	1
27/06/2026	3	3	-	-	4	4	-	-
28/06/2026	1	1	-	-	5	5	-	-

Date	Daily Death Toll	Daily Male Deaths	Daily Female Deaths	Daily Child Deaths	Daily Injuries	Daily Male Injuries	Daily Female Injuries	Daily Child Injuries
29/06/2026	10	9	1	-	1	1	-	-
30/06/2026	21	21	-	-	-	-	-	-
01/07/2026	19	19	-	-	-	-	-	-
02/07/2026	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
03/07/2026	3	3	-	-	3	3	-	-
04/07/2026	2	2	-	-	3	3	-	-
05/07/2026	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	-
06/07/2026	15	14	1	-	-	-	-	-
07/07/2026	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
08/07/2026	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
09/07/2026	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
10/07/2026	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-
11/07/2026	1	1	-	-	3	3	-	-
12/07/2026	-	-	-	-	9	9	-	-
13/07/2026	2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-
14/07/2026	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-
Total	4,324	3,679	392	253	12,223	9,737	1,450	1,036

Source: Lebanese Ministry of Health.

Casualty Reporting Methodology and Notes

Information International relied on the semi-daily casualty reports issued by Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, which released 117 daily reports out of the 136 days of war, from the outbreak of hostilities on 2 March until the middle of July. Information International noted that several reports were subsequently amended, including revisions to the overall numbers of fatalities, injuries and other information contained in the daily updates. As a result, figures reported for a limited number of days may not have reflected the final totals at the time of publication, with corrections incorporated later into the cumulative figures.

The figures recorded on 10 March reflect a significantly higher number of fatalities and injuries because they represent the cumulative total for the first nine days of the war. The initial reports did not include a breakdown by gender and age group (men, women and children).

Throughout the war, including during periods officially designated as falling under a "ceasefire," Lebanese daily casualties continued to be recorded, with no complete halt in human losses. The massacre of 8 April was the deadliest single incident, resulting in 1,638 casualties between killed and wounded, including 33 children killed and 153 children injured. A total of 86 children had already been killed during the first days of the war.

Following this massacre, Lebanon submitted a complaint on 15 April. It was one of only three complaints filed by the Lebanese state, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lebanon's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, regarding Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory.

A second complaint was submitted on 10 June concerning the Israeli army's spraying of glyphosate over southern border villages on 1 February. Glyphosate is an agricultural herbicide used to kill weeds.

A third complaint was submitted on 11 June, after Israeli forces targeted two Lebanese officers, a brigadier general and a captain, on the Khardali Road north of the Litani River. The attack occurred after coordination through the Mechanism, the body responsible for monitoring military activities in southern Lebanon and chaired by a US officer.

Military Casualties

In addition to attacks targeting journalists, Israeli forces targeted 36 members of the Lebanese Armed Forces, resulting in deaths and injuries, as well as 13 members of the Directorate General of State Security who were killed.

In a statement issued on 10 April 2026, the Media, Guidance and Public Relations Department of the Directorate General of State Security said:

“Israeli airstrikes targeted the government Serail building in Nabatieh, which houses the regional directorate of State Security in Nabatieh. The strikes resulted in the killing of 13 personnel who were continuing to perform their duties in serving citizens under the difficult circumstances Lebanon is currently facing.

The Directorate General of State Security condemns these attacks targeting military personnel and civilians on Lebanese territory.

The Directorate General of State Security will hold the official funeral ceremony for 13 of its fallen members tomorrow, Saturday, at 10:00 a.m. at the Sidon Governmental Serail.”

Israeli drones also targeted four members of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and two members of the General Security Directorate.

Date	Affiliation	Name	Rank	Place of Death	District
09/02/2026	ISF	Hassan Ali Jaber	First Adjutant	Yanouh	Tyre
05/03/2026	ISF	Ali Qassem Mazloun	First Sergeant	Zahle	Western Beqaa
07/03/2026	General Security Directorate	Yahya Shukr	First Inspector	Al-Nabi Sheet	Baalbek
07/03/2026	Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)	Abdel Salam Adel Al-Turki	Sergeant	Kawthariyet Al-Riz	Sidon
07/03/2026	LAF	Hussein Awad Awad	First Corporal	Al-Khraybeh	Baalbek
07/03/2026	LAF	Jawad Hussein Awad	Conscription Soldier	Al-Khraybeh	Baalbek
07/03/2026	LAF	Ali Ayoub Khalil	Conscription Soldier	Al-Khraybeh	Baalbek
10/03/2026	LAF	Khodr Wafiq Shuqair	Corporal	Barashit	Bint Jbeil
17/03/2026	LAF	Mohammad Suleiman Al-Ahmad	Soldier	Qaaqaiyet Al-Jisr	Nabatieh
17/03/2026	LAF	Omar Nazem Al-Abd	Conscription Soldier	Qaaqaiyet Al-Jisr	Nabatieh
17/03/2026	LAF	Mohammad Al-Mustafa Bilal Al-Madrani	Conscription Soldier	Zibdin	Nabatieh
17/03/2026	LAF	Mehdi Akram Qubaisi	Conscription Soldier	Zibdin	Nabatieh
28/03/2026	LAF	Mohammad Mufid Al-Tufaili	Corporal	Deir Al-Zahrani	Nabatieh
28/03/2026	LAF	Fadl Abdullah Ayoub	Corporal	Kfartebnit	Bint Jbeil
30/03/2026	LAF	Ali Hussein Al-Ajam	Conscription Soldier	Al-Amiriya Checkpoint	Tyre
05/04/2026	LAF	Hussein Nahleh	Corporal	Kfarhatta	Sidon
08/04/2026	General Security Directorate	Ali Al-Khaled	First Adjutant	Mansouri	Tyre
08/04/2026	LAF	Ali Nassereddine	Cadet Sergeant	Al-Mansoura	Hermel
08/04/2026	LAF	Mohammad Bassam Shuhaitli	First-Class Soldier	Shmistar	Baalbek
08/04/2026	LAF	Hussein Khaled Yassin	First Sergeant	Sidon	Sidon
08/04/2026	LAF	Ali Hassan Qassem	Conscription Soldier	Shmistar	Baalbek
10/04/2026	Directorate General of State Security (DGSS)	Mohammad Sobhi Ayoub	First Adjutant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh

Date	Affiliation	Name	Rank	Place of Death	District
10/04/2026	DGSS	Ahmad Qanso	First Sergeant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Yousef Qanso	First Sergeant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Mohammad Daawi	First Sergeant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Mohammad Raslan	First Sergeant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Moussa Haidar	Adjutant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Ali Faqih	First Adjutant	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Hussein Harb	Sergeant Major	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Hussein Mohammad Hassan Mallah	Sergeant Major	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Hassan Tarhini	First Sergeant Major	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Khalil Al-Mukdad	Corporal	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Ali Hejazi	Officer	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
10/04/2026	DGSS	Ali Bdeir	Officer	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
12/04/2026	LAF	Abbas Hassan Qassem	First Adjutant	Shmistar	Baalbek
16/04/2026	LAF	Mohammad Hammoud	Sergeant	Kfar Melki	Sidon
19/04/2026	LAF	Patrick Antranig Bikarian	Soldier	Al-Qlayaa	Marjayoun
29/04/2026	LAF	Hussein Ahmad Sultan	Soldier	Khirbet Selm	Bint Jbeil
30/04/2026	LAF	Ali Rifaat Jaber	Adjutant	Kfar Roummame	Nabatieh
07/05/2026	ISF	Ali Hussein Badran	First Sergeant Major	Deir Al-Zahrani	Sidon
12/05/2026	LAF	Mohammad Ali Obeid	First Sergeant Major	Jibchit	Nabatieh
26/05/2026	LAF	Saleh Mohammad Soni	Conscription Soldier	Lake Qaraoun	Western Beqaa
27/05/2026	LAF	Kamel Marwan Markiz	Soldier	Kfar Roummame Road	Khardali
28/05/2026	LAF	Alaa Mahmoud Madlaj	Sergeant	Zefta	Al-Zahrani (Sidon villages)
28/05/2026	LAF	Omar Khodr	Conscription Soldier	Kfartebrnit	Nabatieh
06/06/2026	LAF	Hussein Ghazal	Soldier	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
06/06/2026	LAF	Wissam Sabra	Brigadier General	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
06/06/2026	LAF	Elie Khoury	Captain	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
20/06/2026	LAF	Jamil Nahal	Soldier	Nabatieh	Nabatieh
20/06/2026	LAF	Ali Ibrahim	First Sergeant	Touline	Marjayoun
21/06/2026	LAF	Samir Al-Abd	Corporal	Al-Qlayleh	Tyre

Martyrs According to Military Agencies



LAF

33



DGSS

13



ISF

3

General Security
Directorate

2

Total

51

Casualties by Institution and Rank.

Institution / Rank	Number of Fatalities
General Security Directorate	2
First Inspector	1
First Sergeant Major	1
Internal Security Forces	3
First Sergeant	1
First Adjutant	1
First Sergeant Major	1
Directorate General of State Security	13
First Sergeant	4
Adjutant	1
First Adjutant	2
Sergeant Major	2
First Sergeant Major	1
Corporal	1
Officer	2
Lebanese Armed Forces	33
Conscription Soldier	9
Soldier	6
First-Class Soldier	1
Sergeant	3
First Sergeant	2
Corporal	5
First Corporal	1
Cadet Sergeant	1
Adjutant	1
First Adjutant	1
First Sergeant Major	1
Captain	1
Brigadier General	1
Total	51

Casualties by Location.

Location	Number of Fatalities
Jibchit	1
Al-Amiriya Checkpoint	1
Al-Qlayaa	1
Khirbet Selm	1
Al-Mansoura	1
Zahle	1
Al-Nabi Sheet	1
Zefta	1
Barashit	1
Sidon	1
Yanouh	1
Kfar Roummane Road	1
Mansouri	1
Kfarhatta	1
Touline	1
Kfar Roummane	1
Lake Qaraoun	1
Kfar Melki	1
Al-Qlayleh	1
Kawthariyet Al-Riz	1
Deir Al-Zahrani	2
Kfartebnit	2
Qaaqaiyet Al-Jisr	2
Zibdin	2
Shmistar	3
Al-Khraybeh	3
Nabatieh	17
Total	51

Journalists: Witnesses and Victims

Lebanon's press continues to pay the ultimate price as journalists are killed while carrying out their mission of reporting events and bringing the truth to the world.

Following the continued targeting of journalists by Israeli forces, the Lebanese Ministry of Information (MoI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched a joint awareness campaign in early July from Beirut under the title: "Protecting Journalists Is a Legal and Humanitarian Obligation."

As part of the campaign, the MoI, in cooperation with the ICRC, installed a billboard carrying a message emphasizing that journalists are civilians and are protected under international humanitarian law. The campaign was launched under the slogan: "So that someone remains to tell the story..."

Name	Date	Position / Affiliation
Mohammad Shehab	12 March	Photographer
Mohammad Shreim	18 March	Head of Political Programs at Al-Manar TV
Hussein Hammoud	25 March	Photographer and freelance journalist
Ali Shoaib	28 March	Al-Manar TV correspondent

Name	Date	Position / Affiliation
Fatima Ftouni	28 March	Al Mayadeen TV correspondent
Mohammad Ftouni	28 March	Freelance photojournalist and brother of Fatima Ftouni
Ghada Dayekh	8 April	Presenter and correspondent at Sawt Al-Farah Radio
Suzanne Khalil	8 April	Presenter and correspondent at Al-Manar TV and Al-Nour Radio
Amal Khalil	22 April	Journalist and southern Lebanon correspondent for Al-Akhbar newspaper

Source: Press Syndicate.

Emergency Medical Responders Killed

A large number of emergency medical organizations participated in rescue operations throughout the war, including, in addition to the Lebanese Red Cross and the Directorate General of Civil Defense affiliated with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities:

The Islamic Health Committee - Civil Defense teams - Al-Risala Scout Association's medical emergency services - The Islamic Risala Scouts Association - The Lebanese Popular Aid Association - Local volunteer civil defense centers - Healthcare workers and volunteers from other organizations, including Amel International Foundation and others.

Regarding the names of those killed, the actual number may exceed the officially reported figure due to the large number of organizations involved and the absence of a unified casualty registry from a single source. This report therefore relies on figures provided by the Ministry of Public Health.

According to data from the Directorate General of Civil Defense affiliated with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, nine Civil Defense personnel were documented as killed between 2 March and 15 July:

Name	Date	Centre / Place of Death
Fahmi Mohieddine Al-Shami	18 March	South Lebanon Regional Centre – Sidon; died from injuries sustained during the attack on Sidon
Hussein Ali Sati	28 April	Killed during a rescue mission in Majdal Zoun – Tyre District
Hadi Jihad Daher	28 April	Killed during a rescue mission in Majdal Zoun – Tyre District
Hussein Ibrahim Ghadbouni	28 April	Killed during a rescue mission in Majdal Zoun – Tyre District
Hafez Ali Yehya	8 May	Rashaya Al-Fakhar Centre; killed on the Rashaya Al-Fakhar–Kfarshuba road
Ahmad Mohammad Noura	12 May	Nabatieh Regional Centre; killed during an airstrike on Nabatieh city
Hussein Mohammad Saleh Jaber	12 May	Nabatieh Regional Centre; killed during an airstrike on Nabatieh city
Kamel Youssef Zein	26 May	Sohmor–Jeb Jennine Centre; killed while providing medical assistance to an injured person near Lake Qaraoun Dam
Mahmoud Jaafar Shoaib	19 June	Douwair Centre – Nabatieh; killed along with members of his family in the town of Al-Sharqieh

Source: Lebanese Civil Defense.

Lebanese Red Cross Personnel Killed

Two Lebanese Red Cross personnel were killed between 2 March 2026 and 15 July 2026:

Name	Position	Details of Death
Youssef Raymond Assaf	Volunteer paramedic	Injured during a medical rescue mission following an Israeli airstrike in Majdal Zoun, Tyre District, on 9 March, and died from his wounds on 11 March 2026
Hassan Ali Badawi	Lebanese Red Cross paramedic	Killed in a direct Israeli strike targeting a medical team and ambulance on the Beit Yahoun road, Bint Jbeil District, on 12 April 2026

Source: Lebanese Red Cross.

Attacks on the Healthcare System: Hospitals and Medical Facilities

Year	Number of Attacks	Fatalities	Injuries
2024	149	238	279
2025	3	-	1
2026	212	135	406

Source: WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care.

Hospitals Targeted and Forced to Close.

District	Hospital
Bint Jbeil District	Bint Jbeil Public Hospital
Marjayoun District	Mais Al Jabal Public Hospital
Bint Jbeil District	Salah Ghandour Hospital

Source: WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care.

Hospitals Targeted but Remaining Operational.

District	Hospital
Hasbaya District	Hasbaya Public Hospital
Bint Jbeil District	Tebnine Public Hospital
Nabatieh District	Al-Najdeh Hospital / Lebanese Popular Aid Association
Nabatieh District	Nabatieh Public Hospital / Nabih Berri University Governmental Hospital
Nabatieh District	Ragheb Harb Hospital
Tyre District	Lebanese Italian Hospital / Najm Hospital
Tyre District	Jabal Amel Hospital
Tyre District	Hiram Hospital – Tyre
Sidon District	Labib Medical Centre
Sidon District	Osseiran Hospital
Western Beqaa District	Western Beqaa Hospital – Sohmar

Source: WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care.

Hospitals in the coastal area, including Bahman Hospital and Al-Borj Hospital in the Baabda–Dahieh area, were temporarily closed for short periods between March and May 2026 due to Israeli threats. Bahman Hospital also sustained severe structural damage as a result of the attacks before resuming normal operations.

Attacks on Medical and Emergency Response Personnel, 2 March – 15 July 2026.

Date	Medical Personnel Killed	Medical Personnel Injured
10/03/2026	14	45
13/03/2026	-	3
14/03/2026	13	3
15/03/2026	1	7
16/03/2026	6	11
18/03/2026	2	27
19/03/2026	-	11
21/03/2026	-	12
28/03/2026	9	7
29/03/2026	1	1
30/03/2026	-	1
01/04/2026	1	9
04/04/2026	1	5
05/04/2026	-	3
06/04/2026	3	9
07/04/2026	-	4
09/04/2026	16	18
11/04/2026	12	12
12/04/2026	2	2
13/04/2026	1	5
14/04/2026	-	11
15/04/2026	3	8
16/04/2026	2	11
17/04/2026	7	8
29/04/2026	3	1
03/05/2026	-	4
06/05/2026	-	3
07/05/2026	-	2
08/05/2026	1	1
10/05/2026	2	5
11/05/2026	-	2
13/05/2026	2	1

Date	Medical Personnel Killed	Medical Personnel Injured
14/05/2026	-	1
15/05/2026	-	6
16/05/2026	3	4
22/05/2026	7	10
23/05/2026	-	25
24/05/2026	-	3
25/05/2026	1	2
26/05/2026	1	7
29/05/2026	2	1
31/05/2026	-	18
01/06/2026	1	3
02/06/2026	-	39
03/06/2026	-	7
04/06/2026	1	1
06/06/2026	2	5
07/06/2026	-	2
09/06/2026	-	6
10/06/2026	1	1
11/06/2026	-	2
13/06/2026	1	9
19/06/2026	2	3
21/06/2026	-	1
Total	124	408

Source: WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care.

Attacks on Fuel Stations

Under international humanitarian law, fuel stations are, in principle, civilian objects and should not be considered military targets merely because they are owned by, or politically or economically affiliated with, a particular party. However, the Israeli military has justified its strikes on fuel stations operated by Al-Amana, claiming that the company is a source of funding for Hezbollah and that its stations therefore constitute legitimate targets. Israeli forces have also targeted multiple institutions involved in the distribution of food and other basic commodities. According to the Israeli military, the purpose of these strikes is to disrupt supply and mobility, damage the local economy, and place pressure on the population.

Fuel Stations Confirmed as Having Been Targeted.

Governorate / District	Location
Tyre District	Deir Qanoun El-Nahr
Tyre District	Srifa
Tyre District	Burj El-Shemali
Tyre District	Al-Housh area
Bint Jbeil District	Beit Yahoun
Tyre District	Ras El-Ain Road, vicinity of Rashidieh
Tyre District	Al-Burgholiyyah
Between Bint Jbeil and Tyre Districts	Deir Antar – Al-Majadel
Nabatieh District	Nabatieh–Shoukin Road / Shoukin ascent
Nabatieh District	President Nabih Berri Avenue – Al-Maslakh intersection
Nabatieh District	Kfartibnit

Source: *Information International*.



Evacuation Warnings Issued by the Israeli Military During the War on Lebanon



The Israeli military issued 345 evacuation warnings during the 66-day war between September 23 and November 27, 2024, compared with 230 warnings during the 135-day war from March 2 to June 30, 2026. These are the number of warnings issued by the Israeli military during its wars on Lebanon.

Such warnings are presented as measures intended to identify areas or individuals affected by the fighting and protect civilians. The figures for civilian deaths and injuries, as well as casualties among medical personnel and military personnel, however, challenge this characterization. The warnings were issued alongside tens of thousands of airstrikes and artillery attacks.

Locations Most Frequently Mentioned in the Warnings

South Governorate

Tyre District: Al-Abbassiya, Al-Burgholiyyah, Al-Bass, Burj El-Shemali, Burj Rahal, Jal al-Bahr, Al-Haniyah, Al-Hamadiyah,

Rashidieh, Ras al-Naqoura, Zaquouq al-Mefdi, Shabriha, Tyre, Arab al-Jall, Ain Baal, Maashouq, Al-Qassamiya camp, Nabi Qassem Shrine, Al-Qulayleh, Qana, Deir Qanoun El-Nahr, Deir Kifa, Al-Shihabiyah (Tayr Zebna), Al-Qantara, Al-Ghandouriyah, Burj Qalawiya, Wadi Jilo, Qaqaaiyat El-Jisr, Srifa, Khirbet Selm, Beit Yahoun, Majdal Zoun, Jabal al-Butm, Kafra, Yater.

Saida District: Al-Ansariyah, Arzi, Haret Saida, Al-Zrariyeh, Al-Kharayeb.

Jezzine District: Jarjouh, Sejoud, Ain Qana, Mlita, Kfar Houneh.

Nabatieh Governorate

Ansar, Haboush, Harouf, Toul, Deir El-Zahrani, Nabatieh, Nabatieh al-Tahta, Al-Kfour (Nabatieh), Kfartibnit, Mazraat Kfar Jouz, Zefta, Yohmor, Arnoun, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah.

Bekaa Governorate

Baalbek District: Bednayel, Britel, Douris, Ain Bourday, Al-Labweh, Nabi Chit, Saraain al-Fawqa, Saraain al-Tahta,

Al-Khoder, Hosh al-Ghanam.

Zahle District: Qasr Nabaa.

Western Bekaa District: Mashghara, Sohmor, Labaya, Zalaya, Qelaya, Dalafi, Yohmor al-Bekaa.

Hermel District: Hermel.

Mount Lebanon Governorate

Baabda District: Hadath, Haret Hreik, Ghobeiry, Laylaki, Burj al-Barajneh, Chiyah, Jnah, Al-Ghadir, Tahwitat al-Ghadir.

Aley District: Choueifat, Al-Amroussieh.

Beirut Governorate

Beirut: Bashoura, Zoqaq al-Blat.

Border crossing: Masnaa border crossing.

The warnings ranged from orders to evacuate entire areas, including broad geographic zones such as the entire area south of the Litani River, to extensive areas of the Bekaa and Beirut's southern suburbs. Warnings targeting one or more buildings were often followed by the destruction of surrounding buildings outside the area explicitly covered by the warning.

Types of Evacuation Warnings.

Type of warning	Number of warnings	Percentage
Area evacuation	139	60.43%
Warning (prohibiting movement/return)	11	4.78%
General warning	5	2.17%
Building	75	32.61%
Total	230	100%

Source: *Information International*.

The warnings were issued on 91 of the 135 days from the beginning of the war through the end of June. The largest number were issued in March, accounting for 44% of all warnings.

Warnings by Month.

Month	Number of warnings	Percentage
March	102	44.35%
April	39	16.96%
May	66	28.70%
June	23	10%
Total	230	100%

Daily Evacuation Warnings.

Date	Area evacuation	Warning (prohibiting movement/return)	General warning	Building	Total
02/03/2026	2			19	21
03/03/2026	2			10	12
05/03/2026	2			2	4
06/03/2026	1				1
07/03/2026	2			1	3
08/03/2026	1				1
09/03/2026	1			1	2
10/03/2026	3			2	5
11/03/2026	4				4
12/03/2026	2			5	7
13/03/2026	2			1	3
14/03/2026	1		2		3
15/03/2026	1				1
16/03/2026	1				1
17/03/2026	2			1	3
18/03/2026	3			2	5
20/03/2026	2				2
22/03/2026	2				2
23/03/2026	2				2
24/03/2026	3			5	8
25/03/2026	1				1
26/03/2026	1				1
27/03/2026	2				2
28/03/2026	1				1
29/03/2026	1		1		2
30/03/2026	2				2
31/03/2026	2			1	3
03/04/2026	2				2
04/04/2026	6			5	11
05/04/2026	1			1	2
06/04/2026	2				2

Date	Area evacuation	Warning (prohibiting movement/return)	General warning	Building	Total
07/04/2026	1			1	2
08/04/2026	2			2	4
09/04/2026	1				1
10/04/2026			1		1
15/04/2026	1				1
16/04/2026	1				1
17/04/2026		1			1
19/04/2026			1		1
20/04/2026		1			1
21/04/2026		1			1
23/04/2026		1			1
24/04/2026	1				1
25/04/2026		1			1
26/04/2026	1	1			2
28/04/2026	1				1
30/04/2026	2				2
01/05/2026	1				1
02/05/2026	1				1
03/05/2026	1				1
04/05/2026	2				2
05/05/2026	1				1
06/05/2026	1				1
07/05/2026	1				1
08/05/2026	2				2
09/05/2026	1				1
10/05/2026	1				1
11/05/2026	1				1
12/05/2026	2				2
13/05/2026	2				2
14/05/2026	1				1
15/05/2026	2			2	4

Date	Area evacuation	Warning (prohibiting movement/return)	General warning	Building	Total
16/05/2026	1				1
17/05/2026	2				2
18/05/2026	2				2
19/05/2026	1			1	2
20/05/2026	1				1
22/05/2026	1			2	3
23/05/2026	2				2
24/05/2026	2				2
25/05/2026	1			5	6
26/05/2026	6				6
27/05/2026	3				3
28/05/2026	2			5	7
29/05/2026	3				3
30/05/2026	3				3
31/05/2026		1			1
01/06/2026		3			3
02/06/2026	1				1
03/06/2026	2			1	3
04/06/2026		1			1
05/06/2026	2				2
06/06/2026	1				1
07/06/2026	1				1
08/06/2026	1				1
09/06/2026	1				1
10/06/2026	2				2
12/06/2026	2				2
13/06/2026	2				2
14/06/2026	2				2
18/06/2026	1				1
Total	139	11	5	75	230

Source: Information International.

5,260 Lebanese Prisoners in Israeli Prisons

From 1949 to June 2026

According to data, approximately 5,260 Lebanese men and women have been captured or detained in Israeli prisons from 1949 through May 2026.

Around 5,230 prisoners were released by 2000 through multiple prisoner exchanges and releases. The detainees held at Khiam detention center were also released following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Two men, Yehia Skaff and Abdullah Alyan, remained in detention or among those missing whose fate is still unknown.

After 2000, Lebanese fisherman Mohammad al-Farran was reported detained in October 2005 while at sea off the coast of Tyre. Since the outbreak of the war in October 2023, Israeli forces have captured 31 people: 13 cases in 2024, seven in 2025, and eight from the beginning of 2026 through the end of June.

More than 30 temporary detentions of Lebanese residents of border villages were also recorded during this period, most of them farmers and livestock herders. They were held for periods ranging from a few hours to two days before being released. The average age of those currently held or detained is approximately 36, and all are male. Most hold Lebanese citizenship, with the exception of one Syrian national who was captured on April 22, 2026, in the border town of Debl.

Most captures took place in southern border villages, notably Aita al-Shaab, Khiam, Taybeh, and Shakra. One exception was the abduction of Imad Amhaz from the Batroun area in northern Lebanon, in an operation carried out by an Israeli special forces unit in 2024.

Another case involved the abduction of Lebanese General Security officer Captain Ahmad Shukr in a complex operation. Lebanese security forces confirmed that the Mossad was involved in kidnapping him in the Zahle area. The stated reason was reportedly to search for the remains of Israeli Air Force navigator Ron Arad, who disappeared after his aircraft was shot down in southern Lebanon on October 16, 1986.

More recently, it emerged that Patrick Bakarian, a serviceman in the Republican Guard who went missing in April after, according to a Lebanese Army investigation, losing his way in the Qlaiaa area of the Marjayoun District, had apparently been captured by Israeli forces stationed at the time in the Tel al-Nahas area adjacent to Qlaiaa. However, a statement issued by the Lebanese Army Command on Wednesday, July 15, 2026, said:

“The Army Command – Directorate of Guidance mourns Private Patrick Antranik Bekarian, with whom contact was lost on April 19, 2026. It was subsequently established that he was killed after being targeted inside his vehicle by the Israeli occupation forces, which held his body. His remains were handed over by the International Committee of the Red Cross on July 15, 2026.”

The issue of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli prisons remains one of the longstanding unresolved issues between Lebanon and Israel. Official and public calls continue for clarification of the fate of missing persons, the release of all detainees, and greater clarity regarding the legal and humanitarian circumstances of their detention.


Lebanese Prisoners and Detainees.

No.	Full name	Date of detention	Place and year of birth	Place of detention
1	Yehia Mohammad Skaff	March 11, 1978	Bhannine, 1959	Inside occupied Palestine
2	Abdullah Khalil Alyan	From his home in Al-Bayyada, 1981	Al-Bayyada, 1942	Al-Bayyada
3	Mohammad Adel al-Farran (missing fisherman)	October 2005	Tyre, 1984	Naqoura waters
4	Waddah Kamel Younes	October 2024	Houla, 1971	Blida
5	Youssef Mousa Abdullah	October 2024	Bablieh, 1986	Aita al-Shaab
6	Mohammad Abdel Karim Jawad	October 2024	Aita al-Shaab, 1994	Aita al-Shaab
7	Ibrahim Mounif al-Khalil	October 2024	Aita al-Shaab, 1990	Aita al-Shaab
8	Hassan Aqil Jawad	October 2024	Aita al-Shaab, 1987	Aita al-Shaab
9	Imad Fadel Amhaz	October 2024	Al-Kwakh, Al-Bekaiyyah, 1986	Batroun

No.	Full name	Date of detention	Place and year of birth	Place of detention
10	Hadi Mustafa Assaf	October 2024	Al-Diyabieh, 1990	Aita al-Shaab
11	Hussein Ali Sharif	October 2024	Al-Yammouneh, 1990	Aita al-Shaab
12	Abdullah Khodr Fahdeh	October 2024	Al-Qasr, 2002	Aita al-Shaab
13	Ali Qassem Assaf	October 2024	Hermel, 1999	Aita al-Shaab
14	Hassan Youssef Qashqoush	October 2024	Qaqaiyat El-Jisr, 1988	Aita al-Shaab
15	Ali Nasser Younes	December 19, 2024	Hermel, 1992	Shakra
16	Fouad Habib Qataya	December 19, 2024	Hermel, 1982	Shakra
17	Hassan Ahmad Hamoud	January 26, 2025	Taybeh, 1985	Taybeh
18	Hussein Amin Karaki	January 26, 2025	Khirbet Selm, 1989	Markaba
19	Ali Hassan Tarhini	January 28, 2025	Jebchit, 2006	Taybeh
20	Mohammad Ali Jheir	February 2, 2025	Naqoura, 1991	Naqoura waters
21	Mortada Hassan Mahna	February 16, 2025	Maroun al-Ras, 1983	Maroun al-Ras
22	Ali Mohammad Fneish	June 4, 2025	Maaroub, 1990	Naqoura waters
23	Maher Fares Hamdan	June 7, 2025	Shebaa, 1994	Mount Hermon
24	Atwa Mohammad Atwa	February 9, 2026	Habbariyeh, 1961	Jabal al-Rous / Habbariyeh
25	Abbas Ali al-Deirani	March 23, 2026	Qasr Nabaa, 1989	Khiam
26	Ahmad Hussein al-Aitawi	March 23, 2026	Labweh, 1999	Khiam
27	Shadi Karami Abdel Aal	March 24, 2026	Kfar Shuba, 1991	Home / Halta
28	Sami Imad Saab	April 4, 2026	Shebaa, 1992	Home / Shebaa
29	Abdullah Ahmad al-Obeid	April 22, 2026	Syria, 1992	Debl
30	Shawqi Afif Atieh	May 19, 2026	May 2, 1980	Halta
31	Ahmad Afif Atieh	May 19, 2026	November 10, 1982	Halta
32	Ali Atif Atieh	May 19, 2026	September 27, 1999	Halta
33	Ahmad Ali Shukr (retired captain in the Lebanese General Security Directorate)	December 17, 2026	Nabi Chit, 1957	Zahle

Source: *Information International*.

33 detainees in Israeli prisons 1978 - 2026



80% of Bridges Linking Lebanon to the South Were Bombed

Israel has revived an old strategy of isolating the areas south of the Litani River from the rest of Lebanon by destroying the bridges linking the south with Beirut and the Bekaa.

During the previous war in 2024, Israeli aircraft also targeted the bridges at the Aboudieh and Arida border crossings linking Lebanon with Syria in the north, while smaller crossings were closed, and the Masnaa border crossing linking Eastern Lebanon and Syria was also bombed. These actions were intended to cut Lebanon off from the support it had previously received from Syria.

The targeting of bridges is a strategy the Israeli military has employed since its first attempts at occupation in the 1970s, continuing through the 2006 July War.

The bridges that were directly destroyed or damaged are: Qasmiyeh, Old Qasmiyeh, Qasmiyeh Bahri, Zrariyeh–Tayr Filsay, Qaqaaiyat El-Jisr, Al-Dalafah, Mashghara, and Sohmor.

The Khardali Bridge itself was not directly struck, but the roads leading to it were cut off after the main road was hit in several major airstrikes. The Borghouz Bridge had not been targeted as of the publication date of this issue.

Bridges Targeted.

Bridge	Date targeted	Connection	Result
Zrariyeh Bridge	March 13, 2026	Links the Tyre District to the west, Bint Jbeil District to the south, and Nabatieh District to the east. In practical terms, it connects the coastal area, particularly Tyre and its surroundings, with the inland southern villages.	Completely destroyed
Old Qasmiyeh Bridge	March 18, 2026	Connects the old coastal road between Saida to the north and Tyre to the south, in the Qasmiyeh area near the mouth of the Litani River.	Completely destroyed
Qasmiyeh Bridge	March 22, 2026	Located near the mouth of the Litani River north of Tyre, it carries traffic along the coastal corridor between Saida/Zahrani to the north and Tyre and the southern border area to the south.	Partially destroyed
Qaqaaiyat El-Jisr Bridge	March 23, 2026	Links the Nabatieh District north of the Litani with the Bint Jbeil District south of the Litani. It is a key route toward Wadi al-Hujayr and the villages around Ghandouriyah.	Completely destroyed
Al-Dalafah Bridge	March 25, 2026	Located in the Western Bekaa, it links the area with southern Lebanon, particularly the routes toward Hasbaya, the Arqoub area, and Marjayoun.	Completely destroyed
Mashghara Bridge	Early April 2026	Connects Mashghara with the surrounding area on both banks of the Litani, particularly toward Sohmor and the villages of the Western Bekaa.	Completely destroyed
Sahmar Bridge	Early April 2026	Connects Sohmor with Mashghara across the Litani River, forming part of the Western Bekaa road network between the two towns and neighboring villages.	Completely destroyed
Qasmiyeh Marine Bridge	April 8, 2026	Carries the coastal highway between Saida to the north and Tyre and the southern border areas to the south, crossing the final stretch of the Litani River before it reaches the sea.	Completely destroyed

Source: *Information International*.

Bridges Not Targeted.

Bridge	Connection
Khardali Bridge	Links the Nabatieh/Kfartibnit area to the north with the Marjayoun/Deir Mimas area to the south.
Borghouz Bridge	Links the Jezzine/Western Bekaa corridor to the north with Hasbaya and the Arqoub area to the south.

All of these bridges are located on the Litani River or along sections of its course near the coast. Their primary function is to connect the areas south of the Litani with the rest of southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa.

Report on Humanitarian Assistance and Health Services Provided During the War

According to Figures from the Ministry of Public Health

Figures published on the Ministry of Public Health's digital platform show that the health response to the war was not limited to receiving the wounded or treating direct injuries. It encompassed a broad network of medical and humanitarian services for displaced people, ranging from hospital care and emergency services to primary healthcare, mental health support, childhood vaccinations, and maternity care. These figures reflect the pressure placed on Lebanon's healthcare sector, particularly as the war coincided with large-scale displacement and attacks on healthcare facilities and civilian areas. The Ministry of Public Health issued a decision to admit and treat all displaced people in hospitals at the ministry's expense.

According to the available data, 18,802 displaced people received inpatient care, while 24,593 displaced people were treated in emergency departments. This shows that the burden was not limited to cases requiring hospitalization, but also included emergency cases requiring rapid intervention without prolonged hospital stays. The data also indicates that approximately 58% of inpatient cases were treated in public hospitals, highlighting the central role of the public sector in shouldering the cost of the health response during the war.

Type of Health Service	Number / Percentage
Displaced people who received inpatient care	18,802
Displaced people treated in emergency departments	24,593
Percentage of inpatient care provided in public hospitals	58%
Percentage of patients aged 18 and over	82.8%

Source: Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.

These figures indicate that the health services provided were directed largely toward adults, with 82.8% of patients aged 18 and over.

The platform also highlights the importance of mental health in the response to the war. Mental health services accounted for approximately 8% of total health service utilization, an important indicator because the effects of war are not limited to physical injuries, but also include psychological trauma, anxiety, fear, loss of housing, and family separation. A total of 23,879 people benefited from mental health awareness and information sessions, while 21,082 people received non-specialized mental health consultations. Mental health medications were also distributed at 282 collective shelters, indicating an effort to bring these services to places where displaced people were staying rather than limiting them to hospitals and specialized centers.

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Indicator	Number / Percentage
Share of mental health services in total services	8%
People who benefited from mental health awareness and information sessions	23,879
People who benefited from non-specialized mental health consultations	21,082
Collective shelters where mental health medications were distributed	282

Source: Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.

As for children and women, the data indicates that more than 20,000 displaced children received vaccinations, while 1,775 births were recorded among displaced people. This is significant because it shows that the war did not eliminate the need for routine and essential healthcare services, such as vaccination and maternal and child care. Rather, displacement and overcrowding in collective shelters made these services more urgent.

Child and Maternal Health Services	Number
Displaced children who received vaccinations	More than 20,000
Births recorded among displaced people	1,775

Source: Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.

Health assistance during the war therefore took a multi-level approach: treating emergency cases, ensuring access to hospital care, providing mental health support, vaccinating children, and providing maternity care. This differs from the traditional view of health assistance as being limited to emergency medical response and surgery.

Assistance Distributed to Displaced People

In a brief report on the humanitarian situation and response issued by the Disaster Risk Management Unit at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on July 14, figures were provided on assistance distributed to displaced people both inside and outside collective shelters.

Overview of Assistance Distributed

The figures show that the humanitarian response relied heavily on food, water, and essential relief items, alongside a cash assistance program for people staying outside collective shelters. Hot and cold meals constituted the largest category of assistance.

Sector / Type of Assistance	Quantity
Hot or cold meals	15,593,084
Ready-to-eat meals	219,432
Drinking water / liters	5,961,332
Personal hygiene supplies	241,215
Menstrual hygiene supplies	100,955
Children's supplies	21,287
Mattresses	262,046
Blankets	482,513

Source: Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.

Cash Assistance Program

A total of 490,883 people outside collective shelters benefited from cash assistance, with total payments amounting to USD 15,617,695. Dividing the total payments by the number of beneficiaries gives an approximate arithmetic average of USD 31.82 per person. This average does not necessarily mean that every individual received the same amount, as payments may vary according to eligibility, the number of installments, and the distribution mechanism.

People outside collective shelters who received cash assistance	490,883
Total amount paid in U.S. dollars	USD 15,617,695

Assistance Received by Lebanon in 2026

While pledges made by the United Nations and donor countries at the August 2020 and 2021 conferences to support Lebanon following the August 4, 2020 Beirut port explosion were estimated at around \$668 million, Israel receives billions of dollars in military and economic support annually.

In 2026, Lebanon received financial, in-kind, and other assistance, including support for long-term development projects, amounting to USD 270 million through the end of June 2026.

This assistance was divided between aid related to the impact of the war on Lebanon and other assistance related to previously approved development projects included in the programs Lebanon receives annually.

The assistance can therefore be divided into two categories: reported financial contributions and in-kind assistance.

First: Financial Assistance

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) reports that funding recorded under the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 amounted to approximately USD 269.8 million against requirements of USD 639.9 million, representing 42.2% of the total requirement. The funding tracking data also show that total humanitarian funding reported for Lebanon in 2026 amounted to approximately USD 469 million, with part of this funding falling within the Flash Appeal and part outside it.

Within the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026, which is directly linked to the humanitarian response to the escalation, the figures are as follows:

Item	Value
Current funding requirements	USD 639.9 million
Funding received	USD 269.8 million
Funding coverage	42.2%
Remaining funding gap	USD 370.1 million

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In other words, the war response remained funded at less than half of its requirements, despite the higher overall level of humanitarian funding reported for Lebanon in 2026.

Major Announced Financial Contributions

Donor	Amount	Nature of Assistance
European Union	EUR 100 million	Humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in 2026, including food, healthcare, hygiene, protection, shelter, and psychosocial support.
United Kingdom	GBP 43 million since March	Including a new GBP 13 million package announced in June, in addition to GBP 30 million announced previously.
France	EUR 17 million	Humanitarian support for displaced civilians through the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Lebanese and French organizations.
United States	USD 100 million	Immediate humanitarian assistance announced on June 26 as part of the Trilateral Framework. It had not yet been received.
Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF)	USD 15 million	Reserve funding for an immediate humanitarian response.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The United Nations' revised Lebanon Flash Appeal through August 2026 put total requirements at USD 639.9 million. The EU confirmed EUR 100 million in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon in 2026, while France announced EUR 17 million in humanitarian assistance. The United States announced USD 100 million in immediate humanitarian assistance on June 26 in connection with the Trilateral Framework.

Second: Quantity of In-Kind Assistance

In-kind assistance cannot easily be consolidated into a single figure because some shipments are measured in tons, some in trucks, and others by the number of individual items or meals. The following can nevertheless be documented:

Donor / Organization	Quantity	Type of Assistance
European Union / EU Humanitarian Air Bridge	150 tons	Medical, food, hygiene, and essential supplies, including more than 13,000 blankets.
European Union through UNICEF	45 tons	First-aid supplies, blankets, winter clothing, water tanks, supplies for children and adolescents, and recreational materials. This may form part of the broader European package.
France	Approximately 100 tons through May, including 60 tons in March	Humanitarian and medical equipment, mattresses, lamps, hygiene supplies, and a mobile medical unit.
Qatar	More than 100 tons	Medical supplies, medicines, and first-aid kits, in addition to a program targeting 40,500 families and expected to distribute more than 12,000 food baskets.
Jordan	197 trucks in 10 convoys	Food, medical and relief supplies, hygiene items, tents, and two mobile bakeries.
World Health Organization (WHO) / ECHO	3.5 tons	Surgical, emergency and trauma supplies, medicines, and equipment for hospitals and healthcare centers.
UNICEF	32.5 tons	Emergency medical supplies for hospitals and frontline health services.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

At a minimum, if only the major in-kind shipments measured by weight rather than by individual items are counted, more than 400 tons of documented in-kind assistance came from the European Union, France, and Qatar alone. This is in addition to 197 Jordanian trucks and health-related shipments from the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. However, the figures should not be added mechanically, as some UNICEF and WHO shipments may have been funded or transported through EU mechanisms.

By mid-July 2026, Lebanon had received approximately USD 270 million in funding under the direct humanitarian war appeal, while total humanitarian funding reported for Lebanon in 2026 had reached approximately USD 469 million. In-kind assistance included hundreds of tons of medical, food, and shelter-related supplies, most notably from the European Union, France, and Qatar, in addition to 197 trucks from Jordan.



Public Sector

GOVERNMENT BUILDING RENTS 2026

**ACCORDING TO THE 2026
STATE BUDGET LAW**

**COST OF GOVERNMENT
BUILDING RENTS IN 2026**

LBP 2.106 TRILLION

USD 23.526 MILLION

Entity	Amount (LBP)	Amount (USD)
Embassies abroad	LBP 677 billion	USD 7,564,246
Lebanese Army	LBP 591 billion	USD 6,603,352
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, ESCWA Building	LBP 209.6 billion	USD 2,341,899
School rents, Primary Education	LBP 141.750 billion	USD 1,583,799
Housing allowance abroad	LBP 110.6 billion	USD 1,235,754
School rents, Secondary Education	LBP 75.6 billion	USD 844,693
Ministry of Finance	LBP 35.930 billion	USD 401,453
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, Directorate General of Internal Security Forces	LBP 18.028 billion	USD 201,430
Ministry of Economy and Trade	LBP 17.774 billion	USD 198,592
Directorate General of Customs	LBP 17.250 billion	USD 192,737
Central Laboratory	LBP 16.146 billion	USD 180,402
Court of Accounts	LBP 15.300 billion	USD 170,950
Directorate General of Cereals and Sugar Beet	LBP 15.148 billion	USD 169,251
Directorate General of Land Registry and Cadastre	LBP 13.200 billion	USD 147,486
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, General Security	LBP 12.872 billion	USD 143,821
Ministry of Agriculture	LBP 12.800 billion	USD 143,017
Ministry of the Displaced	LBP 11.380 billion	USD 127,151
Central Inspection	LBP 10.850 billion	USD 121,229
Courts of the Ministry of Justice	LBP 10 billion	USD 111,732
Directorate General of State Security	LBP 8.050 billion	USD 89,944
Directorate General of Land and Maritime Transport	LBP 8 billion	USD 89,385
Ministry of Environment	LBP 8 billion	USD 89,385
Ministry of Labour	LBP 7.205 billion	USD 80,503
Minister of State for Administrative Development Affairs	LBP 6.457 billion	USD 72,145
Jaafari Sharia Courts	LBP 6.320 billion	USD 70,615
Ministry of Industry	LBP 6 billion	USD 67,039

Entity	Amount (LBP)	Amount (USD)
Druze Sectarian Courts	LBP 5.102 billion	USD 57,006
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, Directorate General of Personal Status	LBP 4.653 billion	USD 51,989
Lebanese University	LBP 3.450 billion	USD 38,547
Ministry of Public Health	LBP 2.714 billion	USD 30,324
Minister of State for Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence	LBP 2.685 billion	USD 30,000
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, Directorate General of Political Affairs and Refugees	LBP 2.575 billion	USD 28,771
Higher Disciplinary Council	LBP 2.400 billion	USD 26,816
Directorate General of Education	LBP 2.3 billion	USD 25,698
Druze Community Council	LBP 1.822 billion	USD 20,358
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants	LBP 1.669 billion	USD 18,648
Directorate General of Urban Planning	LBP 1.574 billion	USD 17,587
Ministry of Social Affairs	LBP 1.5 billion	USD 16,760
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	LBP 1.350 billion	USD 15,084
Directorate General of the National Lottery	LBP 1.285 billion	USD 14,358
Central Administration of Statistics	LBP 1.210 billion	USD 13,520
Sunni Sharia Courts	LBP 950 million	USD 10,615
School rents, Vocational and Technical Education	LBP 650 million	USD 7,263
North Governorate	LBP 630 million	USD 7,039
Civil Service Council	LBP 621 million	USD 6,939
Ministry of Culture	LBP 603 million	USD 6,737
Nabatieh Governorate	LBP 550 million	USD 6,145
Directorate General of Civil Aviation	LBP 400 million	USD 4,469
Alawite Islamic Council	LBP 377 million	USD 4,212
Jaafari Mufti's Office	LBP 370 million	USD 4,134
Directorate General of Roads and Buildings, Regional Directorates	LBP 360 million	USD 4,022
Ministry of Youth and Sports	LBP 335 million	USD 3,743

Entity	Amount (LBP)	Amount (USD)
Directorate General of Oil	LBP 295 million	USD 3,296
Directorate General of Post	LBP 250 million	USD 2,793
Directorate General of Cooperatives	LBP 240 million	USD 2,682
Ministry of Energy and Water	LBP 100 million	USD 1,117
Sunni Mufti's Office	LBP 165 million	USD 1,844
Higher Islamic Shiite Council	LBP 150 million	USD 1,676
Total	LBP 2,105.595 billion	USD 23,526,201

Source: Official Gazette, 2026 State Budget.

Cost of Rents for Government Buildings Belonging to Religious Institutions

(Sunni Mufti's Office, Sunni Sharia Courts, Higher Islamic Shiite Council, Jaafari Mufti's Office, Jaafari Sharia Courts, Druze Sectarian Courts, Alawite Islamic Council, Druze Community Council)

LBP 15.256 billion

USD 170,458

Ministry of Interior Rent Costs

Directorate General of Political Affairs and Refugees: **LBP 2.575 billion**
 General Security: **LBP 12.872 billion**
 Internal Security Forces Directorate General: **LBP 18.028 billion**
 Directorate General of Personal Status: **LBP 4.653 billion**

LBP 38.128 billion

USD 426,000

School Rent Costs

(Primary Education, Secondary Education, Vocational and Technical Education)

LBP 218 billion

USD 2,435,754

ESCWA Building Rent

LBP 209.6 billion

USD 2,342,000

Ministry of the Displaced Rent Costs

LBP 11.380 billion

USD 127,150

in comparison

**The combined rent costs
of the following ministries:**

Ministry of Youth and Sports:

LBP 335 million

Ministry of Social Affairs:

LBP 1.5 billion

Ministry of Industry:

LBP 6 billion

Ministry of Culture:

LBP 603 million

Ministry of Public Health:

LBP 2.714 billion

LBP 11.152 billion

USD 124,600




Public Sector

LEBANON'S PRISON CRISIS


CHRONIC OVERCROWDING AND DELAYED REFORMS

Lebanon's prison system is facing a deepening structural crisis that has become a legal, human rights, and security challenge for the state. The crisis is driven by rising inmate numbers, inadequate prison capacity, slow judicial procedures, and delays in implementing long overdue legislative and administrative reforms.

As of April 2026, the total number of detainees in Lebanon stood at approximately 8,700 people, including 6,300 prisoners held in 25 central prisons and 2,400 detainees held in 229 detention facilities operated by the Internal Security Forces. By comparison, the official maximum prison capacity is only 5,377 inmates, while the actual functional capacity is estimated at approximately 3,068 prisoners. This means that prisons are operating at roughly 285% of their intended capacity, one of the highest overcrowding rates in the region.




The figures show that the overwhelming majority of detainees are pretrial detainees who have not yet been convicted. Their number stands at around 7,200 people, representing 83% of the total prison population, highlighting serious deficiencies in Lebanon's criminal justice system. Approximately 1,000 detainees are awaiting release in misdemeanor cases, while only about 150 prisoners are serving sentences of hard labor or life imprisonment. Statistics also indicate that 2,600 prisoners face a single criminal case, while the remainder are involved in multiple concurrent legal proceedings.



Regarding nationality, there are approximately 4,175 foreign prisoners, accounting for nearly 48% of the total prison population. Of these, 2,610 are Syrian nationals, representing around 62.5% of all foreign inmates. Around 2,650 detainees are being held on drug-related charges, including 80 female prisoners, while approximately 350 inmates are classified as being involved in Islamist or extremism-related cases.

Roumieh Prison remains the most striking example of the overcrowding crisis. It alone houses approximately 3,600 prisoners, despite having a normal capacity of only 1,300 inmates. It previously held 147 juvenile detainees, who were later transferred to the modern Warwar Rehabilitation Center for juveniles.

From a legal perspective, the principal regulatory framework governing prisons dates back to Decree No. 14310 of February 11, 1949, which regulated prisons, detention facilities, and juvenile rehabilitation institutions. In 1964, Decree No. 17315 established the Prison Administration and placed it directly under the authority of the Minister of Justice, with the objective of transferring prison management from the Internal Security Forces to the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, Legislative Decree No. 151 of September 16, 1983, particularly Article 29, provided for the establishment of a Directorate of Prisons within the Ministry of Justice and stipulated that its functions, powers, and staffing would be determined by a decree issued by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice.



Despite this legislative framework, Lebanon's prisons remain, in practice, under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and the Internal Security Forces, while the planned transfer of prison administration to the Ministry of Justice has never been completed. Former Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar has drafted a decree to organize the Directorate of Prisons, defining its responsibilities. These included managing prisoners' administrative, daily living, and healthcare affairs; classifying prison types; transferring inmates between correctional institutions; preparing prison-related studies and statistics; proposing modernization and development projects; and evaluating prison capacity and operational needs.

At the same time, prisons under the Ministry of National Defense operate under a separate legal framework established by Decree No. 6236 of January 17, 1995.

One of the principal causes of prison overcrowding is the failure to fully comply with the legal safeguards governing pretrial detention. Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limits pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases to two months, extendable by an additional two months upon judicial order. In felony cases, the limit is six months, extendable for another six months, except in cases involving crimes against state security, homicide, or drug offenses. Once these statutory periods expire, detainees should be released if their trial has not taken place. In practice, however, these legal time limits are frequently exceeded.

Available data also indicate the existence of approximately 60,000 documents and memoranda issued by various security agencies, including Military Intelligence, General Security, and the Information Branch, without corresponding judicial decisions. This raises concerns regarding legal safeguards and the protection of fundamental freedoms.

The primary causes of the current crisis include the chronic shortage of judges, the failure to bring all detainees to their scheduled court hearings, insufficient budgets for both the Ministry of Justice and the Internal Security Forces, delays in serving legal notices, the absence of comprehensive court digitalization, and the economic and security crises Lebanon has experienced in recent years. These factors have resulted in an accumulation of court cases and significant delays in adjudication, directly contributing to the growing number of pretrial detainees.

Against this backdrop, a general amnesty law has been proposed as one possible means of reducing pressure on the prison system. Estimates suggest that such legislation could result in the release of between 3,000 and 4,000 prisoners. However, many legal experts caution that a general amnesty cannot provide a sustainable solution unless it is accompanied by a comprehensive reform plan that includes upgrading prison infrastructure, accelerating judicial proceedings, strengthening judicial independence and administrative efficiency, and fully enforcing legal provisions governing pretrial detention and release on bail.

Ultimately, the guiding principles of Lebanon's penal policy should remain the rule of law, the authority of justice, and the principle of accountability, while ensuring every detainee's right to a fair trial, the right to legal defense, and the prompt resolution of criminal cases. Without addressing the structural causes that have produced the current crisis, Lebanon's prison system will remain trapped in a cycle of chronic overcrowding and judicial delay, even if temporary measures such as a general amnesty or limited prison expansions are implemented. It is worth noting that the proposed general amnesty law remains pending before Parliament, awaiting the necessary political, and often sectarian, consensus among legislators and their respective constituencies.



Public Sector

LEBANON'S PUBLIC CORPORATION FOR HOUSING

FROM A PILLAR OF SOCIAL JUSTICE TO A VICTIM OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

الجمهورية اللبنانية
وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية
المهتمة بالعمامة للسكان

In Lebanon, the rights to housing, education, and healthcare are social rights whose provision falls under the responsibility of the state, particularly for middle-income and low-income groups. Based on this principle, Lebanon has witnessed, since the middle of the last century, a succession of public institutions tasked with managing the housing sector, beginning with the “Reconstruction Authority” established after the events of 1958, followed by the General Directorate of Housing, the Ministry of Housing, and the Independent Housing Fund, until the establishment of the Public Corporation for Housing (PCH) in its current form in 1996 as an independent public corporation with legal status and administrative and financial autonomy.

PCH began playing its effective role in 1999 through the launch of a subsidized housing loan program in cooperation with private banks, allowing a wide segment of Lebanese citizens to purchase a home for the first time. This model proved successful for nearly two decades, as PCH became the state's principal instrument for implementing housing policy and promoting social stability.

In contrast, the entry of the Central Bank of Lebanon into the real estate financing sector during the first decade of the 2000s, through support for high-value housing loans provided via the Housing Bank, a bank in which the private sector owns 80% of the assets, was not the optimal choice from a social justice perspective. Some of these loans were allocated for apartments priced between USD 500,000 and USD 800,000. Instead of directing these resources toward the Public Corporation for Housing to serve low-income and middle-income citizens, they primarily benefited financially capable groups and capital owners, thereby limiting the social impact of state support.

The Public Corporation for Housing has achieved significant accomplishments. From its establishment until the suspension of lending programs in 2018, it granted approximately 85,000 housing loans, representing around 60% of all housing loans granted in Lebanon. The total number of housing loans issued by all lending entities is approximately 131,000, including loans provided through the Housing Bank, military and security institutions, and judges' funds.

Although PCH provided the largest number of loans, its share of the total financing value stood at only 33%, owing to its lower loan ceilings compared with other institutions. The maximum housing loan available through PCH was LBP 270 million, with an actual average of around LBP 190 million, while loan ceilings at banks and other institutions reached LBP 800 million before later rising to approximately LBP 1.2 billion. The total value of the loans granted by PCH reached nearly LBP 10 trillion, equivalent to around USD 7 billion.

These loans played a central role in enabling tens of thousands of Lebanese families to own their homes, particularly those with limited incomes. However, the financial crisis that erupted in 2019, together with the near-complete suspension of subsidized loans, led to the collapse of one of the state's most important social policy tools.

Between 2015 and 2019, the average annual number of real estate sales transactions reached approximately 280,000, while PCH granted around 10,000 loans annually, equivalent to approximately 3.6% of total real estate sales. With the suspension of housing loans, this percentage fell to zero, depriving a wide segment of Lebanese citizens of the opportunity to purchase homes through subsidized financing.

The impact of the crisis was not limited to the housing sector but extended to the national economy as a whole. The real estate sector is directly or indirectly connected to approximately 65 economic sectors, including construction, engineering, furniture, household equipment industries, transportation, and services. The suspension of loans led to a contraction in economic activity across these sectors, rising unemployment, declining purchasing power, and the closure of many businesses that depended on real estate activity.

At the social level, the decline in homeownership opportunities directly affected marriage rates and family stability. Between 2015 and 2019, the average annual number of marriages stood at approximately 41,000. Following the financial crisis and the suspension of housing loans, the figure fell to around 31,000, representing a decline of nearly 20%. This has had clear consequences for Lebanon's demographic and social structure.

Based on these figures, the reactivation of subsidized housing loans appears to be an essential step toward restarting the Lebanese economy. In addition to enabling citizens to purchase homes, such loans stimulate dozens of production and service sectors linked to housing, support the formation of new families, and contribute to improving both demographic and economic indicators.

However, the return of the PCH to its previous role faces a number of structural and administrative challenges. PCH suffers from a severe shortage of human resources, with only 30 employees currently working across five branches, while its approved staffing structure provides for 165 positions. This is because PCH operated for decades without a complete legal staffing framework until one was approved in 2022, although the recruitment process has not yet begun.

PCH also faces the additional challenge of approximately 50,000 accumulated files requiring processing and follow-up, while its current operational capacity is less than 5,000 files annually. This situation has led to the proposal of a draft law

allowing applicants who wish to accelerate the processing of their files to pay a fee of LBP 100 million. PCH would collect the required fees and transfer the surplus to its own fund for use in financing new housing loans. Estimates suggest that, if approved, this project could provide PCH with approximately USD 38 million, an amount sufficient to finance around 550 new housing loans.

Restoring this role requires clear political will, administrative and legislative reforms, and the securing of sustainable sources of financing in order to restore housing policy as a fundamental component of Lebanon's social protection system and economic development.

PCH Suffers from a Shortage of Employees

Only 30 Employees

Currently Work Across PCH's Five Branches

Compared with an Approved Staffing
Structure of 165 Positions

Figure 1: The Numbers

Maximum permitted housing loan value






Figure 2: The Numbers

85,000 loans until the first half of 2019

**Figure 3: The Numbers**


**PCH injects annually through banks:
LBP 1 trillion into the real estate market.**



LEBANON'S CEMENT INDUSTRY

BETWEEN ECONOMIC NECESSITY, POLLUTION AND MONOPOLY

Cement manufacturing ranks among Lebanon's oldest heavy industries. The country's first cement plant was built in 1929 in the Chekka, El Heri and Kfarhata area of northern Lebanon, founded by Bishop Antoine Aridi through the Lebanese Cement Company, which later became part of Holcim. At the time, the venture marked a major industrial and technological leap for a region that had depended almost entirely on agriculture and had a thin, scattered population.




One of history's ironies is that the company built relatively advanced infrastructure of its own, running water lines and power down from the highlands of Koura through the villages of Oweita, Majdal, Kaftoun, Btaaboura, Ijdabrine, Kfarhata, Bidnayel and Kefraya to reach Chekka and El Heri and keep the plant running, at a time when most of those villages had no access to such services themselves. But the urban sprawl that later grew up around the industrial site and its high-voltage lines eventually became a source of health and environmental concern for local residents, compounded by the rising dust and emissions from raw-material extraction and cement production.

Today, Lebanon's cement industry is concentrated in three companies: Holcim, Cimenterie Nationale, and Sibline. Together they occupy more than 2.5 million square meters of land (the equivalent of over 330 soccer pitches), with a combined maximum output of around 6 million tons a year. Actual domestic demand, though, runs between 2 and 3 million tons annually under normal conditions, climbing to roughly 5 million tons during periods of reconstruction and building booms.

For all its importance to the national economy, the industry has for decades been at the center of a wide-ranging environmental and public-health debate. Quarrying limestone and clay scars mountainsides, strips vegetation, and damages soil and groundwater, while blasting, hauling, and factory emissions spread air pollution, dust and noise through surrounding communities. Local data point to cancer rates in the Koura district running above the national average, keeping the link between industrial activity and public health a constant flashpoint, and a standing demand for independent scientific studies.

The quarry file is one of the thorniest in the whole sector. Since the first legislation on the subject, issued in 1935 under the French Mandate, some 15 decrees and regulatory decisions have followed one another without ever adding up to a coherent, lasting national policy for extracting the raw materials cement production requires. The result has been a string of temporary, ad hoc fixes rather than a clear legal framework spelling out where quarries can operate, on what terms, and how they should be rehabilitated once the work is done.

That old problem resurfaced in May 2025, when the Ministry of Environment shut down two of the country's three plants (Holcim and Cimenterie Nationale) over environmental violations tied to raw-material extraction. In response, the two companies turned to importing clinker, the core material used in cement-making, bringing in roughly 1.7 million tons, enough to produce close to 2 million tons of cement and cover most of what the Lebanese market needs.



But as clinker imports later tapered off, and the restrictions on domestic production remained in place, the resulting supply squeeze sent cement prices climbing from around \$92 to nearly \$300 a ton, with only one company still actually producing. About a year on, in April 2026, the Ministry of Industry issued a decision letting the two idled plants resume work, only for the Ministry of Environment to suspend it again pending completion of environmental licensing. This exposed just how far official policy can work against itself, and how directly that plays out in market prices.

Under pressure to end the runaway rise in cement prices (and, critics say, to preserve the logic of sectarian power-sharing among the political class), the Governor of North Lebanon issued a permit on June 25 allowing Cimenterie Nationale to resume operations. That was followed by Ministry of Industry Decision No. 1/52, dated July 1, 2026, fixing the ex-factory price of a ton of cement at \$96, plus value-added tax.

Alongside the environmental debate, a number of experts have floated a different fix altogether: importing clinker from abroad instead of extracting it domestically. Clinker prices in regional markets, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Cyprus, hover around \$45 a ton. Advocates of this approach argue that cutting the steep import duties, which run to about 75% of the material's value before VAT and other fees, would lower production costs while sparing Lebanon's mountains and natural resources from further depletion.

Much of the criticism, though, centers on a simpler point: current policy protects a monopoly far more than it protects a national industry. Lebanon's market consumes a fraction of the cement its factories are capable of producing, yet ordinary citizens pay the price in inflated costs, nearby residents pay it in pollution and poor health, and the landscape pays it in mountains and quarries left permanently degraded.

The real choice isn't between the economy and the environment; it's finding the balance between them. The goal shouldn't be to shut the cement industry down, nor to shield companies at the public's expense, but to regulate a strategic sector on sound scientific and legal footing: one that keeps production running, protects public health and natural resources, blocks monopoly, and gives Lebanese consumers a basic commodity at fair, sustainable prices.

To get there, the state needs a real strategic plan, one that reckons with the residential neighborhoods that have grown up around these plants by relocating industry to genuinely industrial zones, and that prepares to scale back domestic output. That means revisiting more than ten sites already flagged in earlier studies as better suited to production, both for their high output potential and their distance from residential areas.




Figure. Laws related to cement companies in Lebanon.

Year	Law / Decree / Decision	Core Content	Key Notes
1935	Decision 253/L.R	First regulatory framework for quarry operations in Lebanon, issued under the French Mandate.	Contained no integrated planning or environmental vision.
1983	Urban Planning Law No. 69	Made the establishment of quarries subject to prior licensing and to regulatory conditions to be set out in an implementing decree.	The implementing decree was never issued, so the old system remained in force in practice.
1994	Decree 5616/1994	Regulated licensing mechanisms and the distribution of administrative authority over quarries.	Overlooked spatial and geographic considerations and left preparation of a master plan to the urban planning authority.
1997	Decision 4/1997, later Decision 40/1997	Adopted an initial master plan for quarries, then amended it to add new sites.	Granted specific sites to cement companies; seen as driven more by political bargaining than environmental criteria.
1998	Amendment to the master plan	Added 17 new quarry sites.	Continued expansion under what became known as the policy of “gravel-sharing,” a play on Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system.
1999	Ruling of the State Shura Council	Annulled Decree 5616/1994.	Legally brought down the master plan and all related amending decisions.
2002	Decree 8803/2002	Became the core legal framework still governing quarries and crushers today, and set up a new master plan.	Defined the sites where quarrying is legally permitted.
2009	Decree 1735/2009	Amended Decree 8803, expanding the master plan with 11 additional sites.	Restricted the Cabinet’s discretion and barred open-ended licensing of quarries outside the master plan.
2009	Decree 2366/2009 (National Physical Master Plan for Lebanese Territory)	Set a binding national framework for land use and for protecting environmentally sensitive areas.	Regarded as the highest planning authority that all licensing decisions must comply with.
2011	Decision 18 of the Higher Council for Urban Planning	Set a master plan for Bdehoun, confining the existing quarry to its current footprint and barring further expansion.	Later overturned following a legal challenge brought by the National Cement Company.
2019	Circulars and decisions from the Ministry of Interior	An attempt to shut down unlicensed quarries and tighten enforcement of the law.	Ended instead in repeated “administrative grace periods” rather than actual closures.
2024	Cabinet Decision No. 56	Granted cement companies a two-year administrative grace period to keep operating.	Seen as a continuation of the policy of legal exceptions.
2025	Cabinet Decision No. 17	Rescinded Decision 56 and required the companies to file for licensing through proper channels.	Described as a step toward restoring the rule of law.
2026	Cabinet Decision No. 16	Paved the way for long-term licenses for cement companies’ quarries despite their lying outside the master plan.	Viewed as a way around Decree 8803 and as effectively legalizing existing violations.
2026	Cabinet Decision No. 59	Formally rescinded Decision 16 while keeping its substance intact, and revived the 1997 master plan.	Potentially problematic, since it revived a plan that had already been legally struck down.

Source: *Information International*.

RAFIC HARIRI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TRAFFIC

FIRST HALF OF 2026

Despite the continuation of the war and its economic and social repercussions, Rafic Hariri Airport traffic shows a gradual increase following the sharp decline recorded in March 2026 with the outbreak of the war. Total passenger numbers rose from around 139,000 in March to 151,000 in April, before the recovery accelerated to reach approximately 442,000 in June.

This increase reflects a partial return of travel activity after the initial shock of the war, in addition to the growing arrival of expatriates with the beginning of the summer season. This trend strengthened at the start of July, when Minister of Tourism Laura Al Khazen Lahoud announced that the number of arrivals had reached between 12,000 and 15,000 per day.

However, this increase does not indicate a complete return of tourism activity to previous levels, as it is mainly linked to the movement of expatriates. Nevertheless, it reflects exceptional resilience in the context of an ongoing war.



Arrivals and Departures at Beirut International Airport in the First Half of 2026.

Month	Departures	Arrivals	Transit	Total	Difference Between Arrivals and Departures
January	308,340	236,848	989	546,177	-71,492
February	200,097	209,701	221	410,019	+9,604
March	90,153	49,037	4	139,194	-41,116
April	78,735	72,393	18	151,146	-6,342
May	152,830	185,942	218	338,990	+33,112
June	187,730	253,921	244	441,895	+66,191
First Half	1,017,885	1,007,842	1,694	2,027,421	-10,043

Source: Rafic Hariri International Airport

The figures, particularly for May and June, indicate an increase in the number of arrivals to Lebanon compared with departures.

However, compared with the same period in 2025, air traffic during the first half of 2026 declined significantly, with Beirut International Airport recording around 972,000 fewer passengers. Nevertheless, if the upward trend observed in July continues throughout the second half of the year, Lebanon could recover a substantial share of the lost passenger traffic and restore much of the momentum in arrivals and departures, despite the continuation of the war.

Indicator	First Half 2026	First Half 2025	Change	Percentage Change
Arrivals	1,007,842	1,598,877	-591,035	-36.97%
Departures	1,017,885	1,400,167	-382,282	-27.30%
Transit	1,694	382	+1,312	+343.46%
Total Passengers	2,027,421	2,999,426	-972,005	-32.41%
Flights	18,087	23,949	-5,862	-24.48%

Number of Flights During the First Half of 2026

The number of flights declined from 23,949 flights in the first half of 2025 to 18,087 flights in 2026, representing a decrease of 24.48%.

April recorded the lowest number of flights, before activity increased to 3,031 flights in May and 3,644 flights in June.

January	February	March	April	May	June	Total
4,800	3,823	1,441	1,348	3,031	3,644	18,087

The figures show three main trends:

Collapse in traffic at the start of the war:

The airport lost nearly two-thirds of its monthly traffic between February and March.

Dominance of departures during the peak of the war:

Departures exceeded arrivals by 47,458 people during March and April.

Clear recovery in May and June:

The combined increase in arrivals during these two months exceeded departures by 99,303 passengers, reducing the overall first-half imbalance to only 10,043.

The Trilateral Framework, Between Constitutional Legitimacy and the Path of National Dialogue

The State Alone Guarantees Lebanon's Unity and Sovereignty

By Dr. Hussein Mahmoud Rammal (academic and legal scholar in international and constitutional law)

Lebanon is passing through a critical period in which constitutional considerations are intertwined with regional shifts, particularly amid the debate stirred by the choice of direct negotiation and the discussion surrounding the Trilateral Framework and its implications for Lebanon's national and constitutional constants. The issue is not confined to the negotiating mechanism itself; it extends to how far any political course aligns with the constitutional references the Lebanese themselves chose as the foundation of their state, and with the obligations that public international law places on the international community in resolving disputes and respecting the rights of peoples. Any national approach, then, does not derive its worth from its political outcomes alone, but from how closely it adheres to the Lebanese Constitution and to the legal rules that form the framework governing the state's sovereignty, unity, and higher interests.

I. The Constitutional and Legal Basis for Any Negotiating Track

The Lebanese Constitution did not leave the country's national choices to bare political discretion; it laid down binding pillars that may not be bypassed. Paragraph (b) of the Constitution's preamble affirms Lebanon's commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which makes the rights set out in that declaration part of the constitutional framework that must be respected when shaping public policy. This commitment takes on particular weight in light of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration, which enshrines every person's right to leave any country and to return to their own, a right regarded as fundamental to human dignity itself.

On this basis, any political approach touching on the Arab-Israeli conflict or the future of Palestinian

refugees remains bound to respect this constitutional and legal framework, so as not to weaken the legal foundation underpinning Lebanon's international positions, while keeping foreign policy consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.

This is reinforced by paragraph (i) of the Constitution's preamble, which clearly rejects the permanent resettlement and naturalization of refugees, treating it as something that touches the very fabric of the national entity and the constitutional balance of the Lebanese state. This principle is not a passing political stance but a constitutional rule that must be honored, requiring that all initiatives, documents, or negotiations remain consistent with this constitutional commitment and leave no room for interpretations that could undermine national constants or harm the state's higher interests.

II. National Sovereignty, Between the Armistice Agreement and Security Council Resolutions

The defense of Lebanese sovereignty does not begin with any newly drafted political framework. It rests on an accumulated body of law established by international agreements and Security Council resolutions.

The 1949 Armistice Agreement provided the legal framework governing military relations between Lebanon and Israel following the 1948 war, affirming respect for international borders and the cessation of military action, making its provisions a legal reference that cannot be set aside in any subsequent negotiating track.

Security Council Resolution 425, issued on March 19, 1978, following the Israeli invasion of southern

Lebanon, explicitly affirmed the need for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, political independence and territorial unity, and established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to help implement the resolution.

Security Council Resolution 1701, issued on August 11, 2006, in the wake of the July 2006 war, once again affirmed respect for the Blue Line, the cessation of hostilities, and the extension of the Lebanese state's authority over the whole of its territory, while strengthening the mandate of UN forces to help consolidate stability and implement the relevant international obligations.

Preserving Lebanon's rights accordingly requires invoking these legal references as fixed pillars of national sovereignty, since the legal weight of any negotiation is measured not merely by the immediate gains it secures, but by how consistent it is with the international legal rules that have already established and affirmed Lebanon's rights through the United Nations.

III. Political Division and the Crisis of Constitutional Interpretation

Lebanon's experience has shown that political division becomes far more dangerous once it moves from a disagreement over choices to a disagreement over the very meaning of constitutional concepts. When interpretations multiply around the concept of sovereignty, the limits of constitutional authorities' powers, or the nature of the state's international obligations, a legal crisis emerges that goes beyond ordinary political disagreement.

This crisis shows up as horizontal splits among political forces and vertical splits reaching into public opinion and state institutions, weakening the constitutional system's ability to produce unifying national decisions and preventing the formation of a shared vision on existential questions.

Addressing this problem is not a matter of favoring one side over another, but of restoring the Constitution as the supreme reference to which everyone is accountable, and of firmly establishing the principle that political decisions must submit to constitutional rules, rather than bending constitutional text to shifting political balances.

IV. National Dialogue Under the Taif Agreement as a Gateway to Building the State

The persistence of political differences does not mean a shared national vision is out of reach. It underscores, instead, the need for a responsible national dialogue conducted under the Constitution and the Taif Agreement, as the constitutional framework governing Lebanese political life.

Developing the state, however, cannot be achieved through slogans or abstract intellectual approaches, particularly those calling for sectarianism to be uprooted from people's hearts before it is addressed in law, since building modern states does not rest on testing people's intentions or changing individual convictions, but on the strength of institutions, the effectiveness of the law, and equality among citizens in rights and duties.

A constitutional state does not wait for hearts to change before applying the law; it makes the law itself the instrument that organizes society, protects rights, safeguards freedoms, and delivers justice. When the law prevails over everyone equally, divisions recede naturally in favor of citizenship, and allegiance to the state becomes stronger than any other allegiance.

Lebanon's genuine recovery begins with restoring the state of institutions, defining the nation's higher interests according to a clear constitutional vision, strengthening judicial independence, entrenching the principle of accountability, and respecting the rule of legitimacy, so that authority becomes subject to the Constitution and citizens can trust that their rights are protected by law rather than by the balance of power.

Given all this, the present moment calls for the logic of the state to prevail over the logic of division, and for a return to the Constitution as the unifying reference that no political will or factional interest can override. National dialogue, when held within the framework of the Taif Agreement and aimed at developing state institutions, reinforcing its sovereignty, and consolidating the rule of law, can lay the foundation for a new phase in which the Lebanese converge on a single concept of the state: a state that safeguards the rights of all its citizens, preserves its sovereignty over the whole of its territory, and defines its national interests according to the Constitution and international law, so that it may become a model of a free and strong state in the East, one that unites the preservation of freedoms with the firm application of the law. Nations find stability only when the state is the ultimate reference, and the law is the supreme authority to which everyone submits.

FREIKEH

Origin of the Name

According to Anis Freyha’s encyclopedia, the name *Freikeh* has two principal meanings. The first derives from the Arabic root *faraka* (to rub), referring to wheat and the process associated with *freek*, the traditional roasted green wheat. The second traces the name to the Assyrian word *Parakku*, meaning a shrine or sacred place. Some historical accounts also suggest that several of the village’s churches were built atop the ruins of ancient temples, pointing to the area’s long history of settlement.

Location

Freikeh is located in the Matn District of Mount Lebanon Governorate. It borders Beit Shabab to the east and Qornet El Hamra to the west, while Wadi Freikeh forms one of the tributaries of the Nahr el Kalb to the north. The village enjoys a mild climate and mountainous landscape at an elevation of approximately 500 meters above sea level. It lies about 20 kilometers from Beirut and covers an area of approximately 820,000 square meters.

Housing and Population

Despite its proximity to Beirut, Freikeh has preserved much of its traditional character. The village still features old stone houses and historic churches alongside modern residential neighborhoods.

Religious Affiliation	Number	Percentage %
Maronite	564	90.10
Greek Orthodox	20	3.19
Greek Catholic (Melkite)	14	2.24
Syriac Orthodox	6	0.96
Armenian Orthodox	5	0.80
Sunni	4	0.64
Unspecified	4	0.64
Evangelical (Protestant)	3	0.48
Armenian Catholic	2	0.32
Christian (unspecified)	2	0.32
Shiite	1	0.16
Assyrian (Nestorian)	1	0.16
Total	626	100%

Registered Voters

Gender	Number	Percentage %
Male	315	50.32
Female	311	49.68
Total	626	100%

Families

Freikeh is home to approximately 15 families. The largest is the Ghassoub family, with around 183 members. Other prominent families include Hashem, Moukarzel, Mallah, Mahboub, Yazbek, Bejjani, Rizk, Abu Dibs, Abi Akar, Abu Khalifeh, Rihani, Daher, Hanna, and Moussa.

Local Administration

Administratively, Freikeh falls under the municipality of Beit Shabab. The village has one mukhtar and an elected council.

Freikeh and Amin Rihani

Freikeh gained both Arab and international recognition as the birthplace of the renowned writer and thinker Amin Rihani (1876 to 1940), one of the leading figures of the Arab literary renaissance and an early advocate of dialogue between East and West. His house still stands in the village and has been converted into a museum and cultural center that preserves his manuscripts and personal belongings while welcoming researchers and visitors.

Freikeh is also associated with the celebrated theater director Mounir Abou Debs, who established a cultural and theatrical space in the village that left a lasting mark on Lebanon’s theater movement.

Economic Life

The village’s principal agricultural products include fruit trees, olive groves, vineyards, and pine trees.

Freikeh is known for its lush natural surroundings and the cultivation of olives, pines, grapevines, and a variety of fruit trees. Wheat was once widely grown in the area, and the village still has a hill known as Al Buweider (“the little Threshing Floor”), a reminder of its agricultural heritage.

THE HABEEL FAMILIES

Although “Habeel” is also the name of a village in the Jbeil district, the family that carries this name is concentrated entirely in Beirut governorate, in the Msaytbeh area. The Habeel family belongs mainly to the Syriac Orthodox community (78.3%), followed by the Evangelical (Protestant) community (13%). Both the family name and the village name trace back to two figures who appear across numerous religious texts, their story centered on the killing of Abel by his brother Cain, an episode regarded in these traditions as the first murder in human history.

Gender	Number	%
Male	7	30.43
Female	16	69.57
Total	23	100%

Sectarian Breakdown

Denomination	Male	Female	Total	%
Syriac Orthodox	6	12	18	78.3
Evangelical (Protestant)	1	2	3	13.0
Sunni	-	1	1	4.3
Latin (Roman Catholic)	-	1	1	4.3
Total	7	16	23	100%

THE AHL FAMILIES

There is no single agreed-upon account of the origin or meaning of the family name, though the name itself, “Ahl,” translates roughly to “family” or “kin.”

The Ahl family comes from North Lebanon governorate, specifically from the Zgharta district, with the largest share of the family registered in the city of Zgharta and two members from the town of Ashash. The family numbers 106 people (over the age of 21), 52 of them male and 54 female. Three of the women have married outside the family’s own denomination, and five have moved outside North Lebanon governorate. The family belongs to the Maronite community.

Gender	Number	%
Male	52	49.06
Female	54	50.94
Total	106	100%

Sectarian Breakdown

Denomination	Male	Female	Total	%
Maronite	52	51	103	97.17
Greek Orthodox	-	1	1	0.94
Sunni	-	1	1	0.94
Shia	-	1	1	0.94
Total	52	54	106	100%



WARAQ

ART ON PAPER FROM LEBANON AND BEYOND

NEW EXHIBITION IN NABU MUSEUM

The exhibition gathers a century of that work, in drawing, watercolor, ink, gouache, pastel, silkscreen, and mixed media. Some sheets were quick studies caught in a single afternoon. Some were kept in studio folders for a lifetime. Some were finished works in their own right, signed and built to last.

The works selected across these galleries cast light on the journey of the page through places and ideas: from the Parisian ateliers where the first Lebanese moderns learned to draw, through the mountains and coast they came home to render, into portraits and interiors, and onward to the liberated Arabic letter and the foundational poems of pre-Islamic Arabia.



NABU MUSEUM

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