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A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK INTO ISRAEL'S 2024 WAR ON LEBANON

ASSASSINATION OF SAYYED HASSAN NASRALLAH


MASS DESTRUCTION, MASS DISPLACEMENT,
AND COUNTLESS CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

Jawad Nadim Adra

"Manawish" of the
Syrian Regime

Israel Violates Ceasefire Agreement
151 Breaches, 26 Killed, 27 Wounded

Timeline of Israel's War on Lebanon
October 8, 2023 – November 27, 2024



Index

197 | October-December 2024

3 Editorial
Letters to a Friend over there (11-12)
By Jawad Nadim Adra

Leader

7 A Comprehensive Look Into Israel's 2024 War On Lebanon
Assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
Mass Destruction, Mass Displacement, and Countless
Ceasefire Violations

8 Israel Violates Ceasefire Agreement
151 Breaches, 26 Killed, 27 Wounded Destruction
of Dozens of Homes, and Settlers in Maroun al-Ras

14 Honoring the Lebanese Army's Fallen Soldiers During
the 2023-2024 Israeli Offensive
47 total army losses, 19 Martyred

18 Hezbollah Confirms More Than 500
"Martyrs on the Path to Jerusalem"

22 Lebanon Loses 12 USD Billion Due to Israeli Offensive

24 2006-2024
Massive Displacement During War Reveals an
Unexpected Solidarity Among the Lebanese
Have minorities' fears truly vanished,
or is this a temporary situation requiring greater state
accountability?

32 Timeline of Israel's War on Lebanon
October 8, 2023 – November 27, 2024

36 United Nations Resolutions 1948-2006
From Resolution 61 to Resolution 1701 – Diplomatic
Solutions to Life and Death Wars in the Region

42 One-year Anniversary of Al-Aqsa
flood
For Israel, it's the Black Sabbath
For the world, it's an open war with
endless possibilities
By Dr. George Yaqoub

49 Impact of Israeli Offensive on Beirut
Airport:
4.1 Million Passengers Lost

Public Sector

50 Lebanon Awaits Its 14th President:
A Battle of Politics, History,
and Foreign Influence

56 Fatherland (2)
Miss Fatima Hussein
By Dr. Hanna Saadah

58 Discover Lebanon
Zandouqa: A Green Spot Being
Ravaged by Quarries

59 Lebanon Families
The Makhoutas: A Majority Greek
Family Orthodox from Koura

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Information International S.A.L
Al-Borj Building, 4th Floor Martyr's Square, Commercial Center
Beirut - Lebanon, P.O.BOX: 11-4353 Beirut, Lebanon
Tel: (961-1) 983008/9 Fax: (961-1) 980630
E-mail: infointl@information-international.com
Web: www.information-international.com
Web: www.monthlymagazine.com



@infointl
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Letters to a Friend over there (11-12)

(11) Hezbollah and Opponents: A Story of Can and Cannot



By Jawad Nadim Adra

The author previously published a series of eight articles titled “Letters to a Friend Over There” in An-Nahar. The series continues in The Monthly.

Dear Friend,

I have received your painful letter. You have reflected our collective pain and suffering. We are the dreamers of a homeland and of a humanity that shelters all the world’s nations. You ask: has Hezbollah made a major mistake by entering this war in solidarity with Gaza? You know that a convincing answer is not that simple. “Perhaps this isn’t the right time, given that bombs are falling on people’s heads,” you say.

Nothing stands in the way of us thinking together, and I wish we could share this discussion with all who are interested and engaged. We must attempt to elevate the debate and avoid insults, gloating, or revenge threats.

It may be too early to open this discussion, but it’s not too early to consider it:

1. Those who believe that resistance is over—whether out of schadenfreude, wishful thinking, or despair—will soon discover that this is not so. There are realistic matters, including “the agreement” to keep Hezbollah away from the northern [Palestinian] borders, halt supply lines through Syria, and grant the Israeli military the cover to fly over our airspace and carry out attacks at will. However, resistance to the ideas of a “Jewish state,” the “Promised Land,” and “Your borders, O Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile” will persist for now and from one generation to the next. Resistance isn’t confined to religion or race. It must express an intellectual renaissance that reminds us of our ancient past and lays the foundation for a bright future. If we do not do so, we will end, as T. S. Eliot put it, *not with a bang but a whimper*.

2. Those who think that the resistance will continue with the same approach it had before the war, even if it wins, although it might not, are mistaken; if it does, it would be committing a major mistake. Recurring political data indicate that changes are taking place internally but are being announced only within very narrow circles. We will discuss this further at a later time.

3. Those who belong to the Arab world nationally and civilizationally and dream of a civil and citizenship-based state, are now more than ever invited to show the civilized face of our region against a racially and religiously discriminatory entity equipped with the latest technology and weapons. They are invited to practice intellectual resistance and independence from two issues: religious fundamentalism and a West that shows us daily that it does not see us as full humans or equals.

4. Around 30 towns and villages in the south were completely destroyed. Reports estimate that around 100,000 homes were destroyed, with approximately 3,961 casualties and 16,520 injuries. Daily horror remains a persistent nightmare, even when the bombing stops. You and I sometimes feel like strangers in our own homeland. Where are human rights? Where is democracy? Where is international legitimacy? Where is the international community? These phrases must be used with caution. Some should be removed from the modern lexicon or exposed for their brutal intentions, which have blinded us, as dust does when it is thrown in our eyes, dazzling by the West.

5. I agree with you on the need to address the relationship with Iran and discuss it with openness, keeping in mind that sovereign states have their own interests and that Lebanon primarily belongs to its regional environment—

The Levant, Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Maghreb—what we used to call the “Arab world.” Do you remember that map? “The Arab World” Why has it disappeared? Why has it been replaced with “MENA”? The answer: To benefit Israel, which remains an openly Jewish state, slapping us and the civilized world in the face, while we erase our Arab world.

6. You wonder why the Lebanese state has not yet declared a state of war. Why hasn't the army been mobilized? The answer is that some think this war is only against Hezbollah, not against Lebanon, seeing Hezbollah as a “state within a state.” I personally wonder why they didn't see in this war on Lebanon an opportunity to declare a united single state. Why didn't they tell Hezbollah and its supporters, “We are with you now, but let us build the state together,” “let us make sure the army is well-equipped and establish a clear defense policy.” Each of us would abandon their “mini-state” in favor of the Lebanese state, provided you do the same. Wasn't this an opportunity?

7. You raise important points in your letter, such as “Hezbollah speaks of injustice, especially that inflicted upon the Palestinian people. That is why Hezbollah entered this war in solidarity with the Palestinians. Those who remain silent in the face of injustice are complicit in the wrongdoing.” You say that Lebanon was the only country that tried to stop the genocide in Gaza when the world was divided between active participants, outspoken critics, and passive onlookers. As such, Lebanon rose to the highest rank on the ladder of virtue and principles, and you wonder why this isn't highlighted. You also question whether starting the war in solidarity with Gaza was the right thing to do, the lack of preparedness for the worst, the high costs Lebanon bears, and the severe breaches within Hezbollah's leadership and communication channels due to its involvement in Lebanese politics and its corrupt intricacies. Then you continue, “Why did Hezbollah remain silent about the injustices inflicted upon the Lebanese people in their land, wealth, schools, health, and future?” These are core issues that needs to be discussed.

8. You remind me of a topic we discussed long ago: “What would happen if Iran decided to sign peace with Israel?” I remember telling you that Sayyed Hassan would not accept it, and that Israel doesn't

want peace except on its terms. You replied that the future might surprise everyone. Will Hezbollah be present to discuss this and other issues when Israel stops its onslaught? Is Hezbollah capable of doing so?

9. As Hassan Nasrallah and leaders from the first, second, and even third ranks have been assassinated, will we witness changes in the approach? Will there be an effort to examine what happened, why it happened, how the breaches occurred, and how significant the sacrifices and mistakes were? Will there be efforts to build a state that reclaims stolen rights and serves as a model of transparency and accountability? While we cannot write the present as history to derive lessons from it, isn't it time to ask what kind of Lebanon we want, agree on it, and work toward it?

10. A quick look at our ancient history, which we have not studied with objectivity, reveals that our region prospered at the age of city-states. However, we were always subject to invasions and occupations and could not put an end to them. Moreover, we did not transition from the city-state to the nation-state. To this day, we have not agreed on diagnosing our internal problems, let alone on solutions. The factors of geography, religions, and natural resources have always been—and still are—attractive to external forces seeking to keep us apart. These same factors have also created barriers within us to building the state.

You also asked if Hezbollah's opponents can discuss relations with Iran. Will they truly embody the slogans: “Freedom, sovereignty, and independence from “East” and “West”? I believe that if they wish to do so, they can.

I would like to share with you this story: A British friend, the wife of a dear friend, wanted to join our discussion about the war on Gaza and Lebanon. She said the following: “Israel today resembles predatory animals, which typically work hard to hunt other animals to satisfy their hunger. When these animals age, they lose their fangs and hunting ability, becoming only killers. They prey on people around them who had been peaceful with them. Israel is that killer animal.”

Question: “Aging and without fangs? Look at what it's doing!” Her answer: “Our governments in the West are its fangs.”

- End of story -

We live today in a world devoid of values and ethics, aimed at subjugation or, at times, physical and always psychological annihilation.

George Orwell's prophecy has come true: "Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish a dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power."

Yours sincerely,

(12) "Manawish"* of the Syrian Regime

Dear Friend,

This is my 12th letter to you. I had written the 11th but hadn't sent it when sudden and significant changes swept through our region, the most notable being the fall of the Assad dynasty. In that letter, I discussed the war on Lebanon and ended it with a quote by George Orwell, predicting that power would be exercised solely for power's sake, through brute force, without any moral or ethical justification. Power becomes its own principle, and this brings to mind Don Corleone's words in *The Godfather*:

"If you hold a gun, and I hold a gun, we can talk about the law. If you hold a knife, and I hold a knife, we can talk about rules. If you come empty-handed, and I come empty-handed, we can talk about reason. But if you have a gun and I only have a knife, then the truth lies in your hands. And if you have a gun and I have nothing, what you hold isn't just a weapon—it's my life. The concepts of laws, rules, and morals only hold meaning when they are based on equality. The harsh truth of this world is that when money speaks, truth goes silent, and when power speaks, even money takes

* "Manawish": during the Otoman Occupation, the word was related to those who support the person in power. it could be derived from the word "Munawesh" in Arabic that means scrimmage.

three steps back. Those who create the rules are often the first to break them. Rules are chains for the weak, tools for the strong. In this world, anything good must be fought for. The masters of the game are competing for resources while only the weak sit idly, waiting to be given a share."

They preach backwardness and betrayal but ignore the elephant in the room: corruption. The word *corruption* comes from the Latin *corruptio*, from the verb *corrumpere*, meaning to mar, bribe, or destroy. In *Lisan al-Arab*, corruption is described as "the opposite of righteousness and the antithesis to integrity."

This highlights the necessity of building institutions that outlast individuals, steering clear of tribalism or sectarianism. Institutions cannot thrive amidst corruption, which is the primary cause of destruction in Syria, Lebanon, and the world. Its effects are especially devastating here due to the absence of institutional foundations.

The West's rhetoric about "human rights," "international legitimacy," and "democracy" has failed repeatedly in our modern history. A realistic and critical reading of the two World Wars tells a different story from what we were taught. What happened in South America, across Asia—especially in Vietnam and Cambodia—perfectly illustrates Orwell's assertions. The so-called "civilized" Western ideals fell in Gaza.

When we speak of Palestine, pre-Mandela South Africa, or the fate of Indigenous peoples in North America, Australia, and New Zealand, we are addressing values—truth, goodness, and beauty—and Socrates' reflections on justice and virtue: "There is only one good: knowledge, and only one evil: ignorance."

The pursuit of knowledge, though fraught with challenges, is enlightening and fulfilling. As we both know, the destination isn't power or wealth, as Don Corleone pointed out, but a deeper understanding of the good. Knowledge tells us that the "Syrian regime" fell long ago—when it failed to bring prosperity and freedom to its people, when it couldn't liberate occupied lands, and when it did what it did in Lebanon. Its men in Lebanon and Syria fell with it even when they were in power.

The regime fell when it withdrew from Lebanon in the manner that it did: forced and dishonorable. It fell

when it failed to stand with its people in 2005 after they stood with it. It fell when it refused to reflect on its past, rectify its mistakes, and atone for its sins. It drowned in the blood of innocents to defend its grip on power and obstructed reforms in Lebanon alongside its allies.

The Ba'ath Party's division and conflicts within and between Syria and Iraq epitomize this collapse. It is quite unfortunate that the military rule of the Assad dynasty was the longest in Syria's history but didn't translate into institution-building or enlightened governance.

We can discuss all this with a clear conscience because we neither sought their favor nor applauded their actions. We see the bigger picture: displaced and marginalized groups, squandered rights, oppression, and corruption. A broken region now ripe for the taking by Israel and Turkey under U.S. patronage.

I won't delve into geopolitics, but consider this: China's Belt and Road Initiative faces challenges with Iran and Syria, Russia's influence wanes, and in our Arab world, the only expanding powers are Israel and Turkey, while Iran recedes.

You ask whether Syria will fragment and if this turmoil will spill into Lebanon. Let's broaden the question:

Will there be a unifying initiative in Syria toward reconciliation and amnesty?

Will Turkey take the lead from Iran and head for Jerusalem?

Will the Kurds achieve autonomy or face suppression?

If the Kurds succeed, what about the Druze, Alawites, and Christians?

When and how will Turkey and Israel clash?

Where is Egypt? Where is Saudi Arabia? Why can't we revive the idea of the Arab world?

Where are the so-called Syrian "freedom fighters" and Sorbonne intellectuals advocating for "international legitimacy"? Assad left Syria, yet they are silent.

Western powers will continue doing as they please because they hold the upper hand. The best-case scenario for Syria may resemble Egypt, while the worst mirrors Libya. Neither offers progress but rather subservience to Israel, Turkey, and U.S. interests.

After a sea of blood, a realistic review of the events leads us to raise numerous questions—not only about the failure and violence perpetrated by the regime but also about the role of external forces in funding and arming the "opposition" and encouraging acts of violence. Any comprehensive and accurate approach must take into account the significance of the Israeli role, its expansion supported by the U.S. and some other Western powers, as well as the importance of oil, gas, and the competition to control this region in the face of Russian and Chinese interests.

The issue was not about rights and freedoms; otherwise, why did those same countries remain silent about the violence perpetrated by Hafez al-Assad and only decide to confront Bashar al-Assad when he began to open up?

Jordan's fate, on the other hand, lies in Israel's hands. Syrian and Arab nationalists must safeguard Jordan and Lebanon as the region's anchors. Those of us dreaming of a homeland-state must continue raising awareness, planting seeds for a genuine renaissance rooted in our land, free from foreign dependence or internal subservience.

My father once told me the story of Abdullah and Darwish, rivals vying for Ottoman favor to govern northern Lebanon. When Abdullah was initially chosen, the masses chanted:

"Manawish Manawish The great Abdullah defeated Darwish!"

But midway, it turned out Darwish had won, and the same crowd shouted:

"Manawish Mashallah Darwish defeated Abdullah!"

We are reminded of Abu Ja'far al-Mansur's words on his state's downfall: *"We entrusted significant matters to small men, minor matters to great men, and distanced friends out of trust in their loyalty while drawing enemies closer out of fear of their enmity. Thus, the enemy remained hostile, and the friend became an enemy."*

This is our story in Lebanon, Syria, and the Arab world.

With my warm regards,

Leader

A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK INTO ISRAEL'S 2024 WAR ON LEBANON

ASSASSINATION OF SAYYED HASSAN NASRALLAH

**MASS DESTRUCTION, MASS DISPLACEMENT,
AND COUNTLESS CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS**



ISRAEL VIOLATES CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

151 BREACHES, 26 KILLED, 27 WOUNDED DESTRUCTION OF DOZENS OF HOMES, AND SETTLERS IN MAROUN AL-RAS

The ceasefire announced between Lebanon and Israel took effect at 4:00 a.m. on Wednesday, November 27, 2024, for a period of 60 days, with various measures intended to turn it into a permanent ceasefire. Israel, however, is yet to comply with the agreement. The settler state has continued carry out acts of aggression on the ground, including shelling, killing, and bulldozing houses.

The number of Israeli breaches reached 151 as of Wednesday, December 18, 2024. These breaches resulted in 26 fatalities, 27 injuries, the destruction of dozens of homes, and significant incursions into several villages and towns which Israel had previously been unable to reach during the military confrontations with Hezbollah.

The latest of these violations involved a group of Israeli settlers who entered the town of Maroun al-Ras and erected a tent, holding up a sign that stated, "Lebanon is ours". The settlers were later escorted away by the IDF. Hezbollah, on the other hand, responded to Israel's violations on December 12, 2024, by hitting the occupied site of Ruwaisat al-Alam with missiles. The militant group said this is a defensive strike that intended to stop violations from the Israeli side.

These violations continue despite the formation of a five-nation committee led by the United States, which is tasked with monitoring and stopping the fighting and as well as implementing Resolution 1701. This committee has held two meetings so far, yet the violations persist—raising the question:

Will this agreement collapse at the end of its sixty-day period, plunging us back into war? Or is Israel merely exploiting the interim period to achieve what it had hoped to accomplish on the battlefield?

Table: Dates and Locations of Israeli Breaches and Their Outcomes from November 27, 2024, to December 19, 2024.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
November 27, 2024	Al-Khiam	The Israeli army opened fire on a number of journalists covering the return of residents, wounding in two people.
November 27, 2024	Kfarkela – Odaisseh	Firing of shells to intimidate citizens who attempted to reach the two towns.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
November 28, 2024	Aita al-Shaab – Maroun al-Ras – Aytaroun	Shelling directed at the outskirts of these towns.
November 29, 2024	Al-Khiam – Markaba – Talousa and between Al-Khiam and Burj al-Molouk	Shelling on the outskirts of these towns.
November 29, 2024	Markaba	Demolition Operation.
November 29, 2024	Al-Khiam	Incursion of four tanks into the western neighborhood of the town.
November 29, 2024	Kfarkela	Demolishing and uprooting of olive trees.
November 29, 2024	Al-Khiam	Gunfire targeting mourners during an attempt to bury a martyred in Chiyah, causing casualties.
November 29, 2024	Aytaroun	Artillery shelling and an advance toward Aytaroun.
November 29, 2024	Kfarkela	Demolition of the sports field.
November 29, 2024	Bint Jbeil	Shooting at civilians, two injuries.
November 30, 2024	Aytaroun	Israeli incursion into the town, setting fire to a minivan, crushing several cars, and erecting earth mounds.
November 30, 2024	Sidon	A drone hovering over the city.
November 30, 2024	Al-Bissariyyeh	An airstrike on the Tibna injuring one person.
November 30, 2024	Bint Jbeil	Bursts of fire from Maroun al-Ras toward Bint Jbeil to prevent residents from returning.
November 30, 2024	Majdzoun	A minivan targeted by a drone, resulting in three people wounded.
November 30, 2024	Beirut and the Southern Suburbs	Drone flights observed for the first time since the ceasefire.
November 30, 2024	Al-Joussiyeh – Al-Hour Crossing	Airstrikes on these border sites damaged the General Security post.
November 30, 2024	Baalbek	Drones spotted over Baalbek.
December 1, 2024	Al-Khiam	Detonation of houses on the eastern outskirts of Al-Khiam.
December 1, 2024	Arnoun	Airstrike.
December 1, 2024	Yaroun	Shelling of residential neighborhoods.
December 1, 2024	Aytaroun	Shelling on the southern outskirts of the town.
December 1, 2024	Ibl al-Saqi	A tank shell fired at the town.
December 1, 2024	Bint Jbeil	Heavy machine-gun fire directed at the town.
December 1, 2024	Maroun al-Ras	Bulldozing of some houses in the town.
December 1, 2024	Al-Khiam	Firing of three shells at Al-Khiam.
December 1, 2024	Marjeyoun Plain	Shelling on the Marjeyoun Plain.
December 2, 2024	Marjeyoun	A drone targeted a motorcycle carrying a State Security sergeant (Mehdi Khreis), causing his death.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
December 2, 2024	Ainata	Airstrike of flare bombs, wounding two people.
December 2, 2024	Bouslaya and Al-Bureij (Outskirts of Jbaa)	Airstrike causing the uprooting of several trees.
December 2, 2024	Maroun al-Ras – Ainata – Bint Jbeil (Triangle)	Airstrike with a guided missile on this triangle, resulting in one person wounded.
December 2, 2024	Naqoura	Gunfire from the Israeli army toward houses in the town.
December 2, 2024	Kfar Milki	Airstrike.
December 2, 2024	Houmine el-Fawqa – Deir ez-Zahrani	Airstrike.
December 2, 2024	Heights of Jabal Safi – Al-Luwayzeh – Mlikh	Airstrikes.
December 2, 2024	Arnoun	Airstrike.
December 2, 2024	Maroun al-Ras	Demolish of the town's mosque.
December 2, 2024	Yaroun – Maroun al-Ras – Hanin	Airstrikes.
December 2, 2024	Bint Jbeil – Ainata – Aytaroun	Machine-gun fire from the Israeli position in Maroun al-Ras.
December 2, 2024	Mays al-Jabal	Israeli incursion around Mays al-Jabal Hospital.
December 2, 2024	Houla	Incursion by an Israeli tanks and bulldozers to block the road between Houla and Wadi al-Salouqi.
December 2, 2024	Yaroun	Machine-gun fire.
December 2, 2024	Beit Lif	Machine-gun fire.
December 2, 2024	Haouch es-Sayyed Ali – Hermel	A drone strike with three missiles, which the IDF claimed targeted Hezbollah infrastructure.
December 3, 2024	Beit Lif	A drone raid on the town.
December 3, 2024	Majdalzoun	Machine-gun fires.
December 3, 2024	Marjeyoun Plain	A shell landed in the area.
December 3, 2024	Triangle of Deir Mimas – Burj al-Molouk – Kfarkela	An Israeli tank advanced about 200 meters toward the triangle from the Lebanese Army checkpoint.
December 3, 2024	Shebaa	A shepherd, Jamal Mohammad Saab, was martyred by a drone strike.
December 3, 2024	Deir Siryan	An airstrike on the outskirts of the town.
December 3, 2024	Habbouch	Machine-gun fire aimed at one of the town's neighborhoods.
December 3, 2024	Hariss	An Israeli airstrike on Hariss caused six fatalities and two injuries.
December 3, 2024	Area between Sijed and Mlikh	An Israeli airstrike.
December 3, 2024	Aita al-Shaab	Thermal balloons and illumination flares launched.
December 4, 2024	Naqoura Port	Shelling of Naqoura port, where the Lebanese Army is stationed.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
December 4, 2024	Marjeyoun Plain	Artillery shelling of the Marjeyoun Plain.
December 4, 2024	Tyre	A drone flew at low altitude.
December 4, 2024	Al-Khiam	Demolition of several houses.
December 4, 2024	Majdalzoun	A vehicle was targeted.
December 4, 2024	Deir Siryan	A Civil Defense medic, Ali Nabaa, was targeted, martyred.
December 4, 2024	Kfarkela	Israeli shelling.
December 4, 2024	Bint Jbeil	Drones spotted flying over the city.
December 5, 2024	Naqoura	A drone exploded near a Civil Defense center.
December 5, 2024	Ain Arab	A strike on the main road.
December 5, 2024	Yaroun	Demolition of houses in the forest area.
December 5, 2024	Shebaa	A bulldozer advanced onto the western road of Shebaa, erecting an earth mound.
December 5, 2024	Zahrani Region	Drone flights in the area.
December 5, 2024	Al-Aarida Crossing – Al-Adra in Rableh – Joussieh Crossing	Shelling of these crossings to prevent passage between Lebanon and Syria.
December 5, 2024	Area between Zawtar and Yuhmor	Shelling of the area.
December 5, 2024	Aytaroun	Shelling toward Aytaroun caused fear among residents.
December 5, 2024	Bint Jbeil	A drone targeted the car of citizen Hassan Hourani, resulting in no injuries.
December 5, 2024	Yaroun	Homes were booby-trapped.
December 5, 2024	Triangle of Al-Mari – Al-Majidiyeh – Ain Arab	Artillery shelling.
December 5, 2024	Ramiyah and Aita al-Shaab	Machine-gun bursts directed at Ramiyah and Aita al-Shaab.
December 5, 2024	Aytaroun	An incursion by bulldozers and tanks, land leveling, and tree cutting.
December 7, 2024	Deir Siryan	A drone strike on a motorcycle resulted in the death of a civilian.
December 7, 2024	Beit Lif	An Israeli airstrike caused five fatalities and five injuries.
December 8, 2024	Al-Khiam	Blowing up several houses near the town's mosque.
December 8, 2024	Dibbin	An airstrike on the town, causing three fatalities.
December 8, 2024	Al-Majidiyeh	Two brothers, Samir and Hani Sanan, were kidnapped while picking olives; later released by Israel.
December 9, 2024	Saf al-Hawa – Bint Jbeil Road	An Israeli airstrike targeted a car, killing the driver and wounding soldiers at a Lebanese Army checkpoint.
December 9, 2024	Zebqin	Artillery shelling damaged a home.
December 9, 2024	Zebqin	A drone strike on a car.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
December 9, 2024	Majdalzoun	Artillery shelling damaged a house and a car.
December 9, 2024	Rmeish	Artillery shelling on the outskirts of the town.
December 9, 2024	Ras al-Naqoura	Artillery shelling of a location reportedly containing a minefield, where Israel claimed four soldiers had fallen.
December 9, 2024	Alma al-Shaab	Illumination flares launched.
December 10, 2024	Maroun al-Ras	Booby-trapping and detonating several houses.
December 10, 2024	Main Road between Aytaroun and Bint Jbeil	Israel confronted a Lebanese Army and UNIFIL patrol trying to reopen the road closed by the Israeli Army.
December 10, 2024	Bint Jbeil	A drone strike.
December 10, 2024	Sarda and Al-Omara	An Israeli tank column entered the area after withdrawing from Al-Khiam.
December 10, 2024	Shiheen and Al-Jeeben	Shells landed on the outskirts of both towns.
December 10, 2024	Shaqra and Doubieh	Machine-gun fire directed at the town.
December 10, 2024	Taloussa – Bani Hayyan	Patrols with gunfire.
December 10, 2024	Mays al-Jabal	Several houses were blown up.
December 10, 2024	Beirut and its Southern Suburbs	Drone flights over Beirut and its southern suburbs.
December 11, 2024	Ainata (Khallet al-Dirdar)	A home was targeted, resulting in one fatality and one injury.
December 11, 2024	Road between Beit Lif and Sarbin	A missile targeted a van, causing the death of Hamza Baddah.
December 11, 2024	Naqoura (Hay al-Shoumer)	A drone detonated a house.
December 11, 2024	Area between Majdalzoun and Shiheen	A drone strike targeted the area.
December 11, 2024	Bint Jbeil (Hay al-Aweiny)	A guided missile strike caused three fatalities.
December 11, 2024	Bint Jbeil	Machine-gun fire from Maroun al-Ras toward Bint Jbeil.
December 11, 2024	Burj al-Molouk	15 Israeli soldiers raided the home of the Jouki family and expelled the residents.
December 12, 2024	Al-Khiam (Town Square)	A drone strike caused the death of Mustafa Awadeh and wounded another person.
December 12, 2024	Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Drone flights observed.
December 12, 2024	Rashaya, West Bekaa, and Zahrani	Warplane flights observed.
December 12, 2024	Area between Shamaa and Tayr Harfa	Detonation of several houses.
December 12, 2024	Mount Hermon	An Israeli bulldozer worked on opening and widening a road to link the Lebanese side with the Syrian side.
December 13, 2024	Al-Bissariyyeh (Tibna area)	An airstrike.
December 13, 2024	Az-Zrariyeh	An airstrike.
December 13, 2024	Beirut and the Southern Suburbs	Drone flights.
December 13, 2024	Tyre	Drone flights.

Date of Israeli Violation	Targeted Location	Nature and Results of the Violation
December 14, 2024	Majidiyeh Plain	A Lebanese Army soldier (Abdo Mohammad Abdel Aal) was arrested while helping his brother herd sheep; released after two days.
December 14, 2024	Khardali Road	An Israeli drone targeted a car, killing Mohsen Sharafeddine (from Nabatieh) on his way to work in Jdeidet Marjeyoun.
December 14, 2024	Area between Tayr Harfa and Al-Jebeen	Several houses were destroyed.
December 14, 2024	Area between Maroun al-Ras and Yaroun	Demolition of several houses.
December 14, 2024	Area between Mays al-Jabal and Kfarkela	Patrols with gunfire.
December 15, 2024	Beirut and the Southern Suburbs	Drone flights.
December 15, 2024	Area from Al-Manarah toward Mays al-Jabal	Patrols with gunfire.
December 16, 2024	Area between Al-Musaylih and Al-Najariya	A drone strike resulted in three wounded.
December 16, 2024	Al-Bissariyyeh	An airstrike on the outskirts of the town.
December 16, 2024	Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Drone flights.
December 16, 2024	Shebaa	Israeli shelling on the outskirts of Shebaa.
December 16, 2024	Naqoura	Demolition of several houses.
December 16, 2024	Markaba	Demolition of several houses.
December 17, 2024	Majdalzoun	A minivan targeted by a drone, resulting in two wounded.
December 17, 2024	Naqoura	Demolition of houses and side roads.
December 17, 2024	Outskirts of Kfar Shuba and Hilta	Artillery shelling on the outskirts of these towns.
December 17, 2024	Kfarkela	Demolition of houses in the town.
December 17, 2024	Yaroun	Demolition of houses in the town.
December 17, 2024	Area between Zawtar and Deir Siryan	Explosions in this area.
December 18, 2024	Maroun al-Ras	Israeli civilians from an extremist group entered the town, erected a tent with a sign that said, "Lebanon is ours," then left under IDF orders.
December 18, 2024	Naqoura	Bulldozing houses near the UNIFIL headquarters.
December 18, 2024	Maroun al-Ras	Destruction of one house and the town's mosque.
December 18, 2024	Beirut and the Southern Suburbs	Drone flights.
December 18, 2024	Bani Hayyan	Grenades thrown at houses, bulldozing of a house, and tearing down the mosque's wall.
December 18, 2024	Area between Shiheen and Yaroun	Demolitions

Source: Compiled by Information International based on reports from various media outlets regarding Israeli violations of the ceasefire between November 27 and December 18, 2024.

HONORING THE LEBANESE ARMY'S FALLEN SOLDIERS DURING THE 2023-2024 ISRAELI OFFENSIVE

47 TOTAL ARMY LOSSES, 19 MARTYRED

The Israeli offensive on Lebanon, which lasted from October 8, 2023, to November 27, 2024, resulted in over 4,500 deaths and more than 16,500 injuries across all Lebanese regions, especially in the south.

Among the victims were 47 soldiers of the Lebanese Army, 19 of whom lost their lives while on duty, while 28 were killed in their homes or while traveling on civilian roads.

These fallen soldiers hailed from all regions and sects, reflecting the national composition of the Lebanese Army, which was established under General Emile Lahoud after the army's reorganization, the integration of militias, the unification of national doctrine, and the identification of Israel as the enemy.

It is noted that more than half of the 19 soldiers killed in action (10 soldiers) were married and collectively had 27 children (see Table 1).

The fallen soldiers are distributed by age group as follows:

- 9 soldiers aged 20–30 years.
- 5 soldiers aged 31–40 years.
- 5 soldiers aged 41–50 years.

Table 1: The 19 Lebanese Army soldiers killed in action between October 8, 2023, and November 27, 2024.

#	Name	Date of death	Place of death	Place and Date of Birth	Joined the Army	Marital Status
1	Sergeant Abdul Karim Al-Miqdad	5-December-2023	Army center in Odaisseh shelled	Lassa - Jbeil 7-May-1996	2018	Married, no children
2	Soldier Youssef Hassan Abdel Aal	30-September-2024	Killed while riding his motorcycle at Al-Wazzani checkpoint	Kfarshouba - Hasbaya, 6-October-1999	Extended service from 28-June-2017	Single
3	Corporal Ali Hassan Qassem	3-October-2024	Killed at army center	Sarafand, 1-October-1996	2021	Single
4	Sergeant First Class Maher Ahmad Owaik	3-October-2024	Killed while evacuating injured persons	Bourj Al-Yahoudieh, 7-August-1979	2008	Married, three children

#	Name	Date of death	Place of death	Place and Date of Birth	Joined the Army	Marital Status
5	First Soldier Marwan Yaqoub	11-October-2024	Army center in Kafra targeted	Barachit - Bint Jbeil, 15-November-1988	Extended service from 31-January-2019	Single
6	Corporal Jaafar Sheet	11-October-2024	Army center in Kafra targeted	Kuwait, 28-June-1976	Extended service from 28-August-2006	Married, four children
7	Corporal First Class Mohamed Abdul Hadi Hussein	17-November-2024	Army center in Al-Mari targeted	Meshmesh - Akkar, 11-May-1977	2009	Married, three children
8	Master Sergeant Tarek Aql Sobhie	20-October-2024	Military vehicle targeted in Ain Ebel	Dabbabiyeh - Akkar, 7-December-1985	2008	Married, three children
9	Sergeant Ahmed Haidar Haidar	20-October-2024	Military vehicle targeted in Ain Ebel	Ayat - Akkar, 1-January-1994	2019 (specialist)	Married, three children
10	First Soldier Jaafar Mohammad Jaafar	20-October-2024	Military vehicle targeted in Ain Ebel	Al-Kouakh - Hermel, 1-February-1990	2015	Married, four children
11	Corporal Mohammad Hussein Nazzal	24-October-2024	Targeted while evacuating injured persons in Yater outskirts	Sareefa - Tyre, 20-September-1994	2018	Single
12	Major Mohammad Sami Farhat	24-October-2024	Targeted while evacuating injured persons in Yater outskirts	Deir Qanoun Ras Al-Ain - Tyre, 14-September-1988	2006	Single
13	Corporal Moussa Youssef Mhanna	24-October-2024	Targeted while evacuating injured persons in Yater outskirts	Saida, 17-November-1997	2021	Single
14	Master Sergeant Bassam Ahmad Al-Zakhouri	17-November-2024	Army center in Al-Mari targeted	Batramaz Minieh - Dinnieh, 1-July-1987	2008	Married, two children
15	Master Sergeant Ayman Abdel Latif Rahhal	19-November-2024	Army center in Sarafand targeted	Tyre, 1-April-1982	2008	Married, two children
16	Sergeant Adam Jerji Aoun	19-November-2024	Army center in Sarafand targeted	Ghaziyeh, 24-November-1997	2015	Single
17	Sergeant Ali Mohammad Harb	19-November-2024	Army center in Sarafand targeted	Zawtar Al-Sharqiya, 4-August-1994	2018	Single
18	Soldier Abbas Ali Nahleh	20-November-2024	Army vehicle targeted on Borj Al-Muluk - Qlaiya road	Jdeidet Marjeyoun, 29-October-1998	2022	Single
19	Master Sergeant Diab Mohammad Jaafar	24-November-2024	Army center in Al-Amriyah near Naqoura shelled	Beit Younes - Akkar, 25-January-1982	2006	Married, three children

Source: Directorate of Orientation in the Lebanese Army-Army Magazine.

Off-Duty Deaths

As for the 28 Lebanese Army soldiers who lost their lives off-duty when they were at home or driving on civilian roads, according to their dates of death, it is observed that the majority (19 soldiers) were married and collectively had 35 children.

The fallen soldiers are distributed by age group as follows:

- 1 soldier aged 19 years.
- 11 soldiers aged 20–30 years.
- 12 soldiers aged 31–40 years.
- 4 soldiers aged 41–50 years.

Table 2: The 28 Lebanese Army soldiers who lost their lives at home or on civilian roads, from October 8, 2023, to November 27, 2024.

No.	Name	Date of Death	Place and Date of Birth	Service Details	Marital Status
1	Sergeant Ali Skayki	23-September-2024	Ain Baal - Tyre, 05-June-1989	Service extended as of 9-11-2007	Married with 3 children
2	Sergeant Ahmad Mustafa	23-September-2024	Boudai - Baalbek, 06-June-1993	Service extended as of 1-9-2006	Married, no children
3	First Sergeant Mahmoud Hoteit	23-September-2024	Douair - Nabatieh, 06-April-1983	2007	Married with 2 children
4	Sergeant Jamal Jaber	23-September-2024	Yohmor - Nabatieh, 10-December-1990	2018	Married with 2 children
5	Corporal Ali Hussein	23-September-2024	Al-Khraybeh - Baalbek, 23-October-1991	Service extended as of 1-7-2014	Married with 2 children
6	Corporal Firas Farhat	23-September-2024	Nabatieh, 10-August-1997	Service extended as of 10-8-2015	Married, no children
7	Sergeant Mahdi Hashem	24-September-2024	Annamiriyeh - Nabatieh, 24-October-1994	Service extended as of 16-12-2013	Married with 1 child
8	First Sergeant Ali Diab	24-September-2024	Al-Khoder - Baalbek, 01- July-1988	2008	Married with 3 children
9	Sergeant Ismail Samra	28-September-2024	Tyre, 05-December-1983	Service extended as of 15-10-2012	Married with 2 children
10	Corporal Hassan Haj Hassan	28-September-2024	Shmustar - Baalbek, 01-February-1995	Service extended as of 20-6-2016	Single
11	First Sergeant Qassem Nasreddine	29-September-2024	Al-Kwakh - Hermel, 02-December-1992	Service extended as of 24-1-2012	Married with 1 child
12	Sergeant Hussein Haqq	30-September-2024	Al-Kwakh - Hermel, 16-February-1987	Service extended as of 2-7-2009	Married with 2 children
13	Private Mohamed Madi	02-October-2024	Mashghara - West Bekaa, 12-February-1992	Service extended as of 27-7-2018	Single
14	Sergeant Ali Hijazi	03-October-2024	Burj Al-Barajneh - Baab- da, 20-July-1987	Service extended as of 13-11-2006	Married with 2 children

No.	Name	Date of Death	Place and Date of Birth	Service Details	Marital Status
15	First Sergeant Hikmat Faqih	07-October-2024	Srifa - Tyre, 25-June-1981	2000	Married with 3 children
16	Sergeant Hussein Shami	11-October-2024	Al-Baysariyeh - Sidon, 25-March-1988	2008	Single
17	First Sergeant Bilal Arrar	20-October-2024	Shmustar - Baalbek, 20-February-1984	2008	Married with 2 children
18	Corporal Hussein Kanaan	28-October-2024	Boudai - Baalbek, 16-November-1997	2019	Married with 2 children
19	Corporal Wi'am Al-Suwaid	31-October-2024	Al-Bustan - Tyre, 12-January-1990	2014	Single
20	Recruit Mohamed Amhaz	01-November-2024	Burj Al-Barajneh - Baabda, 30-September-2002	Service extended as of 1-7-2024	Single
21	Recruit Ibrahim Meshayek	01-November-2024	Beit Meshayek - Baalbek, 29-September-2005	Service extended as of 1-1-2024	Single
22	Sergeant Haidar Samaha	06-November-2024	Shmustar - Baalbek, 07-March-1995	2016	Married, no children
23	Recruit Ali Al-Qurssifi	10-November-2024	Maallaqah Al-Shimali - Zahle, 01-December-2001	Service extended as of 1-7-2023	Single
24	First Sergeant Ali Abdel Hussein	10-November-2024	Shmustar - Baalbek, 01-July-1987	2007	Married with 5 children
25	Recruit Ali Al-Sablaney	21-November-2024	Falawi - Baalbek, 05-August-2001	Service extended as of 1-2-2023	Single
26	First Sergeant Antoine Keyal	25-November-2024	Tyre, 22-August-1992	2009	Single
27	First Sergeant Khodr Mahmoud	26-November-2024	Al-Muhammara - Akkar, 27-February-1980	2010	Married with 1 child
28	Corporal Hussein Tlais	26-November-2024	Maallaqah - Zahle, 16-August-1994	2015	Married with 2 children

Source: Directorate of Orientation in the Lebanese Army - Army Magazine.



HEZBOLLAH CONFIRMS MORE THAN 500 “MARTYRS ON THE PATH TO JERUSALEM”

On October 8, 2023, the day after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in Gaza, Hezbollah launched what it described as a “support front” in solidarity with the Palestinian resistance movement. On the same day, Israel began its war on Lebanon.

In this war, hundreds of Hezbollah fighters have fallen; Hezbollah calls them “Martyrs on the Path to Jerusalem.” The official death toll reached 505 according to obituary announcements up until September 27, 2024, when Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated. Following his death, the party ceased announcing the names of fallen fighters, but later held ceremonies for several leaders, including Sheikh Nabil Qaouq, Hashem Safieddine, and Mohammed Afif, the head of Hezbollah's media relations.

Estimates now indicate that the total number of Hezbollah fallen fighters has exceeded 2,000, many of whom fell in ground confrontations with the Israeli army along the border region, though no detailed information is available about these casualties.

Distribution according to age groups and regions:

Hezbollah's 505 fallen fighters were distributed across 195 Lebanese cities, towns, and villages from October 8, 2023, to September 27, 2024.

It appears that the largest number of fallen fighters came from the town of Aytaroun (14), followed by the towns of Kfar Kila, Houla, and Aita Al-Shaab, each with 13 fallen fighters.

Table: Distribution of Hezbollah fallen fighters across Lebanese cities, towns, and villages from October 8, 2023, to September 27, 2024.

Town	Number of Fallen Fighters	Town	Number of Fallen Fighters	Town	Number of Fallen Fighters
Aytaroun	14	Nabatiyeh	8	Kfar tibnit	5
Kfar Kila	13	Shaqra	7	Kounine	4
Houla	13	Tyre	7	Brital	4
Aita Al-Shaab	13	Beit Lif	7	Halousiyeh	4
Mais Al-Jabal	12	Beirut	7	Al-Majadel	4
Bint Jbeil	12	Adchit	7	Tair filsaya	4
Markaba	11	Sohmor	7	Al-Sawana	4
Blida	10	Al-Khiam	6	Al-Shahabiya	4
Al-Taybeh	9	Ainata	6	Sal'a	4
Majdal Silm	9	Jouaya	5	Baalbek	4
Al-Hermel	8	Naqoura	5	Hariss	4
Khirbet Silm	8	Haddatha	5	Ghobeiry	4

Town	Number of Fallen Fighters
Deir Qanoun Al-Nahr	4
Adloun	4
Meshghara	3
Shhour	3
Taloussa	3
Al-Adaysa	3
Al-Khoder	3
Al-Qlayleh	3
Mahrouneh	3
Qana	3
Byaroun	3
Debaal	3
Aita Al-Jabal	3
Shebaa	3
Al-Nabi Sheet	3
Harouf	3
Tura	3
Al-Jbin	3
Hlabta	3
Ram	3

Town	Number of Fallen Fighters
Al-Shaiteyeh	3
Aytit	3
Al-Tira	3
Borj Al-Barajneh	3
Abrikha	2
Kfar Melki	3
Halta	3
Deir Amess	2
Al-Nasriyeh	2
Al-Jumeijmeh	2
Haret Hreik	2
Hay Al-Fikani ((Zahle	2
Qasr Naba	2
Ansar	2
Maroun Al-Ras	2
Rshaf	2
Beit Yahoun	2
Hrabta	2
Deir Al-Zahrani	2
Deir Qanoun Ras Al-Ain	2

Town	Number of Fallen Fighters
Tebnine	2
Al-Mansouri	2
Deir Siryan	2
Jibsheets	2
Ali Al-Nahri	2
Seir Al-Gharbiyeh	2
Tair Harfa	2
Shaata	2
Yater	2
Mlikh	2
Meidoun	2
Maaroub	2
Ansar - Baalbek	2
Tammnin Al-Fawqa	2
Tayr Debba	2
Bednayel	2
Al-Burj Al-Shamali	2
Rubb el tletin	2
Touline	2
Zibdeen	2

List of Towns with One Fallen Fighter Each:

Dibbine, Al-Najariyah, Yahfoufa, Al-Halaniyeh, Younine, Deir Kifa, Jlela, Meifadoun, Al-Nabi Othman, Hanine, Al-Qasr, Al-Khreibeh, Lebbaya, Ham, Bouday, Al-Bazzaliyyeh, Jbaa, Wadi Umm Ali Baalbek, Zebqin, Hezzine, Ain Baal, Aaramta, Al-Qusaybah, Borj Alaway, Qarha, Al-Kark, Zahleh, Alaway, Teffahta, Al-Bazourieh, Mhaybib, Kfar Roumman, Kfarshouba, Siddiqeen, Rishknanay, Al-Labweh, Miqraq, Gaza, Iyat, Al-Qomatiyyeh, Hourtaala, Al-Ghassaniyyeh, Al-Sarafand, Houmin El Tahta, Blat, Rza, Al-Ayshiyah, Sribbin, Kafra, Majdal Zoun, Al-Samaaiyah, Ansariyyah, Yohmur, Yarin, Jarmaish (near the Syrian border in Bekaa), Taraya, Al-Dalafeh, Saida, Al-Saksekeya, Douair, Kfar Filah, Barish, Kfar Seer, Al-Sharbeen, Al-Hafeer, Ankoun, Ain Qana, Al-Abbasiyyah, Al-Ghaziyyah, Houmin El Tahta Zawtar Al-Sharqiyyah, Al-Nabateh Al-Fouka, Al-Maalaqa, Arkay, Al-Sultaneyah, Al-Louaizeh, Toul, Bayt Shama, Al-Muaisrah, Jbal Al-Botm, Baraachit, Baflay, Tarbeekha, Al-Ghandouriyyah, Borj Rahal, Al-Khwakh, Qaaqaiyat Al-Jisr, Mazraat Bayt Msheik, Niha, Bani Hayyan, Al-Jiyyeh, Eba, Safad Al-Batikh, Hadath Baalbek, Falawiyyah, Ain Biswar, Kfardan, and Kouthariyeh Al-Rezz.

2- Distribution by Age Groups:

More than half of the 505 fallen fighters (259) were under 35 years old. The distribution by age groups is as follows:

- **Under 20 years old:** 6 fallen fighters, representing 1.1% of the total.
- **Between 20 and 25 years old:** 47 fallen fighters, representing 9.3% of the total.
- **Between 26 and 30 years old:** 98 fallen fighters, representing 19.4% of the total.
- **Between 31 and 35 years old:** 108 fallen fighters, representing 21.4% of the total.
- **Between 36 and 40 years old:** 95 fallen fighters, representing 18.8% of the total.
- **Between 41 and 45 years old:** 46 fallen fighters, representing 9.1% of the total.
- **Over 45 years old:** 105 fallen fighters, representing 20.8% of the total.

Hezbollah's "Martyrs on the Path to Jerusalem"

From October 8, 2023 to September 27, 2024 (inclusive)

505


Fallen Fighters

Based on official obituary announcements, which stopped being released on September 27, 2024

The fallen fighters were distributed across 195 Cities, Towns, and Villages



Distribution by Age Groups



The Largest Number of Hezbollah Members Were Killed in the Following Periods

From September 16 to 22, 2024: **63 killed**

From October 22 to 28, 2023: **28 killed**

3- Distribution of Fallen Fighters by Weekly Dates:

The largest number of Hezbollah fallen fighters fell between September 16 and September 22, 2024, with 63 fallen fighters, due to sea bombardments. In the last three weeks of October 22 to October 28, 2023, 28 fallen fighters fell. The number then reached 20 fallen fighters in the period from March 13 to March 20, 2024, while the lowest number recorded was 1 fallen fighter in the last week of April 2024.

- October 8-14, 2023: 4 fallen fighters
- October 15-21, 2023: 15 fallen fighters
- October 22-28, 2023: 28 fallen fighters
- October 29 - November 4, 2023: 10 fallen fighters
- November 5-11, 2023: 13 fallen fighters
- November 12-18, 2023: 6 fallen fighters
- November 19-25, 2023: 9 fallen fighters
- November 26 - December 2, 2023: 3 fallen fighters
- December 3-9, 2023: 9 fallen fighters
- December 10-16, 2023: 12 fallen fighters
- December 17-23, 2023: 17 fallen fighters
- December 24-30, 2023: 11 fallen fighters
- December 31, 2023 - January 6, 2024: 13 fallen fighters
- January 7-13, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- January 14-20, 2024: 2 fallen fighters
- January 21-27, 2024: 8 fallen fighters
- January 28 - February 3, 2024: 6 fallen fighters
- February 4-10, 2024: 9 fallen fighters
- February 11-17, 2024: 20 fallen fighters
- February 18-24, 2024: 4 fallen fighters
- February 25 - March 5, 2024: 18 fallen fighters
- March 6-12, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- March 13-20, 2024: No fallen fighters
- March 21-28, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- March 29 - April 5, 2024: 14 fallen fighters
- April 6-12, 2024: 3 fallen fighters
- April 13-19, 2024: 8 fallen fighters
- April 20-26, 2024: 5 fallen fighters
- April 27 - May 3, 2024: 3 fallen fighters
- May 4-10, 2024: 7 fallen fighters
- May 11-17, 2024: 5 fallen fighters
- May 18-24, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- May 25-31, 2024: 12 fallen fighters
- June 1-7, 2024: 6 fallen fighters
- June 8-14, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- June 15-21, 2024: 6 fallen fighters
- June 22-24, 2024: 4 fallen fighters
- June 29 - July 8, 2024: 11 fallen fighters
- July 9-15, 2024: 5 fallen fighters
- July 16-22, 2024: 7 fallen fighters
- July 23-29, 2024: 9 fallen fighters
- July 30 - August 5, 2024: 8 fallen fighters
- August 6-12, 2024: 13 fallen fighters
- August 13-19, 2024: 9 fallen fighters
- August 20-26, 2024: 16 fallen fighters
- August 27 - September 2, 2024: 2 fallen fighters
- September 3-8, 2024: 1 fallen fighter
- September 9-15, 2024: 7 fallen fighters
- September 16-22, 2024: 63 fallen fighters
- September 23-27, 2024: 8 fallen fighters

LEBANON LOSES 12 USD BILLION DUE TO ISRAELI OFFENSIVE

It is still early to talk about the direct and indirect material and economic losses and damages resulting from the Israeli offensive on Lebanon because, especially since September 17, 2024, no thorough field surveys have been conducted in the affected areas—whether in the South, Beirut's southern suburbs, the Bekaa, or Beirut itself—to accurately determine the extent of the damage.

Consequently, the current figures for losses are preliminary estimated. They were mainly determined for housing and commercial, industrial, and agricultural institutions based on reports appearing in the media about damage following every Israeli airstrike and assault.

The direct and indirect damages and losses have reached about USD 12 billion (the World Bank estimates USD 8.5 billion by the end of October 2024, including USD 5 billion in economic losses and USD 3.4 billion in material losses). This is more than double the losses in the 2006 Lebanon war, estimated at USD 5.3 billion.

These losses are divided into two phases:

- **Phase One:** Spanning from October 8, 2023, to September 16, 2024, with a lower cost of approximately USD 3 billion.
- **Phase Two:** The worst and most difficult phase, spanning from September 17, 2024, until November 27, 2024, the date the ceasefire took effect. Losses in this period reached USD 9 billion.

Displacement Figures

- **Number of displaced people in shelters:** 189,174 individuals, making up 44,000 families.
- **Number of refugees to Syria:** 379,883 Syrians and 213,141 Lebanese = 593,029 individuals.
- **Number of those who left for other countries:** 150,000, distributed among Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, European countries, the United States, and Canada.
- **Number of displaced to Iraq:** 28,000, though some estimate as many as 150,000, citing “transfer” (i.e., relocating Shiites to Iraq indefinitely).

State Revenues and Other Losses

The state's loss is considerable due to declining revenues, some of which might be collected once the war ends, while others—such as airport departure fees—are inevitably lost.

Losses for September and October 2024 amounted to USD 11.5 million for the state.

Losses are estimated to reach about USD 40 million in November, and around 250,000 people have lost their jobs and livelihoods, with the number expected to rise.

- Israel has so far committed 42 massacres.
- 30 families have been entirely wiped out—husband, wife, and children—leaving only a single survivor in each case.

Table: Comparison of the Details of These Losses in 2006 and From October 8, 2023, to November 27, 2024 (in USD).

Human, Material, and Economic Damages/Losses	July 2006 War	Phase One (Oct 8, 2023 – Sep 16, 2024)	Phase Two (Sep 17, 2024 – Nov 27, 2024)	Total Cost of War Until Nov 27, 2024
Infrastructure	900 million	50 million	550 million	600 million
Housing: - Total Destruction (75,000) - Partial Destruction (25,000) - Minor Damage (5,000)	2.2 billion	- Total destruction of 4,040 units: 303 million - Partial destruction of 2,730 units: 68 million - Minor damage to 7,500 units: 38 million Total: 409 million	- Total destruction of 44,000 units: 3.3 billion - Partial destruction of 31,000 units: 775 million - Minor damage to 141,000 units: 705 million Total: 4.78 billion	- Total destruction: 48,000 - Partial destruction: 34,000 - Minor damage: 149,000 Total: ~231,000 housing units Value: 5.189 billion
Commercial, Industrial, and Tourism Firms	470 million	120 million	400 million	520 million
Agriculture, Fires, and Environment	450 million	250 million	670 million	920 million
Debris Removal and Other Unforeseen/Contingent Costs	50 million	70 million	360 million	430 million
Indirect Losses Due to Economic Decline	1.2 billion	6 million per day = 10% of the estimated GDP (22 billion). 343 days x 6 million = 2.06 billion	30 million per day = 50% of the estimated GDP (22 billion). 72 days x 30 million = 2.16 billion	4.22 billion
Total	5.3 billion	2.96 billion	8.234 billion	11.87 billion
Casualties / Injuries	900 / 4,000	667 / 1,400	3,156 / 14,459	4,047 / 16,368 (actual figures may be higher, as many remain under rubble or were taken captive)
IDPs Within Lebanon	600,000	95,000	800,000	895,000

Source: Information International, based on data collected from the media.

2006–2024 MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT DURING WAR REVEALS UNEXPECTED SOLIDARITY AMONG THE LEBANESE

HAVE MINORITIES' FEARS TRULY VANISHED, OR IS THIS A TEMPORARY SITUATION REQUIRING GREATER STATE ACCOUNTABILITY?

From the very start of the Israeli offensive against Lebanon—after Hezbollah announced a support front for Gaza following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, launched by Hamas and other Palestinian Islamic Jihad groups on October 7, 2023—the fighting remained confined to the border areas with occupied Palestine. Initially, displacement from these areas was relatively small (8,080 displaced people by October 15, 2023), but the numbers continued to climb. Soon, displacement went beyond southern villages, towns, and cities to include Beirut's southern suburbs, predominantly Shiite parts of the Bekaa region, as well as Baalbek and Hermel. By October 24, 2024 (one year and nine days later), a total of 833,391 people had been displaced within Lebanon, with another 433,250 heading to Syria, amounting to 1,266,641 displaced persons in total, according to an excerpt from a comprehensive study by former Defense Minister, Yacoub Riyad Al-Sarraf.



Did This Displacement Trigger an Internal Crisis in Lebanon as Some Predicted?

Shortly after the events of October 7 and 8, Information International conducted an opinion poll to gauge the views of Lebanese citizens from all sects (a representative sample of 1,000 respondents) regarding what happened in Gaza (occupied Palestine) and in southern Lebanon once the support front opened. The results were somewhat surprising in a country where sectarian tensions run deep, intensified by a long-fostered Sunni–Shiite divide and the older split dating back to 2005—after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri—between the March 8 and March 14 blocs.

Over time, some figures from both blocs shifted allegiances, yet the Sunni–Shiite rift only deepened with the outbreak of the Syrian conflict and Hezbollah’s involvement in supporting the Syrian state. The study conducted by Information International revealed that a very small percentage of people – about 1%, mostly Christians, – favored neutrality vis-à-vis current issues in the region. This stands in sharp contrast with previous declarations by some Christian circles—mainly the Maronite Patriarchate—that supported Lebanese neutrality. Meanwhile, the apparent Sunni–Shiite split was mirrored by a Christian divide as well—one segment supporting the March 8 bloc (which media and political figures often refer to as the “resistance axis”), while another segment sided with the March 14 bloc, predominantly Sunni and aligned with the Future Movement.

The First Problem: Crisis Profiteers

When displacement began last year, in October 2023, the issue of rising apartment rents suddenly took center stage, with rates skyrocketing to levels wholly out of step with what was typical—clearly in anticipation of new arrivals by those seeking to profit from crises.

With no oversight and a laissez-faire market dictating prices, public outcry erupted against this sudden spike in rents. This prompted Information International, through its YouTube channel, to raise the alarm. Its founder, Jawad Adra—who presented the study and some of its findings—stated, “While conducting fieldwork, we discovered that many property owners have dramatically increased rental prices, taking advantage of certain incidents in the South instead of making their homes available to those in need.”

He went on to stress that this and other basic necessities (bread, water, gasoline, diesel, etc.) must be highlighted, and that the Lebanese government must take measures to prevent people from profiting off a crisis situation. “We don’t want some individuals seizing the opportunity for personal gain...”

Following this, there were calls for the government to declare a state of emergency, organize the displacement process, and shoulder the associated costs, as this would be the obvious responsibility of any government. Failure to do so suggests not just a dereliction of duty but a possible setup for friction between displaced and non-displaced communities that could ignite internal conflict.

However, the government’s continued disregard of these matters—coupled with the day-by-day and month-by-month surge in displacement—eventually led to a sharp escalation in September and October 2024. Some journalists, politicians (both party-affiliated and independent), academics, and cultural figures warned that the growing numbers of displaced people could spark an internal strife, potentially even a civil war. This perspective aligned with Israeli media and political narratives, as well as its military actions. The Israeli forces specifically targeted predominantly Christian areas in Lebanon, and although they did occasionally strike areas with other religious majorities, they particularly targeted Shiite refugees—fueling a momentary surge of fear. These areas had traditionally been considered “safe zones” due to the absence of Hezbollah or Shiite populations, and now they were under fire simply for opening their doors to the displaced.

Between Aspirations and Reality

It appeared that the desired outcome for a small minority was indeed for this internal strife to erupt. One needn’t be a master of nuance to see or deduce this, given the various rumors (such as claims that displaced families were carrying rockets into shelter centers) and the Israeli offensive targeting specific areas coupled with scare tactics designed to trigger a mass exodus from one region to another.

Yet what actually happened exceeded the hopes of this tiny minority—and there are numerous reasons for that. Many Lebanese rushed to shelter displaced families through individual initiatives or via party-based efforts.

Even the possibility of displacement caused rents in supposedly safer areas to spike. But this initial wave mostly involved Shiite-to-Shiite displacement: people went to the city of Tyre, where some moved into free apartments or paid rent, and some settled in public schools. A small number headed to the southern suburbs of Beirut to stay with relatives, while even fewer went to Baalbek and Hermel, also seeking refuge with family or acquaintances.

Some wealthier residents of the South preemptively rented apartments without moving in, as a precaution. Displacement did give rise to a few problems—considered exceptional and unrepresentative—such as a displaced renter arriving at an apartment only to be told by the landlord that someone else had offered more money, and so the unit was re-rented without informing the original renter. In other instances, a landlord would wait until the displaced family, who had risked up to 12 hours on the road, finally arrived, then suddenly demand a higher rent before handing over the keys.

On the night of the mass exodus from the South—Monday, September 21, 2024—as the Israeli offensive greatly intensified in that region, the number of displaced individuals jumped to 99,620 between September 19 and 26, 2024, averaging 14,231 per day (see Table 1). During that period, a few exceptional incidents occurred, but they remained anomalies rather than widespread patterns.

The usual crisis profiteers stayed true to form. However, one unanticipated factor was the rush of everyday people to open their homes and welcome displaced families, regardless of sect or region, from Akkar to Tripoli, Koura, Beirut, Metn, Chouf, Aley, and Souk El Gharb. So the “desired outcome” of triggering internal strife never materialized.

This spirit of solidarity among Lebanese went far beyond what some sociologists and theorists—who focus on themes like “minorities’ fears”—had predicted.

Sectarian Division and Severed Connections

When considering Israel’s objectives during its offensive against Lebanon, one could see it as an attempt at sectarian partitioning: the areas targeted were the South, the Suburb, and the Bekaa, all predominantly Shiite regions, as well as any other area—regardless of its sectarian composition—that opened its doors to displaced families. This adds to an already volatile situation made worse by the state’s weak engagement to prevent friction between the displaced and local residents. Failing to organize the process—for instance, simply announcing that public schools were open without ensuring a practical, administrative framework for housing displaced people (complete with necessary supplies)—led to issues on the ground.

This underscores how crucial it is not to sideline the country’s military institutions, including the Lebanese Army, in times like these.

Among the offensive’s clear objectives was the bombing of roads to hinder people’s movements and prevent them from traveling—evident in the heavy bombing of the Lebanese–Syrian border route, effectively blocking vans and cars. This also applied to the border area in Akkar, impeding both Lebanese fleeing to Syria and Syrians in Lebanon who wished to return home.

Meanwhile, authorities announced the start of the school year in public schools without providing alternative accommodations for displaced families or laying out how to manage classes for both host-community students and displaced students.

Although the solidarity and cooperation among Lebanese, as well as the empathy and support extended to Gazans in occupied Palestine (as shown in the Information International study), were heartening, this alone is not sufficient without a true sense of national unity—one not merely dictated by sectarian or non-sectarian leaders. There is a pressing need for real state action, with official institutions and security forces, especially given that the “people, army, resistance” equation still holds sway.

Yet how can the Lebanese Army, obliged under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to deploy along the entire southern border with occupied Palestine for the protection of Lebanese territory and citizens, fulfill its mission if it lacks the appropriate weaponry for defense—never mind the capacity for preemptive strikes, should they become necessary?

Diverse Reasons, One Embrace

Is every Shiite automatically a member of Hezbollah or Amal?

Of course not. There are also “opposition Shiites,” some of whom have spoken out on TV and social media (bearing in mind that Shiites Against War did not originate locally, but rather externally, and has no real connection to Lebanese Shiites). Nevertheless, the displacement is the same, and the majority of those displaced (although some are Christian or Sunni residents of the South) are Shiites who consistently affirm that they are part of the “resistance community,” calling themselves “Ahl Al-Muqawama” (the people of the resistance) or at least the “supportive environment for the resistance.” They underscore that their experience with the occupying entity predates the founding of Hezbollah itself. Indeed, it wasn’t until the year 2000 that Lebanon’s South was liberated; consequently, they have only lived in freed territory for the past 24 years. Most residents of Beirut’s southern suburbs are originally people from these same areas—hailing from the South, Bekaa, or even parts of Keserwan.

When displacement began—as noted earlier—it mainly went from Shiite areas to other Shiite areas, such as moving from a predominantly Shiite village in the South to the southern suburbs of Beirut.

However, when a massive wave of displacement occurred—preceded by intelligence operations against Hezbollah involving pager devices (on Tuesday, September 17, 2024) and subsequent explosions of communication devices (September 18, 2024), along with the assassination of a number of Hezbollah leaders, culminating in the assassination of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024—all Shiite areas became unsafe. A second wave of displacement therefore compounded the already significant first wave. Many people slept on roads and sidewalks before eventually finding their way to shelters. From the 2006 experience, a fair number of individuals knew where best to head this time.

Public schools across numerous Lebanese regions were opened to house the displaced. What no one expected, however, was the large number of ordinary citizens from all sects rushing forward on their own initiative to help.

The Sunni Community

Sunni areas in Beirut, Tripoli, and Akkar quickly mobilized once calls went out for blood donations to help those injured by the pager-device blasts. Residents of Tariq Al-Jdideh and Qasqas along with Sunnis from Tripoli and Akkar flocked to hospitals and blood donation centers. This surge in volunteerism is particularly noteworthy since it ran completely counter to the desired outcome of the enemy and those echoing its narrative.

Afterward, people opened their homes to the displaced, even before public schools were used as shelters. Many families considered these displaced individuals to be guests, with some going so far as to say, “They’re the homeowners now.”

Did the Sunni-majority solidarity with the people of Gaza help heal the Sunni–Shiite divide?

Religion may have been one factor. Some felt the support front should be even stronger and more painful for the enemy than it was when the fighting first began.

Could it be that if Lebanese citizens distance themselves from their sectarian leaders, they reveal a profound humanity and patriotism that refuse to stand idle in the face of such suffering?

This, too, appears to be a plausible explanation, judging from how people reacted on the ground during this displacement.

The Druze Community

A study conducted by Information International in January 2024 on the Israeli offensive in Gaza and Lebanon’s involvement in the support front found that although not all Druze (100%) endorsed participating in the war, 89% utterly opposed the operations conducted by the Zionist entity against the people of Gaza. Moreover, 96% of surveyed Druze respondents said the events of October 7, 2023, were primarily a consequence of occupation, injustice, and blockade.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the Druze community was fully prepared to receive and assist displaced families, bolstered by the pro-Gaza and pro-Palestine statements of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt—the son of Kamal Jumblatt, who always stood alongside the Palestinian cause.

Christians and the July 2006 Experience

During the latest Israeli offensive, the Zgharta area arguably surpassed other Christian regions in terms of publicly welcoming displaced families, becoming something of a model in this regard. The stance taken by former MP and Marada Movement leader Sleiman Frangieh had a major impact on the people of Zgharta; they began preparing to receive displaced individuals even before they arrived.

Meanwhile, the funeral of the fallen Lebanese Army Major Mohammed Farhat in Rachain—Zgharta—a Maronite town and church where his body was laid to rest, since it was impossible to hold the funeral in his hometown of Deir Qanoun Ras el-Ain in the Tyre district—offered a poignant and uplifting image of Lebanese solidarity in the midst of tragedy.

Naturally, Zgharta wasn't alone: when Baalbek was threatened, around 50,000 people were displaced in one night. They flooded into Deir El-Ahmar, a Christian town whose residents opened their doors to the displaced, as did villages in Akkar. It's important to note that Deir El-Ahmar largely supports the Lebanese Forces party, yet local communities along the Lebanese–Syrian border had already had their own cooperative experience with Hezbollah when extremist groups (such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda) launched attacks across the Syrian border, alongside the Lebanese Army and area residents.

What stands out in the Christian- and Sunni-majority villages of Akkar is how similar they are to Lebanon's southern villages, in that the state has long neglected them. They have struggled with poverty and deprivation since the founding of Greater Lebanon a century ago. Even so, they, too, opened their homes to the displaced.

As for the Metn region, it has its own story of hosting displaced people, stretching back to the Israeli offensive on Lebanon in July 2006. The secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party is present in Metn and considers Israel an enemy, believing it must be resisted, with residents of threatened and war-torn areas welcomed.

However, one should not overlook the experience of July 2006 involving the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). That offensive began only a few months after the famous Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the FPM and Hezbollah at Mar Mikhael Church in Haret Hreik on February 6, 2006. Less than four months later, war broke out. Former General Michel Aoun (later President of Lebanon) threw himself into relief efforts for displaced families from the South and the Beirut southern suburbs. At one point, a school in Ashrafieh was opened under the auspices of the FPM—despite initial opposition from some quarters—and FPM centers throughout Beirut and Metn were transformed into bustling hubs providing assistance to displaced people.

Unquestionably, this led to stronger ties and the forging of lasting friendships between FPM members and the displaced. Many Christians, who had rarely interacted with other sects during the civil war—and had absorbed the “fear of minorities” narrative—found themselves astonished by the positive impact of this experience.

Amid the current offensive, many of those who took part in the “crisis task force” back in 2006 returned to similar work on the ground. Media outlets visiting shelters have filmed numerous FPM volunteers describing how the lessons of 2006 inform their current efforts, following the directives of former Minister Gebran Bassil, the FPM's leader.

In summary, in 2006, there were certain leaders—first and foremost General Michel Aoun—who took the initiative upon themselves. By 2024, that spirit of empathy continued in practice, augmented by emerging solidarity between Sunni and Shiite communities, the supportive role played by former MP Walid Jumblatt in the mountain regions, and efforts from various groups, parties, and independent individuals.

However, all these grassroots efforts cannot be sustained if the offensive drags on indefinitely. Under these circumstances—especially in the absence of a president—the Lebanese government must step up to the plate.

A Grassroots Resistance Movement, No Fear Among “Minorities” Because the Displaced Always Return Home (2006-2024)

First Scene:

A recurring sight first in July 2006—and now again after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s Support Front, and the subsequent expansion of the Israeli offensive—is the funeral processions of resistance fighters from the South and the Bekaa. The fact that these fallen fighters are laid to rest in their own hometowns underscores that they are truly “children of the land,” sons of the South and Bekaa.

Second Scene:

This one relates to the so-called “fear of minorities” and “sectarian demographic change.” While it’s true that some of these fears have been deeply ingrained or nurtured in some communities, the events on the ground challenge such anxieties. Take the Israeli war on Lebanon in July 2006: once a ceasefire was announced, displaced people from the South packed up at dawn on August 14 and headed back to their villages—even though Israeli warplanes conducted one last strike that same day (in Deir Qanoun Ras el-Ain, Tyre District). Many found their homes completely demolished, yet they erected tents or stayed with relatives while they rebuilt or repaired their houses.

Lebanese observers today remember well that Southerners and Bekaa residents have no intention of leaving their land for good—some have had their homes destroyed two or three times already, only to return and rebuild each time.

It was much the same story in 2024: as soon as displaced families caught word of a potential ceasefire, they began gathering their things and preparing to go home. By dawn on Wednesday, November 27—hours before the official 4:00 a.m. start of the ceasefire—Saida’s coastal highway was already crowded with returning families. They did not wait for confirmation of the ceasefire’s implementation; rather, they set off even though many of their homes had been partially or wholly destroyed.



Displacement Report

In its latest update, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Lebanon noted that:

- Highest rate of in-home hosting: Akkar (65%)
- Lowest rate of in-home hosting: Mount Lebanon (42%)
- Highest rate of rented accommodations: Mount Lebanon (57%)
- Lowest rate of rented accommodations: Beirut (3%)
- Highest rate of displaced people in official centers: Beirut (41%)
- Lowest rate of displaced people in official centers: Akkar (12%)

Table 1. Internal Displacement of Lebanese Citizens and Daily Average of Displacement (From October 15, 2023, to October 24, 2024).

Date	Total Displaced	Number of Days	Increase in Number of Internally Displaced	Daily Average of Internally Displaced
Oct 15, 2023	8,080			
Oct 18, 2023	9,800	3	1,720	573
Oct 19, 2023	10,500	1	700	700
Oct 20, 2023	12,850	1	2,350	2,350
Oct 23, 2023	19,650	3	6,800	2,267
Oct 26, 2023	21,120	3	1,470	490
Oct 27, 2023	28,970	1	7,850	7,850
Nov 2, 2023	25,710	6	-3,260	-543
Nov 9, 2023	26,230	7	520	74
Nov 16, 2023	46,330	7	20,100	2,871
Nov 23, 2023	55,500	7	9,170	1,310
Nov 30, 2023	55,180	7	-320	-46
Dec 7, 2023	58,540	7	3,360	480
Dec 14, 2023	64,050	7	5,510	787
Dec 21, 2023	72,440	7	8,390	1,199
Dec 28, 2023	74,470	7	2,030	290
Jan 4, 2024	76,020	7	1,550	221
Jan 11, 2024	82,010	7	5,990	856
Jan 18, 2024	83,120	7	1,110	159
Jan 25, 2024	86,870	7	3,750	536
Feb 1, 2024	86,670	7	-200	-29
Feb 8, 2024	87,160	7	490	70
Feb 15, 2024	88,280	7	1,120	160
Feb 22, 2024	89,820	7	1,540	220
Feb 29, 2024	91,290	7	1,470	210

Date	Total Displaced	Number of Days	Increase in Number of Internally Displaced	Daily Average of Internally Displaced
Mar 7, 2024	90,860	7	-430	-61
Mar 14, 2024	91,320	7	460	66
Mar 21, 2024	90,490	7	-830	-119
Apr 4, 2024	93,390	14	2,900	207
Apr 11, 2024	92,090	7	-1,300	-186
Apr 18, 2024	92,620	7	530	76
May 2, 2024	93,040	14	420	30
May 16, 2024	93,880	14	840	60
May 30, 2024	94,130	14	250	18
Jun 13, 2024	95,230	14	1,100	79
Jun 27, 2024	96,830	14	1,600	114
Jul 11, 2024	98,000	14	1,170	84
Jul 25, 2024	98,750	14	750	54
Aug 8, 2024	102,520	14	3,770	269
Aug 15, 2024	110,100	7	7,580	1,083
Aug 22, 2024	111,940	7	1,840	263
Aug 29, 2024	113,730	7	1,790	256
Sep 5, 2024	113,050	7	-680	-97
Sep 12, 2024	112,550	7	-500	-71
Sep 19, 2024	111,700	7	-850	-121
Sep 26, 2024	211,320	7	99,620	14,231
Sep 30, 2024	346,210	4	134,890	33,723
Oct 3, 2024	541,530	3	195,320	65,107
Oct 6, 2024	608,510	3	66,980	22,327
Oct 10, 2024	689,720	4	81,210	20,303
Oct 14, 2024	756,580	4	66,860	16,715
Oct 17, 2024	779,610	3	23,030	7,677
Oct 21, 2024	809,043	4	29,433	7,358
Oct 24, 2024	833,391	3	24,348	8,116

Source: A study conducted by former Defense Minister Yacoub Riyad Sarraf.

Table 2. Displacement of Residents in Lebanon (Lebanese and Syrians) to Syria, 2023–2024.

Lebanese (men and women)	Syrians (men and women):	Total
225,600	207,650	433,250

Source: A study conducted by former Defense Minister Yacoub Riyad Sarraf.

TIMELINE OF ISRAEL'S WAR ON LEBANON

OCTOBER 8, 2023 – NOVEMBER 27, 2024

Lebanon endured a devastating Israeli offensive after the Lebanese side opened a support front for Gaza following the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023. The war lasted 385 days, but the most destructive period ran from September 17, 2024, until November 27, 2024 (72 days). Comparing these 72 days of war to the 33-day war in July–August 2006 holds true only insofar as the same enemy—Israel—was involved. Other aspects, such as the war's length, the widespread destruction in the South, Dahiyeh, and Bekaa, the number of fatalities and injuries, and the scale of displacement cannot be directly compared. Perhaps the most significant event in this war's timeline was the martyrdom of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on Friday, September 27, 2024.



Below are the main developments of this war, listed chronologically:

October 7, 2023

At 6:29 a.m., Hamas launches Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on the Gaza border areas, resulting in the killing of 1,200 people and the capture of around 250 Israeli hostages.

October 9, 2023

Hezbollah announces its first group of fallen fighters who fell in clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon: three resistance fighters (Houssam Mohammad Ibrahim from Aitaroun; Ali Raef Fattouni from Khirbet Selm; and Ali Hassan Hadraj from Beirut).

November 5, 2023

An Israeli drone targets a civilian car on the Ainata–Aitaroun road, killing three children (Rimas, Talin, and Layan Mohammad Shour) and their grandmother Samira Abdel Hassan Ayoub. The mother, Huda Abdel Ghani Hejazi, sustains burns.

December 5, 2023

The first soldier from the Lebanese Army falls: Sergeant Abdel Karim Al-Miqdad, killed by Israeli shelling on an army post in the town of Odaisseh. Three other soldiers wounded.

December 19, 2023

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issues a report on damages in Lebanon caused by the Gaza-level hostilities. It records 91 bombardments, 64,000 displaced people, 47,000 olive trees burned, 200,000 birds and 700,000 heads of livestock killed, and 250 beehives destroyed.

February 29, 2024

The total number of fallen Lebanese fighters and civilians reaches 292, broken down as follows:

- 229 from Hezbollah
- 11 from Amal
- 1 from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party

- 1 from the Lebanese Army
- 47 civilians
- 3 journalists

August 17, 2024

Ten Syrian laborers and their families are killed after Israeli jets bombed a factory in Wadi Al-Kafour in Nabatiyeh.

September 17, 2024

Starting at 3:30 p.m., thousands of pager devices used by Hezbollah members explode simultaneously, causing about 200 deaths and 3,600 injuries, many involving permanent disabilities.

September 23, 2024

The most violent day of the Israeli offensive on Lebanon, with 523 people killed, 1,650 wounded, and over 800,000 people displaced in a single day.

September 26, 2024

An airstrike on the town of Almaaysra in Keserwan leaves 18 people killed, 6 wounded, and 8 missing. The last recovered victim was a child, Wissam Hussein from Houla, found on December 8.

September 27, 2024

Friday, 6:00 p.m. A powerful airstrike demolishes multiple buildings in Beirut's Southern suburb, creating a crater over 30 meters deep and leading to the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Israel confirms Nasrallah's death, and Hezbollah announces it on Saturday at noon.

September 28, 2024

Sheikh Nabil Qaouq is killed.

September 29, 2024

Israel, for the first time since the war began, bombs an apartment in the Cola area of Beirut, destroying two apartments and killing four members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), including Mohammad

Abdel Aal (a member of the PFLP political bureau and head of its military/security division) and Imad Ouda (member of the military unit and the PFLP's military commander in Lebanon).

September 30, 2024

Sheikh Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, delivers his first speech since Nasrallah's assassination, declaring: "Israel has not managed to affect our military capabilities—this is a dream they will never realize. Hezbollah is ready for any Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon." He denies Israel's claim that 20 Hezbollah leaders were killed alongside Nasrallah, and states, "The party will elect a new Secretary-General soon, and leadership posts will be fully staffed."

October 1, 2024

An airstrike on Al-Dawoudiyeh village claims 10 victims from the same family (Al-Diab).

October 3, 2024

An Israeli airstrike on an Islamic Health Society center in Bashoura, Beirut, kills 7 paramedics. This is the second airstrike on Beirut following the Cola attack.

October 6, 2024

- An airstrike on the town of Jiyeh in Chouf kills four women.
- Another airstrike on a Civil Defense station in Braachit kills 10 people.
- Hezbollah states it fired a barrage of rockets at areas north of Haifa in Israel, its second such attack after shelling the city that morning on the first anniversary of the Gaza war. Israeli media report that two rockets fell on Haifa and five on Tiberias, about 65 km away.

October 9, 2024

- An airstrike on a shelter for displaced individuals in Al-Wardaniyeh (Chouf District) kills six people and injures 12 others, most from Aitaroun.
- An airstrike on a Civil Defense center in Dardghia (Tyre) kills five paramedics and injures five more.

October 10, 2024

Intense overnight shelling targets Al-Basta and Al-Nouairi in Beirut, killing 22 people and injuring 117, causing massive destruction. Israel claims it was targeting Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah's Liaison and Coordination Unit, who survived the attempt.

An airstrike on Al-Karak in Zahle kills 8 people.

October 12, 2024

According to the Israeli military, Hezbollah launches around 320 rockets from Lebanon into Israel on Yom Kippur, with more than 120 intercepted by Israel's defenses (per Israeli claims).

October 13, 2024

Early morning, Israeli warplanes bomb the historic commercial market in Nabatiyeh and adjacent neighborhoods, completely destroying shops and old homes.

October 14, 2024

An Israeli airstrike on a house in Ayto, Zgharta, kills 24 displaced individuals and injures four others, most of them from the Hejazi family. They had fled Aitaroun on September 23, 2024.

October 16, 2024

An exceptional Christian-Muslim spiritual summit convenes at the Maronite Patriarchate in Bkerke. Its final statement declares: "This barbaric Israeli offensive against Lebanon affects all Lebanese and thus concerns the dignity and pride of all Lebanese. We call for the immediate, full implementation of Resolution 1701, for support for the Lebanese Army, and reaffirm that the Palestinian cause is the central issue that must be resolved according to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 in Beirut."

October 20, 2024

- It is announced that Sheikh Naim Qassem has been elected Secretary-General of Hezbollah.
- Israeli airstrikes target Qard Al-Hasan offices in Dahiyeh, the South, and the Bekaa.

October 21, 2024

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein arrives in Lebanon to work toward a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel.

October 22, 2024

- An Israeli airstrike on Nabatiyeh kills 13 members of the Maatouq family.
- Avichay Adraee, the Arabic language spokesperson for the Israeli military, threatens Sahel Hospital, alleging it stores Hezbollah weapons worth 500 million dollars.
- An Israeli massacre at a funeral in Tiftahta (for a martyred Hezbollah member from the Azeddine family) kills 12 people.

October 23, 2024

- Hezbollah announces the martyrdom of Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, confirming earlier rumors that he was targeted in an Israeli raid on October 4, 2024.
- French President Emmanuel Macron meets Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

October 24, 2024

- Israel targets a group of Lebanese Army soldiers during an evacuation mission, killing Major Mohammad Sami Farhat and two other soldiers.
- A conference in Paris allocates \$1 billion in aid to Lebanon, including \$200 million for the Lebanese Army.

October 30, 2024

Sheikh Naim Qassem delivers his first address since being elected Secretary-General of Hezbollah, stating: "We have entered a new phase of resistance following the assassination of Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah." He emphasizes that his action plan continues the resistance path, affirms that supporting Gaza is a duty, and declares that the party has recovered from the blows it suffered, praising Yahya Sinwar.

November 6, 2024

Violent Israeli shelling targets Dahiyeh, Ouzai, and areas adjacent to Beirut Airport, while Hezbollah rockets reach Ben Gurion Airport, disrupting air traffic.

November 20, 2024

In a speech, Sheikh Naim Qassem outlines Hezbollah's view on the current war, the negotiation phase, and the post-war period. He warns, "The enemy should expect a response targeting central Tel Aviv if Beirut is struck," affirms the fighters' readiness for a long battle, and says Hezbollah is committed to facilitating the election of a president in accordance with constitutional frameworks and under the Taif Accord, reiterating the party's pledge to partake in reconstruction efforts.

November 26, 2024

An announcement is made for a 60-day ceasefire starting at 4:00 a.m. on Wednesday, November 27, based on an agreement between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by the United States and France, to enforce UN Resolution 1701 in all its provisions.



UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 1948-2006

FROM RESOLUTION 61 TO RESOLUTION 1701 – DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO LIFE AND DEATH WARS IN THE REGION

In recent weeks, particularly in the past few days, the local and global political and media discourse has been dominated by the mention of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Some focused on three specific resolutions—1559, 1680, and 1701—as diplomatic means to halt the war in Lebanon and achieve calm on both sides of the border between Lebanon and the Zionist entity. What measures and procedures do these resolutions include to achieve this goal?

1701 • 1559 • 1680



These three international resolutions were passed over 20 years ago. Resolution 1559, caused internal divisions, while Resolution 1701 succeeded in halting the war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. However, these resolutions did not prevent the resumption of war between Lebanon and “Israel” today. Thus, calling for their implementation now could deepen internal divisions and suggest that they were not implemented earlier either due to a lack of political will or loopholes in their provisions—or perhaps it is Israel’s aggressiveness that refuses to abide by international resolutions?

The Beginning

What about previous Security Council resolutions that Israel did not adhere to? Some resolutions were followed by additional ones to emphasize the enforcement of the terms issued by what represents the “international community” after World War II.

Historical Overview (1948-2006)

Based on UN Security Council Resolutions 61 and 62, issued on November 4 and 16, 1948, respectively, a general truce was imposed on the conflicting parties in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and “Israel.” The truce included the establishment of permanent armistice lines, the withdrawal and reduction of armed forces on both sides to ensure compliance. Bilateral agreements were signed, including the Israeli-Lebanese armistice agreement. Despite Lebanon’s neutrality in the 1967 war, “Israel” unilaterally renounced the armistice agreement with Lebanon, which had been signed and ratified by the Security Council in 1949, after the June 5, 1967 war, violating the principles of international law.

The Partition Plan

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine, ending the British Mandate and dividing the land into three new entities: an Arab state (42.3% of Palestine), a Jewish state (57.7%), and Jerusalem and Bethlehem placed under international trusteeship. Although the partition plan was a Zionist demand and was rejected by Arabs, it was not fully implemented. The Zionists themselves exceeded the allotted area for the Jewish state. By 2004, “Israel” had seized 50% of the land designated for the Arab state under the partition plan, leaving only Gaza and the West Bank.



By 2004, “Israel” had seized 50% of the land designated for the Arab state under the partition plan, leaving only Gaza and the West Bank.



In the 1993 Oslo Accords, signed on September 13, 1993, between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and “Israel,” Palestinian independence would only be in certain areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This was followed by continued land grabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’s outskirts.



Oslo 1993

The Oslo Accords were signed without the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, issued on November 22, 1967, after “Israel” occupied more territories. Although Resolution 242 did not explicitly refer to Palestine or the Palestinian people except to address the “refugee problem,” it called for the withdrawal of armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict. There was ambiguity in the English text, which omitted the definite article before “territories,” leading to confusion. Naturally, “Israel” did not implement the resolution.

Resolution 338, issued on October 22, 1973, during the fourth Arab-Israeli war, also known as the October War in Egypt, October War of Liberation in Syria, and Yom Kippur War in “Israel”, called for a ceasefire, but the fighting did not stop until Resolution 339 was passed, which also called for the full implementation of Resolution 242.

More Resolutions and Ongoing Conflict

There have been many additional resolutions, such as Resolution 338 (1974), Resolution 368 (April 1975), and Resolution 369 (May 1974), all related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Resolution 425, issued on March 19, 1978, after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). However, the withdrawal was partial, and Israeli forces and the South Lebanon Army repeatedly violated the terms, even attacking UNIFIL forces.

After Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it controlled parts of Beirut until it partially withdrew in 1985 and fully withdrew in 2000, leading to the creation of the Blue Line.



The Blue Line and International Borders

The Blue Line is not an international border but a line drawn by the United Nations based on Israel's withdrawal line on June 7, 2000, between Lebanon on one side and occupied Palestine and the Golan Heights on the other. It stretches for 120 kilometers.

In 1982, the Lebanese-Israeli conflict resulted in around 16 Security Council resolutions, including demands for the provision of medical aid and delivery of food and medicine to civilians. However, these resolutions were not fully implemented, and those that were, were only partially enforced.

Since the withdrawal in May 2000, Lebanon has been subjected to Israeli artillery and air strikes, as well as assassinations, culminating in the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006.

Following what became known as the July 2006 war, there were further attacks in 2019, leading up to the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in Gaza on October 7, 2023, with Hezbollah and allied groups entering the frontlines in support of Gaza the next day. The conflict expanded following the assassinations of key leaders in Hamas and Hezbollah, most notably Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, in Beirut's southern suburbs, and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh on July 31, 2024, in Tehran. Yahya Sinwar, who was appointed in his place in Rafah – Gaza Strip in early September 2024, was killed in battle. Hezbollah also mourned the loss of its Executive Council head, Hashem Safieddine.

All of this, excluding Haniyeh's assassination, followed two operations expected to kill around 4,000 Hezbollah members through the detonation of pagers and wireless communication devices, regardless of their location, whether at home with their families, at work, or on the streets.



Gaza and Lebanon

The Security Council held several emergency meetings to discuss the situation in Gaza and Lebanon. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned of the outbreak of a regional war in the area and stressed the importance of protecting humanitarian workers and ensuring that civilian sites are not used for military purposes. He stated: “The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded that the continued presence of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories is illegal and that Israel is obliged to end it as soon as possible. The General Assembly has called on Israel to comply.”

It is noted that Israel has committed thousands of violations against Lebanon, disregarding numerous resolutions and international agreements endorsed by the Security Council.

Notable Resolutions

The resolutions highlighted by some local and international parties are:

Resolution 1559:

This resolution was issued on September 2, 2004 by the Security Council on with the support of 9 countries and 6 abstentions. It was passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter titled “The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.” The resolution came at the height of internal political disputes in Lebanon regarding the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s term. It was seen as international interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs, as it was not requested by the Lebanese government but initiated by the U.S. and France. The Lebanese parliament responded the next day by extending Lahoud’s presidency by three years.

Key points of the resolution:

- 1- The Security Council reaffirms its demand for full respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence under the sole authority of the Lebanese government across all Lebanese territory.
- 2- It calls for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon (primarily referring to Syrian forces).
- 3- It calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias (primarily Hezbollah and Palestinian organizations).

- 4- It supports a free and fair electoral process in the upcoming presidential election in accordance with the Lebanese constitution without foreign interference or influence (referring mainly to Syrian influence).

Resolution 1680:

Resolution 1680 was issued by the Security Council on May 17, 2006, as a follow-up to Resolution 1559.

Key points of the resolution:

- 1- It encourages the Syrian government to delineate its borders with Lebanon and to establish full diplomatic relations.
- 2- It commends the Lebanese government for taking measures against the transfer of arms within Lebanese territory and urges the Syrian government to adopt the same measures.
- 3- It welcomes the decision of the National Dialogue to disarm Palestinian militias outside the camps within six months and calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

Resolution 1701:

Resolution 1701 was issued by the Security Council on August 11, 2006, following the July 2006 war between Lebanon and "Israel". This resolution ended the war and reinforced previous resolutions, particularly 1559 and 1680.

Key points of the resolution:

- 1- It emphasizes the importance of extending the Lebanese government's control over all Lebanese territory in accordance with resolutions 1559 and 1680 and the relevant provisions of the Taif Agreement.
- 2- It stresses full respect for the Blue Line between Lebanon and "Israel".
- 3- It calls for security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment of a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of any personnel, armed groups, military equipment, or weapons except those of the Lebanese government and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
- 4- It prohibits the presence of foreign forces in Lebanon without the Lebanese government's approval.
- 5- It bans the sale or supply of arms and related materials except as authorized by the Lebanese government.
- 6- It increases the size of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops.
- 7- It requires "Israel" to provide the UN with all maps of landmines in Lebanon.

Source: Information International based on UN Security Council resolutions and research articles published on the official website of the Lebanese Army.



ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF AL-AQSA FLOOD

**FOR ISRAEL, IT'S THE BLACK SABBATH
FOR THE WORLD, IT'S AN OPEN WAR
WITH ENDLESS POSSIBILITIES**

By Dr. George Yaqoub*

The seventh of October 2023 is regarded as a fateful day in modern history. Yet, a year later, how is it perceived in global public opinion?

It is the day that saw bloodshed among Palestinians and Israelis, as soldiers, fighters, settlers, workers, civilians, and tourists clashed.

This day is seen as the initial trigger for an open war that would engulf Palestine, Lebanon, the region, and possibly lead to a potential conflict stretching from Ukraine to the South China Sea.

* Writer and analyst in economic and geostrategic affairs.



International humanitarian laws, the United Nations Charter, and the Declaration of Human Rights condemned the civilian losses resulting from military operations, as did most religions and natural moral codes, which are often forgotten in violent conflicts.

On the first anniversary of this day, and after it was reported and promoted in a certain way, we will try to convey, confirm, or refute misconceptions. Information International, as well as the author, does not endorse what was reported but instead presents what was said, reported, and its outcomes, as well as what was later denied or confirmed and its current and potential implications for the days to come.

طوفان الأقصى Al-Aqsa Flood



In the Beginning there was a Flood

The war began when armed groups led by Hamas launched a “sudden, unprovoked terrorist attack” (1) on Israel on October 7, which involved rocket fire and an assault by several thousand fighters who breached the Gaza-Israel barrier, attacking Israeli civilian gatherings and military bases.

During this attack, 1,195 Israelis and foreigners (2) were killed, including 815 civilians and 380 military and paramilitary personnel. Additionally, Hamas forces captured 251 Israelis and foreigners and transferred them to Gaza. Since the start of the Israeli invasion and up until Wednesday, October 23, 2024, around 42,000 Palestinians (3) have been killed in Gaza, more than half of whom were women and children.

The severe blockade imposed by “Israel” on Gaza cut off essential supplies, and Israeli bombardments of infrastructure led to a collapse in healthcare services and imminent famine by February 2024.

By early 2024, Israeli forces had completely or partially destroyed more than half of Gaza’s homes, damaged at least a third of the vegetation and agricultural land, and demolished most schools, universities, hundreds of cultural landmarks, and at least dozens of cemeteries.

The entire population of Gaza, numbering about 2.3 million, has been displaced, and over 100,000 Israelis have been internally displaced by February 2024.

The October 7 Attacks

The attacks took place on the Jewish holidays of Simchat Torah and Shemini Atzeret on a Saturday, a day after the 50th anniversary of the start of the Yom Kippur War, which also began with a surprise attack on Israel.

The night before, Hamas had fired 150 rockets toward Israel, with reports of explosions in settlements like Yavne, Givatayim, Bat Yam, Beit Dagan, Tel Aviv, and Rishon LeZion.

Around 6:30 a.m., Hamas announced the beginning of what it called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” claiming it had launched over 5,000 rockets from Gaza into Israel within 20 minutes, resulting in at least five fatalities from the rocket attacks.

Hamas used various tactics, including drones to disable Israeli observation points, paragliders to infiltrate “Israel,” and motorcycles, an unusual tactic for Hamas.

At the same time, approximately 3,000 Hamas fighters infiltrated “Israel” from Gaza using trucks, motorcycles, bulldozers, speedboats, and parachutes, seizing control of the Kerem Shalom and Erez checkpoints and breaching the border fence at five other points.

Reported Information

The gunmen killed civilians in settlements such as Nir Oz, Be’eri, and Netiv HaAsara and other farming communities, taking hostages and setting homes ablaze.

- 52 civilians were killed in the Kfar Aza massacre.
- 108 civilians were killed in the Be’eri massacre (equivalent to 10% of the kibbutz’s population).
- 15 civilians were killed in the Netiv HaAsara massacre.
- Hamas gunmen took up to 50 hostages in Be’eri.

- 325 (4) people were killed and others injured at an outdoor music festival near the Re'im settlement.
- Hamas took at least 37 festival attendees hostage.
- 40 infants were reportedly found beheaded (5) in Kfar Aza kibbutz, one of the hardest-hit communities, with White House officials confirming this information.
- Among the 1,400 victims, AFP reported 200 foreign nationals killed and 222 abducted.

Three days after the attack, the "Israeli army" invited dozens of journalists and foreign correspondents, where an "unprecedented" display of events was presented by the IDF spokesperson to the world.

Reports stated that Hamas gunmen engaged in:

- 1- Mutilation,
- 2- Torture,
- 3- Rape,
- 4- Sexual violence.

The last time such a large number of Jews were killed in a single day was during the Holocaust.



The Counterattack


All of this justified the Israeli counterattack as a self-defense measure to protect civilian lives and state sovereignty.

The Initial Israeli Counter-Operation (October 7–27)

After the initial breach of Gaza's perimeter by Palestinian gunmen, it took hours for the "Israeli Defense Forces" to begin their counterattack.

The first helicopters were sent to support the army from northern "Israel" and reached the Gaza Strip an hour after the fighting began. Upon arrival, the helicopters encountered difficulty in identifying occupied sites and distinguishing between Palestinian fighters, soldiers, and civilians on the ground.

Initially, the helicopters unleashed heavy and indiscriminate fire, targeting around 300 sites in four hours. Later, the helicopters slowed down and began selecting targets more carefully.



Investigations and Findings

A police investigation indicated that one of the IDF helicopters fired at Hamas gunmen and "apparently hit some participants in the Re'im music festival during the massacre that occurred there," as it fired without prior authorization.

An investigation published by Haaretz in July 2024 revealed that the IDF had ordered the use of a protocol known as the "Hannibal Directive."

The investigation confirmed civilian injuries in one instance that took place in the home of Bessi Cohen in Kibbutz Be'eri. Fourteen hostages were in the home when the IDF attacked, resulting in the deaths of 13 people. A report published by Australia's ABC Network in September 2024 also discussed the use of the "Hannibal Directive" in the initial Israeli response.

The report quoted Colonel Nov Erez, a former officer in the Israeli Air Force, saying, "This was an expanded application of the Hannibal Directive. There were dozens of breaches in the fence, with thousands of people in vehicles of all types; some were holding hostages, and others were not."

Israel's Security Cabinet voted to work towards "destroying the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad."


The Israel Electric Corporation, which supplies 80% of Gaza's electricity, cut off power to the area, reducing Gaza's electricity supply from 120 megawatts to 20 megawatts, which was supplied by power plants funded by the Palestinian Authority.

An Alternative Account of Events

We will present here another version of events, giving readers the opportunity to form an assessment of what truly happened, how, and why.

1- The Hamas attack was not the spark but rather a result of ongoing Israeli occupation, the Gaza blockade, settlement expansion, settler violence against Palestinians, restrictions on Palestinian movement, administrative detention, and clear violations of international law, as well as increasing assaults on holy sites in Jerusalem.

2-



Prior to the Hamas attack on Israel in 2023, which primarily targeted civilians, 6,407 Palestinians had been killed and 11,814 injured, while on the other side, 308 Israelis were killed and 1,158 injured. Due to the Israeli blockade on Gaza, UNRWA reported that 81% of the population lived below the poverty line in 2023, with 63% of families suffering from food insecurity and relying on international aid. Additionally, Israeli authorities detained 2,873 Palestinians, including 180 minors, without trial or basic rights.

3- The actual casualties reported by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs six months after the events:

	Total	Israeli Army	Police	Settlers
Less than 1	1	0	0	1
2 to 5	3	0	0	3
6 to 14	15	0	0	15
15 to 19	37	6	0	31
20 to 55	1,009	276	80	653

	Total	Israeli Army	Police	Settlers
56 to 74	143	0	0	143
Over 75	49	0	0	49
Male	1,020	252	72	696
Female	237	30	8	199
Local	1,246	282	80	884
Foreign Workers	11	0	0	11
Total	1,257	282	80	895

- All foreign victims held dual citizenship as they were immigrant settlers, except for eleven expatriate workers.
- All settlers are quasi-military, as they are armed reservists and cannot be considered civilians.

4- The actual Palestinian casualties reported by national and international news are as follows:

- 41,909 deaths
- 97,303 injuries

The actual numbers are as follows:

- 41,909 documented remains, identified and returned to their families from hospital morgues for proper burial.
- 13,545 missing individuals recovered from under the rubble.
- 3,685 buried in mass graves without proper documentation.
- 57,975 injured individuals who died during treatment (60% of the total injuries) due to the systematic destruction of health facilities, with 5,625 hospital beds destroyed, reducing the available beds from 6,450 before October 7.

Thus, the total confirmed death toll is 117,114.

5- Israeli authorities report that 325 people were killed at a music festival near Re'im. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the death toll at the music festival is 371, distributed as follows:

- 267 killed in the Be'eri shelters.
- 69 killed by the IDF during clashes with Hamas under the Hannibal Directive.
- 35 festival security personnel.

6- Israeli authorities, along with European Union representatives and White House officials, claimed that 40 decapitated infants were found in the Kfar Aza kibbutz.

However, there was no evidence or single witness confirming any decapitated infants.

On the first anniversary of the October 7 attacks, it is our duty to shed light on the truth rather than indulge in misinformation and provide justifications under the guise of "self-defense" to cover up a genocide being committed against an entire area with the complicity of "Western, law-abiding democratic nations" in their pursuit of democracy, accountability, and counter terrorism.

IMPACT OF ISRAELI OFFENSIVE ON BEIRUT AIRPORT:

4.1 MILLION PASSENGERS LOST

The Israeli offensive against Lebanon has adversely impacted economic, productive, and service sectors, including air traffic at Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport. The numbers of arriving, departing, and transit passengers dropped noticeably.

Decline in 2023

The number of passengers (arrivals, departures, and transit) was 4,334,231 in 2021 and rose to 6,349,969 in 2022—an increase of 2,015,738 passengers or 46.5%.

However, in the last three months of 2023, following the Israel offensive against Lebanon, passenger traffic decreased by 201,365 passengers, or 13.2%, compared to the same period in 2022, as shown in the following table.

But if we assume a 46.5% growth rate that was supposed to be recorded in 2023 based on what happened in 2022, the decrease would amount to 904,346 passengers, or 40.6%.

Table. Decline in passenger traffic at Beirut Airport during the last three months of 2023 compared to the same period of 2022.

Month	2022	2023
October	520,157	516,846
November	446,450	318,558
December	551,632	481,470
Total	1,518,239	1,316,874

Source: Information International based on data from Rafic Hariri International Airport.

Decline in 2024

During the first 11 months of 2024, passenger traffic reached 5,244,492 compared to 5,798,337 during the same period of 2021, marking a drop of 553,845 passengers or 9.6%.

Assuming the growth rate would have continued at the same pace, the drop can be estimated at 3,250,071 passengers, or 42%.

Therefore, we estimate that airport traffic decreased during the period of the war—from October 8, 2023, until the end of November 2024—by a figure ranging between 755,210 passengers (without factoring in any growth), and 4,154,417 passengers if we assume the previously recorded growth continued.

Public Sector

LEBANON AWAITS ITS 14TH PRESIDENT:

A BATTLE OF POLITICS, HISTORY, AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE

On condition of a ceasefire in southern Lebanon, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has set Thursday, January 9, 2025, as the date for a parliamentary session to elect a new president. He emphasized that MPs will not leave the session until a new president is elected, symbolized by the traditional rising of white smoke from the parliament.

Several parliamentary and political leaders have expressed optimism that this session will conclude with the election of a president, ending the presidential vacuum that has persisted since President Michel Aoun's term ended on October 31, 2022. MPs have failed to elect a president in 12 previous sessions, the last of which was in June 2023.

The History of Presidential Elections in Lebanon

Since Lebanon's independence in 1943, 13 Maronite presidents have held office, in line with the customary sectarian arrangement. Each of these presidents was elected under different circumstances influenced by domestic and regional conditions.



Presidential Election According to the Constitution

Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution states:

“The President of the Republic is the head of state and a symbol of the unity of the nation. He ensures respect for the Constitution and the preservation of Lebanon’s independence and territorial integrity. He presides over the Supreme Defense Council and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which are subject to the authority of the Council of Ministers.”

The president is elected by secret ballot, requiring a two-thirds majority in the first round and an absolute majority in subsequent rounds. The presidential term lasts six years, and re-election is prohibited until six years after the term ends. Candidates must meet the qualifications for parliamentary candidacy and must not hold positions that disqualify them.

Additionally, judges, first-class public sector employees, and similar officials are ineligible during their tenure and for two years following their resignation or retirement. This clause, added to the Constitution in 1990 under the Taif Agreement, is said to have been introduced by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to prevent the military or central bank officials from leveraging their positions to reach the presidency. At the time, Lebanon was under the rule of a military government appointed by President Amine Gemayel in the final days of his term, led by Army Commander General Michel Aoun. However, this constitutional article had already been amended earlier: in 1947 to renew President Bechara El Khoury’s term, in 1995 to extend President Elias Hrawi’s term, in 1998 to allow the election of Army Commander General Emile Lahoud as president, and in 2004 to extend Lahoud’s presidency by three years.

Election Timelines

Foreign Powers Choose the President, While MPs Vote but Do Not Elect

In 1982 book *“Who Makes the President?”*, writer Elias Al-Diri quotes Minister Moussa Mubarak on the process of electing the Lebanese president:

“It’s not an easy task—French, British, and American involvement makes it a long and complex affair, while MPs simply raise their hands.”

In the battles for the presidency, there is no room for personal discretion among MPs. Opinions shift every half hour, and calculations vanish in an instant, much like the dreams of those aspiring to the presidency. Before 1952, Camille Chamoun was promised twice of becoming president (once in 1936 and another time in 1943), only to wake up both times and realize he was still just Camille Chamoun, without the title of “Your Excellency.” The same happened with Hamid Frangieh, Émile Eddé, and Bechara El Khoury before him.

“It’s a hellish game, where the last one laughing laughs the best,” Al-Diri writes, adding that the “password only comes with the morning.”

This depiction of reality has not changed in subsequent elections. Many have aspired to the presidency but never reached it, while others, who were outside the race, ultimately claimed the seat. Some of the most prominent names who aspired but never became president include Raymond Eddé, Jean Aziz, Abdel Aziz Chehab, Hamid Frangieh, Jean Obeid, Maurice Gemayel, Emile Bustani, and Jamil Lahoud.

Foreign-Backed Presidents and Election Details



- Bechara El Khoury: Elected with the support of Britain and several Arab countries (Syria, Iraq, and Egypt) that aligned with it, while France supported Émile Eddé.
- Camille Chamoun: Elected after the ousting of President Bechara El Khoury midway through his second term. He received support from Britain and Syrian President Adib Al-Shishakli, facing off against his rival, Hamid Frangieh.
- Fouad Chehab: Elected with Egyptian-American consensus during a period of regional tension.








- Charles Helou: Elected with an agreement between President Fouad Chehab and the American ambassador in Beirut, alongside a lack of opposition from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who preferred Fouad Amoun.
- Suleiman Frangieh: Elected by a single vote over Elias Sarkis. Some describe it as a purely Lebanese election, while others suggest he had Egyptian support following strained relations between Egypt and the Chehabists after the Mirage aircraft incident and their actions against Soviet intelligence operatives allied with Egypt.
- Elias Sarkis: Elected with Syrian support, while the election was opposed by the Palestine Liberation Organization under Yasser Arafat's leadership.
- Bashir Gemayel: Elected after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, with Israeli backing.
- Amine Gemayel: Elected with American support and no opposition from Israel.
- René Moawad: Elected with Syrian-Saudi backing following the Taif Agreement.
- Elias Hrawi: Elected with Syrian support.
- Emile Lahoud: Elected with Syrian support.
- Michel Sleiman: Elected through regional and international consensus following the Doha Agreement in Qatar.
- Michel Aoun: Supported by Hezbollah, with an agreement between Aoun and the Lebanese Forces facilitating his election.





Key Facts About Lebanon's 13 Presidents

- Seven were MPs, three were military commanders, and one was a central bank governor.
- Only five were elected in the first round of voting.
- Two presidents—Bashir Gemayel and Rene Moawad—were assassinated, with Gemayel killed before taking office and Moawad after 17 days of assuming power.
- The youngest president, Bashir Gemayel, was 35 at the time of election, followed by Amine Gemayel at 40. The oldest was Michel Aoun at 83. Other presidents were between 51 and 64 years old.

Table: Key Election Details of Lebanon's 13 Presidents (1943–2022)

	Name of the President	Age at Election	Date of the Election Session	Number of MPs / MPs Present	Proceedings of the Election Session
	Bechara El Khoury (MP)	53 years	21-September-1943 (assumed office two days later after President Petro Trad's resignation). Re-elected a second time on 27-May-1948, one year and four months before his term ended, after amending the Constitution.	55/47 and then 55/46	- Won in the first round with 44 votes, and there were 3 blank ballots. - Won in the first round again with 46 votes.
	Camille Chamoun (MP)	52 years	23-September-1952 (after President Bechara El Khoury resigned on 18-September and took office the same day he was elected)	77/76	- Won in the first round with 74 votes. - There was one ballot for MP Abdullah El-Hajj and one blank ballot.

Name of the President	Age at Election	Date of the Election Session	Number of MPs / MPs Present	Proceedings of the Election Session
 <p>Fouad Chehab (Commander of the Lebanese Army)</p>	56 years	31-July-1958 (eight days after the start of the constitutional period; he was serving as Commander of the Lebanese Army)	66/56	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 43 votes, Raymond Edde received 10 votes, there were 2 blank ballots, and 1 invalid ballot. - In the second round, he won with 48 votes; Raymond Edde received 7 votes, and there was 1 blank ballot.
 <p>Charles Helou (former MP)</p>	51 years	18-August-1964 (27 days after the start of the constitutional period)	99/99	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Won in the first round with 92 votes; Pierre Gemayel received 5 votes, and there were 2 blank ballots.
 <p>Suleiman Frangieh (MP)</p>	60 years	17-August-1970 (26 days after the start of the constitutional period)	99/99	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round: Elias Sarkis got 45 votes, Suleiman Frangieh 38, Pierre Gemayel 10, Jamil Lahoud 5, and Adnan Hakim 1. - The second round was canceled because 100 ballots were found (an extra ballot). - In the third round, Suleiman Frangieh won with 50 votes against Elias Sarkis's 49 votes.
 <p>Elias Sarkis (Governor of the Central Bank)</p>	52 years	08-May-1976 (after amending Article 73 of the Constitution, moving the election date forward)	99/69	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 63 votes; there were 5 blank ballots. - In the second round, Elias Sarkis won with 66 votes; there were 3 blank ballots.
 <p>Bachir Gemayel (Commander of the Lebanese Forces)</p>	35 years	23-August-1982 (one month after the start of the constitutional period; assassinated on 14-September-1982)	99 total MPs, 92 still alive / 62 present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 58 votes, Raymond Edde got 1 vote, and there were 3 blank ballots. - In the second round, Bachir Gemayel won with 57 votes; there were 5 blank ballots.
 <p>Amine Gemayel (MP)</p>	40 years	21-September-1982 (two days before the constitutional deadline)	99/80	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Won in the first round with 77 votes; there were 3 blank ballots.
 <p>René Moawad (MP)</p>	64 years	05-November-1989 (after the Taif Accord; the presidency had been vacant since Amine Gemayel's term ended on 23-September-1988)	99 total MPs, 72 still alive / 58 present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 35 votes, Georges Saadeh got 16 votes, and Elias Hrawi got 5 votes. - In the second round, René Moawad won with 52 votes; there were 6 blank ballots.

Name of the President	Age at Election	Date of the Election Session	Number of MPs / MPs Present	Proceedings of the Election Session
 Elias Hrawi (MP)	63 years	24-November-1989 (two days after President René Moawad was assassinated; the Constitution was amended to extend his term by 3 years)	99 total MPs, 57 alive / 52 present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 46 votes, Edmond Rizk got 1 vote, there were 4 blank ballots, and 1 invalid ballot. - In the second round, Elias Hrawi won with 47 votes; there were 5 blank ballots.
 Émile Lahoud (Commander of the Lebanese Army)	62 years	15-October-1998 (after amending Article 49 of the Constitution on 13-October-1998, 21 days after the start of the constitutional period; his term was extended by 3 years. He was serving as Commander of the Lebanese Army.)	128/118	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lahoud won in the first round with 118 votes, i.e., all MPs present voted for him.
 Michel Sleiman (Commander of the Army)	60 years	25-May-2008 (after a presidential vacuum since Émile Lahoud's term ended on 25-November-2007)	128/127	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Won in the first round with 118 votes; there were 6 blank ballots, plus 1 vote each for Nassib Lahoud, Jean Obeid, and the martyred former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
 Michel Aoun (MP and former Army Commander)	83 years	31-October-2016 (after a presidential vacuum since Michel Sleiman's term ended on 25-May-2014)	127/127 (MP Robert Fadel had resigned)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the first round, he received 84 votes, 36 blank ballots, 6 invalid ballots, and 1 ballot for Gilbert Zwein. - A second round was held three times because 128 ballots were counted instead of 127. - In the final second round, he got 83 votes, 36 blank ballots, 7 invalid ballots, and 1 ballot for Strida Geagea.

Source: Information International

Presidential Candidates

One of the major flaws in the Lebanese constitution and laws is that they do not require anyone who wishes to be elected President of the Republic to officially declare their candidacy and submit the paperwork and documents proving their eligibility for the position—whether to Parliament or the Constitutional Council. This stands in contrast to candidates for local councils, municipal councils, or parliamentary seats, who must formally submit their candidacies.

Up to now, and in the absence of such a mechanism for presidential candidacy, there are around 22 potential candidates whose names have been circulated (this number may increase in the coming days).


Many names are being mentioned for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. Some have openly announced their candidacy, such as MP Neemat Frem, former minister Suleiman Frangieh, and Tracy Chamoun. Others, however, have not officially announced a bid for the presidency but are nonetheless being discussed—like Army Commander General Joseph Aoun, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and Samir Assaf, who has been holding meetings and consultations in this context.


The candidates and potential candidates for this election cycle are:

- 1- Tracy Chamoun
- 2- Ziad Hayek, former Secretary-General of the Higher Council for Privatization
- 3- Suleiman Frangieh, former minister and MP
- 4- Michel Moawad, MP
- 5- Neemat Frem, MP
- 6- Ibrahim Kanaan, MP
- 7- Elias el-Baysari, General, Acting Director-General of General Security
- 8- Jean-Louis Cordahi, former minister
- 9- Jihad Azour, former minister
- 10- George Khoury, retired Brigadier General
- 11- Joseph Aoun, General and Commander of the Army (whose candidacy would require a constitutional amendment, as happened with the election of General Emile Lahoud. Some believe no amendment is necessary if a consensus is reached on his name, as happened with the election of General Michel Suleiman following the Doha Agreement.)
- 12- Demianos Qattar, former minister
- 13- Roger Deeb, former minister
- 14- Ziad Baroud, former minister
- 15- Sami Gemayel, MP
- 16- Samir Assaf
- 17- Suhail Abboud, judge and President of the Supreme Judicial Council
- 18- Farid al-Khazen, MP
- 19- Marwan Charbel, former minister
- 20- Nassif Hitti, former minister
- 21- Farid al-Bustani, MP

It is worth noting that in Lebanon's past, some presidents have been elected even though their names were neither declared nor widely circulated beforehand.

So who will be the fourteenth President of the Lebanese Republic? Will it be a military figure, a current MP, or a former MP? Will the parliamentarians choose and elect a candidate independently, defying the usual practice, or will they wait for an external decision?





FATHERLAND (2)

MISS FATIMA HUSSEIN

By Dr. Hanna Saadah

The Invasion

Grief from afar is a dry well full of resounding echoes. I could not cry, nor could I feel the sadness. All I felt was a deep, painful void, a dry socket that I could only distract by day, but which kept me awake at night. It was then, in my exiled loneliness, that Miss Fatima Hussein's words came to my rescue:

"When you are sad, if you cannot find words that assuage your loss, you may not be able to get over your grief. Be creative in expressing your emotions and make use of literature; it is the balsam of broken hearts."

That was when I began writing poetry about my fatherland's 1975 deadly autumn and my brother's blue face. The verses scrolled out of me, one or two stanzas at a time, but I had no need to write them down. Once they had descended upon my mind, they became indelible and I could retrieve them at will, especially when I felt overcome by grief. The first two stanzas of Fatherland descended upon me after midnight on New Year's Eve, when the rest of the world was in frenzy:

I watch the trees undress in autumn sun
 Reveal their private branches, one by one
 Unmindful of my gaze, no blush no cry
 Embrace the humming wind and mark the sky.
 These clouds of misty perfume and the breeze
 Bring back your face amidst the naked trees
 And tipsy violins and all the sins
 Of gushing youth, and ah—the memories.

In July of 1976, six months after my brother's death, our Christian hometown, Amioun, was invaded and ransacked by upper-mountain Christian forces. The invaders were Catholic Christians while the invaded were Greek Orthodox Christians. Amioun's evicted inhabitants took refuge in Tripoli, an overwhelmingly Muslim city, where they were well received and given shelter and food until they were allowed to return to their homes six months later. During that dark half-year, I felt like a quadruple orphan who had lost his brother, his hometown, his country, and his history. I received word that my extended family with all my aunts, uncles, and cousins were living with my mother and father at our large Tripoli house. Following Miss Fatima Hussein's advice, I held on to my sanity by writing poetry. The biblical injunction, "With sorrow thou shalt bring forth a child," came to mind as I realized that birth was the antidote of death, creation, the antidote of destruction, and both antidotes were within my power, thanks to Miss Fatima Hussein. That's when the third and fourth stanzas of Fatherland were born:

Where mighty, melancholy mountains peak
 And olive branches meditate and speak
 Unto the earth, who is so old and noble
 And the vine invites the birds to gossip on her cheek.
 Fatherland, oh, fatherland
 If only I could hold your hand and stand upon your shore
 Behold your hoary mountains dive into the sea and snore

With mystifying grace

Implore the endless waves to wash your ancient face.

The Visit

In 1978, during a lull in the war, I flew back to Beirut. To get to Tripoli, I had to drive across two mountain ranges because the seashore road was blocked by warring militias. An otherwise easy, 90-minute drive turned into an arduous, eight-hour journey. Arriving before dark, I was surprised to find my extended family still living with us. After tear-laced kisses and whimpering embraces, I sat down and listened to all their tales. All their homes were demolished during the invasion, stripped to the bone, and rendered uninhabitable. All the able men had gone to the oil countries to work and were sending money to support their homeless families. The homes would take years to rebuild.

The next morning, I asked my father to drive me to Amioun to visit my brother's grave. The town was hard to recognize with all the disfiguring rubble scaring its beautiful face. Places where I had grown up and played were no longer discernable, their original images preserved only in my memory. Painfully, I became aware that my mind was being transformed into an archive of old photographs of places that had molted out of recognition. The home of my grandfather, the town's priest, was being used as a trash dump, and its stone arches, like fossils, lay buried in the dirt. Around it, the few natives who were able to return to the village walked about with lowered gazes and stooped backs. I waved hello to some, and they waved back, but without recognizing me. I had been gone too long and too much had happened during my absence.

The cemetery lay atop a rocky cliff overlooking the vast olive plain beneath, connected to the main road by a long, narrow bridge. The iron-gate squeaked as we slipped in and began our amble across the long, narrow link between life and death, and between present and past. My father limped from back injuries sustained while a political prisoner ten years earlier. I walked beside him in the thin air that

wafted from the graves, smelling of morning rain. At the family's gravesite, there was a tattered wreath over a gravestone engraved with his name, Nadir (1947-1975).

The rain-drenched silence groaned under the heft of memories as we stood there and stared. My heart clawed incessantly at my chest, scuttled across the flesh within, and caused a hemorrhage of tears to explode out of my charged sockets. My sobbing convulsions alarmed my father who steadied my shoulders and watched me discharge my three-year-old debt of grief with a flood of held-back tears. My tears and I became the suspending bridge between present and past, between life and death, and between red and black memories whose colors were faded by the acid rains.

"Enough, Son. Let's go back home. Your mother will start worrying if we stay any longer."

"No," came my gasping reply. "I have three years of tears that I need to shed before I leave. I don't want to carry them back with me to America."

Silence was our conversation on the way back from the grave. My eyes had dried up by then but my father's were still shimmering with recall. I remembered the last line in my mother's letter, which arrived to America two months after Nadir's death:

"Everything has been taken away from us; the only thing we have left is poetry."

The fifth stanza of my unfinished poem scrolled out of my mind as I watched the sun blush at the Mediterranean Sea and the rising moon smile from behind the Cedar Mountains:

Fatherland, before I gray, I will be back

I will be back one misty autumn day

To hug your loving dirt against my chest

And plant a garden on your ruddy breast

Loiter together in the timid afternoon

Until the sun begins to blush before the moon.

(to be continued)



ZANDOUQA: A GREEN SPOT BEING RAVAGED BY QUARRIES

Zandouqa, a Lebanese village in the Baabda district

Origin of the Name

In his book *Names of Lebanese Cities and Villages and Their Meanings* (1956), Anis Freiha states that “Zandouqa” in Aramaic is a borrowed term from Persian, resembling in sound and structure the name of the village, and meaning “prison guard.” Alternatively, if the name is of purely Semitic origin, it may derive from “zen” (meaning “path”) and “dawqa” (meaning “watcher” or “caretaker”). The first part may also be a distortion of “wazen,” which means “hill” or “elevated area,” giving “Zandouqa” the meaning of “Hill of the Watchman.”

Location

The village of Zandouqa is located in the Baabda district, 20 km from the capital Beirut, at an elevation of 500 meters above sea level. It spans a small area of 100 hectares and can be reached via the Mansourieh-Monteverde road.

Population and Housing

The registered population of the village is estimated at around 300 residents, living in 55 homes. The inhabitants belong to the Maronite community.

Voters

In the year 2000, there were 153 registered voters, of whom 84 cast their votes.

By 2009, the number of registered voters had increased to 186, with 133 participating in the elections.


In 2022, the number reached 196 registered voters, with 113 casting their votes.

The voters are distributed among the following families:

- Al-Asmar: 121 voters
- Rizkallah: 42 voters
- Zidan: 33 voters

Local Authorities

Initially, local governance was limited to a Mukhtar (local head) and an elective council comprising three members. However, in late 2016, a municipal council of nine members was established under Decision No. 2274/2016.



Village Issues

Zandouqa enjoys significant green cover due to its small population and limited housing. However, in recent years, the village has witnessed the establishment of several quarries and gravel pits, which have begun to mar the village’s landscape and threaten its green character.

THE MAKHLOUTAS

A MAJORITY GREEK FAMILY ORTHODOX FROM KOURA

Overview

The Makhloutas are among the smaller Lebanese families in terms of population and geographical spread. The majority of the family members belong to the Greek Orthodox denomination and live in the Koura region.

Origin of the Name

The word “Makhlouta” refers to the mixing or blending of different items or materials. It is said that some members of these families used to work in mixing food ingredients and preparing blended meals. Another theory suggests that the name originates from the “Makhlouti” families, which are of Moroccan descent.

Population

There are around 450 members of the Makhlouta Family, the majority of whom are of the Greek Orthodox faith and a minority are Sunni Muslims. The family is distributed across the following areas:

- Amioun (Koura): 315 individuals
- Ashrafieh (Beirut): 60 individuals
- Bshamzin (Koura): 42 individuals
- Jdeideh (Metn North): 18 individuals
- Ghobeiry (Baabda), who are Sunni Muslims: 8 individuals.

SECRET DOCUMENTS OF THE FRENCH OCCUPATION

Delimiting the Southern Borders and the Development of the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1895-1925


Recently published by Kutub Publishing House is the first volume of “*Secret Documents of the French Occupation: Delimiting the Southern Borders and the Development of the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1895-1925*” by Badr El Hage.

The book comprises 430 medium-sized pages, presenting selected French diplomatic documents in chronological order. These documents provide a detailed and precise depiction of Zionist efforts to settle in Syria, particularly in the border areas between Palestine, Syria, and Greater Lebanon. The book also covers negotiations over border demarcations, the Newcombe-Paulet Agreement, and the acquisition of the Hula region.

Zionist attempts were not limited to seizing border areas; there were ambitious efforts to settle in various regions such as Palmyra, the Euphrates, Iraq, the Amik Valley in Iskenderun, and the Bekaa Valley.

The French security apparatuses deployed throughout the French-occupied areas served as key sources of information sent to the High Commissioners in Syria, who then relayed them to the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office in Paris. These reports shaped policies and plans aimed at maintaining long-term control over Syria.

Readers can easily draw connections between today’s events and the schemes planned for this region of the world more than a century ago.



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Al-Borj Building, 4th Floor Martyr’s Square, Commercial Center

Beirut - Lebanon, P.O.BOX: 11-4353 Beirut, Lebanon

Tel: (961-1) 983008/9 Fax: (961-1) 980630

Web: www.kutubltd.com

E-mail: sales@kutubltd.com